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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the meaning of care in our societies. Everyone will be concerned with care in 
some way at some point in his/her life. In the UK and Austria economic and social developments 
challenge traditional family arrangements while the need for care for the elderly is increasing. But 
how do we understand care and which meaning does care have for us, for our relationships, for our 
identities and for our understanding of society? How do we want to live together, and how do we 
want to experience the process of ageing? Understanding the construction of care helps to 
understand aspects of people’s ideals, motives, attitudes, imaginations, aspirations and desires in life.  
 
This study bridges the theoretical level of broad moral questions and their application in particular 
situations. Utilising Critical Discourse Analysis in combination with a sample of newspapers and the 
organisation of focus groups in each country enable an identification of the ‘moral grammar’ of care, 
i.e. the discourses in which care is constructed. The result is an everyday morality, referring to the way 
people understand and make sense of their experiences, histories and emotions about care for elderly 
people. 
 
This moral construction situates care in opposition to an economisation and/or individualisation of 
society. Care reflects an ambivalent desire of people which can be described as being there for each 
other. By exploring themes such as relationships, home, community, independence and the 
commodification of care this thesis demonstrates that, on the one hand, moral assumptions and 
ideals are underlying the organisation of care and, on the other hand, care itself represents an ideal of 
being moral. This construction has important consequences for all those involved in caring 
relationships (as carers and as those being cared for) and any policy making needs to be conscious of 
it. 
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1 Introduction 
Why do we treat our grandparents so badly? (Daily Mail, 05/08/06) 
 
The majority are afraid to become a nursing case (Kronen Zeitung, 17/08/06) 
 
My grandmother needs care. Many people are in a situation in which they 
themselves, or someone close to them, are in need for care. In my family this care is 
organised by my grandmother’s children and carried out by both family members 
and paid and unpaid help from outside the family (in various forms). These care 
arrangements have changed many times since I have started this research and every 
time discussions are going on and decisions have to be made. These decisions 
concern practical questions of organisation, health related issues, financial aspects 
and questions of spatial adjustments in her house. Underlying all of these decisions 
are emotional questions of how we want to live and how we want to be there for 
each other. What is the right thing to do in this situation? But also, what defines a 
good life? Who decides about these questions and why do we think about it the one 
way or the other?  
 
In contemporary Western societies, care is a highly debated issue in academia, 
politics and everyday discourses. The two quotes at the beginning of this 
introduction illustrate the significance of deeply rooted associations with care. 
Responsibility for elderly family members or elderly members of the community or 
society is a defining feature of how contemporary societies understand processes of 
ageing, family, social cohesion and mutual duties and responsibilities. Care needs are 
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seen as an inherently negative aspect of a particular period in someone’s life course. 
The way we think about being old and being in need of care is characterised by 
anxiety to become dependent and to having to rely on someone else’s commitment. 
At the same time some authors claim we live in a de-traditionalised society (Giddens 
1998, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001) in which old traditions, structures and 
authorities made way for new moral questions and answers.  
 
This thesis is investigating the meaning of care in our societies. Everyone will be 
concerned with care in some way at some point in his/her life. In the UK and Austria, 
as in many other countries, economic and social developments challenge traditional 
family arrangements while the need for care for the elderly is, mainly due to 
demographic reasons, increasing. However, even though the familial situations are 
shifting, care needs for elderly people or people with disabilities are to a large extent 
still met in informal settings, usually within the family.1 This is a situation which, 
according to Williams (2004:40), shows that relationships have changed but people’s 
sense of commitment has not (for a similar observation see Fine 2005). In order to 
sustain this historically developed system of care provision, Österle and Hammer 
(2004:103) identify the question of how to keep and raise the willingness of relatives 
and others to take over and carry out care-services as one of the most significant 
issues for the design of modern societies. However, care must not be reduced to 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘informal care’ is to some extent problematic as it might suggest that informal care is less 
work than ‘formal care’. However, the term summarises for me that this care is characterised by 
informal arrangements, relationships and bonds. In other words, it describes an imagination of care 
which is usually, but not always, associated with care by the family, partners or friends. In the text I 
will try to avoid using the term ‘informal’ as much as possible.  
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being an answer to care needs; rather it is a fundamental part of all human 
existence. Judith Phillips (2007:1) in her book Care states that 
Care is fundamental to our individual identity as this is played out in our social 
interactions and relationships. (...) It is fundamental to who we are and how we 
are viewed in both public and private spheres of life. (...) In many ways it is a 
nebulous and ambiguous concept and a part of everyday life which is taken for 
granted. 
 
Care is a feeling, an identity, a commodity and a way of thinking (Phillips 2007). In 
this thesis I explore the moral, ideological and social construction of care. How do we 
understand care? What does care mean for us, for our relationships, for our 
identities and for our understanding of society? How do we want to live together, 
and how do we want to experience the process of ageing? How is care positioned in 
the context of the current societal, economic and political order? By investigating the 
moral constitution of care I will explore the underlying mechanisms which reproduce 
the meaning of care. To understand the construction of care helps to understand 
aspects of people’s ideals, motives, attitudes, imaginations, aspirations and desires in 
life. Exploring people’s understanding of care also challenges simplified ideas about 
the de-traditionalised modern society. The thesis title Caring as a moral practice 
emphasises the moral associations and assumptions which underlie any caring 
practices. At the same time it refers to the fact that the idea of care goes beyond the 
actual practices; care represents a certain moral ideal for society, for a morality of 
living together.   
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This study started (with an MA dissertation) as an investigation of carers’ identities 
with respect to the Austrian care system (Weicht 2006). However, after the 
completion of the dissertation and further research it became obvious that 
important issues had not been discussed sufficiently and I noticed that a new 
approach and a new direction for my research were necessary. I started out with the 
motivation to identify the discursive processes which lead to a possible exploitation 
of carers in informal settings. During the investigation, however, my approach – and 
my attitude - towards these issues altered. On the one hand, the empirical research 
allowed me to hear many different stories and experiences about care for elderly 
people, and on the other hand, care cases in my own family (such as my 
grandmother’s) triggered a re-consideration of my focus on informal carers as victims 
of exploitation. At this point I want to specify that care in my project refers to care 
for the elderly or people with special needs and care for children is not included due 
to two considerations: Firstly, contrary to child care, where the decision to have 
children can be made consciously, the need for care for the elderly often arises 
relatively independently from people’s own plans and expectations. The situations in 
which a family member requires certain forms of care can appear suddenly and are 
not linked to family members’ decisions and choices. Secondly, the actual care for 
the elderly is in principle not bound to an informal context or to specific individuals 
and the setting can hence be chosen more freely. As a result, in the context of care 
for elderly people there is more space for negotiations and considerations about how 
care should be organised, how the person in need of care wants to live and who has 
which responsibilities in this context.  
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1.1 Caring as a moral practice  
The literature on care ranges across various disciplines and theoretical and 
methodological approaches. Phillips (2007) presents the recent discussion in the 
literature on care, much of which will feature in the successive sections of this thesis. 
Her contribution demonstrates the broad meaning of care as a commodity, a social 
practice, an emotion, a political issue and a historical narrative.  
 
Fine and Glendinning (2005) identify five different streams in academic care 
discourses which are often characterised by certain traditional dichotomies. These 
dichotomies, such as care/work (Ungerson 2005; McKie et al. 2001), formal/informal 
and public/private (Fine 2005) or state/society (Daly 2002) are extremely important 
for an understanding of care, even though they are more and more being challenged. 
In this research I will thus explore the significance and the meaning of the 
dichotomies. Taking a similar approach, Watson et al. (2004) demonstrate the 
existence of certain care paradigms to which both those in caring relations and 
academic investigators refer to. But which role do ethical considerations play in the 
context of care? Within the literature on care, the importance of morality for the 
understanding of the concept of care and the motivations for people for taking up 
care is recognised. Much of the work deals exclusively with individuals’ perceptions; 
several psychological studies (Mintz and Mahalik 1996; Skoe 1995; Karniol et al. 
2003) for example demonstrate the relevance of the relation between care work and 
the ethical or moral orientation of individuals. 
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In my approach, however, I want to draw attention to the social and cultural factors 
related to care within society. Not the psychological orientation of individuals but the 
societal arrangement of a moral framework is the focus point of this thesis. 
Supporting my claim, Hughes et al. (2005) for example emphasise care’s meaning as 
both an activity and a culture in order to explain the feminised status and the 
subordination of carers. A similar argument is presented by Winch (2006:6) who 
states that carers are ‘produced by an interplay of political structures and ethical 
attitudes and practices’ which is based on a carer discourse and a ‘morality of caring’ 
(Winch 2006:7). Also Paoletti (2001, 2002) takes up a discursive approach and places 
care ‘as part of the social and moral order’ (2002:815), which is produced and 
reproduced through ordinary talk. She furthermore argues that the vulnerable 
situation of carers needs to be explained by the moral context and its gendered 
nature. These sources suggest that moral and ethical considerations influence the 
social and cultural meaning of being a carer and create to some extent a carer 
identity. Care in itself and the actual experience of care work have an important 
meaning for those involved in the processes, in shaping people’s identities and the 
nature of relating (see Twigg 2000a, 2000b; 1997a; 1997b). The effects of the care-
relationship on identity creation, in particular for the elderly, are also analysed by 
Quereshi and Walker (1989). Hockey and James (2003) look at the life course’s 
impact on identity which is inevitably related to care and they convincingly show 
care’s meaning as a constitutive social practice.2 The other side of the relation 
between identity creation and caring is explored by Lloyd (2006) who focuses on 
                                                 
2
 For a discussion of the construction of social identity see also Jenkins (1996); Hunter (2003).  
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collective organisations of carers (in particular Carers UK) and who warns of an 
oversimplification of group identities. Fisher (1994) offers an interesting discussion of 
possible contradictions with respect to male carers’ identities, similarly to Christie 
(2006) who investigates the tensions arising from traditional gender identities of 
professional carers. An impressive understanding of carers’ motivations and 
situations in relation to gender is offered by Ungerson’s (1987) influential analysis of 
qualitative interviews with informal carers in which she describes the process of 
‘becoming a carer’ and the negotiation of this role. She identifies differences in the 
self-understanding of care between men and women and notices gendered 
differentiations between the notions of duty and love as the reasons for someone 
becoming a carer. The self-understandings, motivations, attitudes and ideas, 
Ungerson is describing, constitute the discursively constructed moral framework. My 
aim is to demonstrate and analyse this construction in public discourse.  
 
Ungerson elsewhere (2000) speaks of an ideology of ‘natural’ traits, practices and 
identities of women which ‘bear such a close resemblance to the practices based on 
the experiences of mothering and hence are construed as ‘natural’ aptitudes of 
women’ (2000:636). Similarly, Guberman et al. (1992) identify ‘feelings of closeness 
and interconnectedness with family, gender-role conditioning, and life situation’ as 
determining the (gendered) caring role. In this context paid and unpaid care are 
designed to be based on the specific construction of care ‘as a hybrid of love and 
instrumentality’ (Ungerson 2000:627). In these accounts ideologies, ideas and 
attitudes about care play a role which all speak about a moral framework in which 
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carers and cared-for find themselves. The role and position of a carer is constructed 
as a moral one. Naturalistic assumptions about both the carer and the cared-for (see 
Watson et al. 2004) characterise the traditional accounts. I agree with the 
importance of these moral attitudes but I think in order to fully understand the 
situation of carers and cared-for, and the realm in which care is to operate, it is 
necessary to study the very construction of this moral grammar3 in itself. The ethics 
of care approach (section 2.2) takes up the idea of ideological gender-linked 
categories (Fraser 1989) in the sense that some social practices (e.g. caring) are 
associated with women and some social practices (e.g. politics) are associated with 
men. In this study I will discuss this dichotomy and the significance and 
consequences of the construction of these gender-linked associations. In that sense 
not only women experience the ‘feminised’ status of being constructed as natural 
carers. All groups of people who care face similar effects on their identity. Through 
categories and dichotomies all participants in care relationships are constructed as 
‘other to the masculine subject of modernity’ (Hughes et al. 2005:265). This 
construction takes place in discourse and can be analysed by investigating the very 
discourse.  
 
In the next chapter (chapter 2) I will describe my understanding of discourse as being 
loosely based on Foucault’s (1972) conception. Heaton (1999) also uses the 
Foucauldian concept of the ‘inner gaze’ to analyse the discourse on informal care. 
She identifies several shifts in the political discourse and the construction of carers. 
                                                 
3
 The term ‘moral grammar’ is used by Fraser (2003a, b) in relation to the discursive creation of 
morality. I will explore this concept further in chapter 2.  
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These have led to a construction of a certain carer identity. Heaton is right to state 
that ‘*t+he effects of the discourse of informal care (…) are real’ (1999:774), meaning 
that these discursive constructions have very particular consequences for all people 
involved. I want to emphasise an important difference in my approach, however: 
Heaton’s focus on the realm of laws and politics assumes a top down mechanism 
through which political decisions are internalised by the public. I want to provide 
more space in the analysis for the production and reproduction of discourses 
through other means, such as the media and day-to-day conversations. How people 
speak, think, argue about care, the ways they imagine and idealise care, these are 
important expressions of the moral construction of care.  
1.2 This research  
Morality and ethics play an important role in the context of care in two ways: Firstly, 
the moral construction of care underlies the practices of care for all those involved in 
caring relationships. Secondly, care represents a moral ideal in society; it is seen as 
an idealised form of people relating with each other. Care for elderly people is by its 
nature an ethical question and practice. The literature has recognised the 
importance of the moral mindset of those caring and authors of the ethics of care 
approach (e.g. Sevenhuijsen 1998, Groenhout 2004, Held 1990, Bubeck 1995, Tronto 
1993) put care in the centre of a construction of a new morality.  
 
In this study I attempt to bridge the theoretical level of broad moral questions and 
their application in particular situations. What I am sketching and analysing could be 
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called an everyday morality, which describes how people understand and make 
sense of their experiences, histories and emotions about care for elderly people. The 
main aim of this research is to understand and explain the moral construction of 
care. This relates to several interrelated research questions:  
 
 What meaning does care have in and for society? 
This research seeks to highlight the moral and ideological underpinnings of 
the process of caring. What are people’s associations with care? Which 
desires, wishes and hopes are related to the social practice of care and its 
imagination? Which discourses do people refer to in order to organise care 
for elderly people? What are the possibilities for contestability of these 
discourses and the moral construction with respect to care? How are carers 
constructed in the public realm and which consequences does this 
construction have for people’s personal care arrangements? To what extent 
are carers vulnerable to exploitation and which role does their identity play? 
How can it be explained that those who care are continuously valued very 
highly while at the same time, care is politically and economically only an 
issue of marginal concern? Is care seen as an issue of public concern or, 
alternatively, as an issue of private responsibility? To what extent is the moral 
construction of care related to possibilities of marketisation, commodification 
and/or professionalisation of care? 
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 What is the ‘proper’ thing to do? 
Hochschild (2003a:214) describes care as 
‘an emotional bond, usually mutual, between the caregiver and the cared-for, a 
bond in which the caregiver feels responsible for others’ well-being and does mental, 
emotional, and physical work in the course of fulfilling that responsibility’. 
 
Individuals are confronted with very personal immediate demands in their 
lives. Care needs do not only require the fulfilment of certain tasks but they 
trigger an answer in an emotional, intimate way. Care as ‘being there for each 
other’ does not fit into a concept of clearly defined rights and responsibilities. 
How are responsibilities, duties and commitments constructed in both family 
contexts and the broader societal framework? How do carers and non-carers 
experience and reflect the social discourse on care(rs)? Care describes a state 
of mind, a willingness and acceptance of ‘being there for each other’. This 
thesis thus also positions care as a concept describing people’s needs and 
desires for how they want to live a good life.  
 
 How is care positioned within a neoliberal construction of modern society? 
It will be explored to what extent the concept of care is seen as being 
contradictory to an economisation of society. How is ideal care described, 
imagined and constructed? I will also implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) 
challenge popular conceptions of late modernity by authors such as Giddens 
and Beck. The investigation of the moral conception of care in two European 
societies demonstrates the importance of ‘traditional’ ideals such as family, 
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home and community. Modern societal trends such as liberalisation, 
individualisation (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001) or de-institutionalisation 
(Österle and Hammer 2004) play an important role in this thesis. Giddens in 
his conception of the ‘Third Way’ (1998:36) for social democracy argues that 
the ‘new individualism (...) is associated with the retreat of tradition and 
custom from our lives, a phenomenon involved with the impact of 
globalization widely conceived rather than just the influence of markets’. He 
argues that we live in an age of ‘moral transition’ (Giddens 1998:3) in which 
mutual obligation and individual responsibility become more important 
features. Drawing on several positions (e.g. Smart 2007, Fraser 2003a, 2003b) 
which are critical of the idea of individualisation I will investigate how care is 
positioned in relation to traditional conceptions of moral living and the 
developments and demands in modern society.  
 
 To what extent is the ideal of care related to an idea of the good life?  
The significance of the moral construction of care is not restricted to the 
particular practices of care; it also includes a focus on the moral construction 
of the self. How do we want to live? How do we want to live with each other 
and be there for each other, in particular when we are old? To what extent is 
a concept of the ‘good society’ or the ‘ideal living’ arrangement sketched in 
the construction of care? 
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The way care is constructed has very real, immediate consequences for all those 
involved in the process. Firstly, people who care face substantial ideological and 
material disadvantages which entail a possible vulnerability to exploitation and 
domination (see Kittay 1999, Bubeck 2002). Secondly, the actual care work is not 
distributed equally over all members of society; in fact particular groups carry the 
main burden. Women, elderly people, volunteers or care workers are segments in 
society who are, because of their particular relation to care, in an economically 
marginalised position. The experiences of everyone involved in care feed into and are 
fed by societal discourses on ageing, disabilities and care. At the same time, care is a 
representation or manifestation of people’s moral desires and ideals. Care for elderly 
people is therefore at a crucial position through which I hope to identify broader 
moral ideals, desires and opinions. I agree with Fine (2005:249) and follow his 
suggestion that ‘*s+ociological interest in care must manifest an interest in the larger 
processes of social change and their effects at the level of personal experience’. The 
moral construction of care, however, also plays a crucial role in constituting the real 
experiences of care for elderly people. In both the UK and Austria public and political 
discourses have emphasised the existence of ‘care emergencies’, arguing that the 
society is in a challenging situation in which care needs of elderly people cannot be 
met sufficiently (often as a prediction for the future). These ‘emergencies’ are 
constructed as direct, logical consequences from an ageing society and changing 
family structures. I want to demonstrate in this study that these discourses (and their 
conjoining political decisions) are based on a specific moral construction of care. 
Because care represents certain moral ideals and desires, alternative political, 
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societal, economic and cultural solutions to deal with care needs often appear 
inferior. Any political intervention needs to start with what care really is and how 
people think about and understand care.  
1.3 Structure  
The moral construction of care is constituted and shaped in political, public and 
private day-to-day discourses. Discourse, thus, needs to be understood, on the one 
hand, as the realm in which care is constituted and, on the other hand, as a tool to 
investigate and analyse the construction of care. In Chapter 2 I will lay out the 
theoretical framework of this thesis. I will present a concept of the everyday morality 
which is based on an alternative ethics of care approach. Furthermore I will discuss 
how the discourses are related to care and how dispositions and identities are 
constructed. Recognising the various meanings and uses of the notion of discourse I 
will describe and discuss my understanding of the very concept. This will also set the 
scene for chapter 3 in which I will present the methodological framework of the 
study. If the moral construction of care is shaped in discourses, how can these 
discourses be analysed? I will take the reader through the framework starting with 
the rationale and the considerations for the use of discourse analysis, followed by 
the operationalisation of the methodological framework. I will argue that the 
utilisation of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with a combination of national 
newspapers and focus group discussions enables an identification of narratives and 
ideals of care and helps to explain how these are constituted in the public and 
private realm.  
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In the chapters 4-8 I will analyse the specific themes of the discourses in order to 
answer the questions posed for this research. The structure represents a 
thematically organised discussion of what care means in society and it follows the 
main themes emerging out of the discursive accounts. In particular chapters 4-6 
follow the main questions associated with care. Who is caring for whom, where does 
this care happen and how is care organised and carried out?  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the construction of care relationships and their significance for 
the understanding of care. I will present materials to describe how relationships in 
the context of care are strongly defined by values and virtues associated with family 
care provision. Even though it is obvious that there are also other actors involved in 
the provision of care the family still remains the main association. This happens 
through an emphasis of values and virtues linked to the family so that family care 
always becomes the point of comparison. People seem to be confronted with two 
opposing cultural discourses: Firstly, families are seen to be the ideal care framework 
and secondly, care within the family is due to economic and social developments not 
possible anymore. I argue that the construction of family is a representation of an 
imagined ideal which can also be embodied by non-family members. People’s homes 
bear a particularly important meaning in this context as the nexus of intimate 
relationships. In chapter 5 I will discuss the geographies of care in more detail. I will 
focus on the utopia of the home and its opposite, the institutional setting. The 
dichotomy between loving, affectionate caring, and professionalised, 
institutionalised work will be situated in people’s understanding of space and place 
  
21 
of caring. Why does their own home bear such an importance for people’s care 
wishes? What is the relationship between the concepts of care and home?  
 
In chapter 6 I discuss the discursive theme ‘community’. Community can be 
understood as an ideological extension of family, while the neighbourhood in which 
community happens is idealised as an extension of the home. People refer to an 
ideal of community and they emphasise the importance of a functioning community 
for the delivery of ideal care. In this chapter I will also raise aspects of nostalgia and 
imagination of ideal caring situations. How do people idealise other times and places 
in order to construct the ideal caring situation? Which role does nostalgia play for an 
understanding of care? Combined with the safe space of the home and the 
framework of the family, community is constructed as a counterforce to what is 
perceived as hostile, individualising and pressurising economic, political and social 
developments.  
 
Having focused on the questions of who, where and how, chapters 7 and 8 will 
discuss themes that are underlying all of the above. Chapter 7 turns to the situation 
of those being cared for. People express anxieties of dependency and vulnerability 
when they imagine old age. In particular I will discuss the construction of a 
dichotomy of the independent, ideal actor on the one hand, and the dependent, 
vulnerable, elderly care receiver on the other hand. In this chapter I also evaluate the 
consequences of this dichotomy not only for care but for social structures in general. 
Desiring and imagining the ideal of independent living for as long as possible 
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sketches an ideology that contradicts many values of care. I will highlight the 
tensions arising from a discourse which, on the one hand, emphasises close, intimate 
care, and on the other hand, idealises independence and independent living.  
 
Before concluding this thesis, chapter 8 takes up the theme of the dichotomies 
mentioned before and discusses the discursive positioning of care in opposition to 
markets. In the other chapters I identify the construction of dichotomies through 
which care is ideologically and morally positioned in opposition to work, 
employment, politics, bureaucracy and markets. This is based on a strong aversion 
against institutionalisation, marketisation and professionalisation of care. In chapter 
8 I will combine these themes by presenting what ideal care means and in particular 
by sketching the opposite, the creation of a form of care which is undesirable and 
rejected. This also requires a rethinking of carers’ identities. I argue that care is not 
primarily understood as the fulfilment of a set of divided tasks; rather it is a complex 
relationship between the person in need of care, the carer and the environment. The 
carer is referred to not as someone providing certain services, but rather as being the 
carer. Creating the ideal of the ‘pricelessness’ of care, the carer is constructed as 
offering a gift to the elderly but also to society in general. 
 
Two countries (the UK and Austria) serve as cases for the empirical investigation, 
enabling a qualitative strategy in an ethnographic tradition as it is meanings, norms, 
values, and identities which are under investigation and which are the target of the 
analysis. Both countries are characterised by being part of a European historical 
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development with its moral and philosophical foundation influenced by a Judeo-
Christian-Muslim ethical tradition. Furthermore both countries are operating with a, 
to some extent, Social-Democratically shaped capitalistic economy. The UK and 
Austria as the exemplifying institutional backgrounds do therefore reflect cases with 
similar societal structures, which allows it to treat the discursive practices as being 
based in a similar context. These countries, however, do also reflect traditional 
differences with respect to (welfare) state regimes within the borders sketched 
above (see Daly and Lewis 2000 for an analysis with particular emphasis of gender 
aspects; Abrahamson 1999). Whereas the institutional organisation of care is 
different in the two countries, informal care is extremely important in both (see also 
Österle 2001).  
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2 Theoretical conception 
2.1 Introduction  
This research focuses on care as a moral practice and a moral symbol in society. In 
this chapter I want to lay out the theoretical conceptions and understandings 
through which the research questions will be addressed. The empirical and analytical 
parts of this thesis will sketch a moral framework operating in society which feeds 
itself from ideas and ideologies present in the very society. This morality could be 
termed an everyday morality. People have certain ideas and associations about what 
is right or wrong in a particular situation. They do ‘feel’ or ‘know’ what the right way 
to act is. This does not mean that everyone in society has the same moral ideals; 
rather a general moral language and understanding, with which these questions are 
worked out is there to draw on. In order to develop a framework which makes it 
possible to grasp the meaning of care some prior questions need to be answered. 
The answers to these questions provide an understanding of how the everyday 
morality in the context of care is operating, and how it can be analysed. 
Understanding what moral acting generally means and understanding how morality 
in society is shaped and formed enables an analysis of care as a moral practice.  
 
- What is a moral practice? 
- What does it mean to be an ethical agent and what is an ethical agent’s 
disposition/identity? 
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- What is the relationship between ethics and the particular social, cultural, 
economic and historical circumstances? 
- How are the ethical dispositions of agents and moral expectations, ideas and 
the everyday morality formed? 
 
What is a moral practice? Care as a moral practice has been explicitly established by 
authors of the ethics of care approach. This approach will form the main theoretical 
position for my analysis. In section 2.2 I will sketch the parameters of this position 
and its meaning for the understanding of both care and morality. Relations between 
people and interdependency are seen as the basis of an ethical framework and caring 
is seen as the quintessential expression of these ethics.  
 
However, the ethics of care approach presupposes ethical agents (which in most 
accounts are gendered agents) with certain dispositions and identities without laying 
out how these dispositions are formed. Thus it will be asked what makes an agent an 
ethical agent. I will use the approach of Virtue Ethics (section 2.3) to foster an 
understanding of the significance of people’s characteristics for the creation of 
ethical agents.  
 
One criticism of the ethics of care approach discusses the latter’s focus on the 
particular (see Fitzpatrick 2005). Particular agents and particular relationships (often 
primary relationships) are the main aspects of this conception. Hence to remedy this 
particularistic emphasis I will discuss Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of responsibility for 
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the other in section 2.4 to allow the focus of this investigation to be extended. This 
will enable a conceptualisation of care as a universal moral practice, a concept also 
emerging from discursive accounts discussed later. Bauman’s position allows an 
understanding of agents as embodying universal responsibility for the other.  
 
The altered ‘new’ ethics of care approach which includes and recognises the 
aforementioned everyday morality, however, does take place in very specific 
cultural, social, political, economic and historical circumstances. In order to 
understand the (moral) meaning of care the material context needs to be 
acknowledged and recognised as being significant for the public discursive 
construction of care. In section 2.5 I will first discuss Honneth’s conception of 
recognition and the moral consensus and I will then present Nancy Fraser’s attempt 
to reconcile recognition and redistribution as a fruitful possibility to sketch an ethics 
of care which recognises the materialist consequences, demands and circumstances 
of care in society.  
 
What will be presented is an ethics of care approach which goes beyond the 
particular, often expressed through family relations, which is usually associated with 
care. Care, though, has an important moral meaning for society in general. Agents in 
this conception are not only expected to be doing the right thing, they are regarded 
as being moral. This concept of ethics takes place in specific social and cultural 
contexts, is influenced by those contexts and is at the same time influencing them. 
Finally, all these positions refer to a notion of agents, values, categories, virtues and 
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ideals and to a construction of these aspects. In section 2.6 I will analyse the realm in 
which the categories are formed and shaped. I will look at the field of discourse and 
how it fosters the formation of care as a moral practice. At the same time discourse 
is used to analyse and to understand these processes and to provide the basis for the 
methodological framework presented in chapter 3.  
 
Moral theories are very complex and extensive in their scope. I will not present a 
textbook analysis of the various perspectives (see for example Rachels and Rachels 
2009; Fitzpatrick 2008); I rather want to identify and highlight aspects relevant for 
this research and for the thinking about the issue of care for elderly people. In order 
to move through the moral conceptualisations and the abstract concept of discourse 
I will refer back to one specific, easily imaginable example: An elderly woman is 
progressively in more need of care on a daily basis. She lives at home with her 
partner and has several children living in more or less geographical proximity. I will 
use this image to illustrate how I understand particular moral theories and concepts 
of discourse and how these are used in this thesis.  
2.2 Ethics of Care 
The example of the situation of care needs firstly triggers a focus on the relationships 
within this family setting. People with a shared family history also share a history of 
mutual dependencies with each other. The ethics of care approach rejects a 
construction of human beings as (masculinised) independent actors but takes human 
relations as its starting point. The theoretical discussion of the ethics of care draws in 
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general on Gilligan’s (1982, 1993) work on ‘the different voice’ in which she 
identified two different (gendered) ways of speaking about moral problems which 
inevitably includes two different modes of describing the relationship between other 
and self. However, it must be held that the different voice she describes is 
‘characterized not by gender but theme’ (Gilligan 1982:2) and that her association 
with women is built upon empirical observation. In her psychological study Gilligan 
uses Chodorow’s observation that gender differences in terms of morality are largely 
a result of the fact that it is rather women who are responsible for child care (Gilligan 
1982:7). As girls develop through an attachment to the mother and boys through a 
separation from the mother the latter rather show a more emphatic individuation 
than the former and in general differences in relation and connection to other 
people occur. Gilligan then follows that separate gendered identities arise and that 
intimacy and relationships are categories rather bound to the female than to the 
masculine identity. As a consequence girls and women judge themselves in terms of 
their ability to care (Gilligan 1982) and they rather listen and try to understand the 
standpoint of other voices than their own. With respect to morality Gilligan follows: 
‘Thus it becomes clear why a morality of rights and noninterference may appear 
frightening to women in its potential justification of indifference and unconcern. 
At the same time, it becomes clear why, from a male perspective, a morality of 
responsibility appears inconclusive and diffuse, given its insistent contextual 
relativism’ (Gilligan 1982:22). 
 
Many authors have further developed variations of an ethics of care. Tronto (1993) 
argues for a questioning of the moral (gendered) dichotomy, which Gilligan identifies 
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but leaves intact. Tronto’s (1993) conception of the ethics of care is built on the 
ideals of attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness. Held (1990) 
highlights the historical split between reason and emotions in the history of 
philosophy and ethics which, in her opinion, is built on the identification of the 
human with man which results not in a universal ethics but in a gendered concept 
(Held 1990:323). Groenhout (2003, 2004), who links the ethics of care approach to a 
Christian/Jewish tradition of morality (she also mentions Levinas in this context, see 
below), argues that for an ethics of care a different idea of human nature is needed. 
Kittay (2009) favours a rejection of the claim that ‘all people are’ in a certain way. 
She rather argues for human relations as a starting point of the development of an 
ethical position. Similarly Noddings (2003) identifies relations and not individuals as 
ontological basis for a moral position.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section a care situation – or a potential care 
situation – taking an ethics of care approach, must be understood as a set of 
relations of people who are interdependent with each other. Groenhout (2003) 
describes that a focus on interdependence, with recognition of the separateness of 
everyone, is doing justice to the fact that humans are social beings. Bubeck (1995) 
emphasises that this interdependency is not socially caused but humanly necessary 
and care in that sense is understood as work that needs to be done because nature 
makes us dependent. In chapter 7 I will describe the discursive notion of dependency 
and independence and its meaning for the understanding of care. The ethics of care 
approach, however, also needs to give attention to feelings and emotions, such as 
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grief, fear, anger, rejection, guilt, shame and aggression (Sevenhuijsen 1998:84). This 
all-encompassing view enables a focus on the moral meaning of relations of 
dependency. Sevenhuijsen (1998:12) describes that the  
‘moral repertoire also needs to encompass notions of cooperation, intimacy and 
trust. Connection, compassion and affectivity should be recognized as important 
sources of moral reasoning’.  
 
This also means for the further analysis to take the ‘epistemological virtues’ 
(Sevenhuijsen 1998) such as empathy, intuition, compassion, love, relationality and 
commitment seriously as ways through which people gain knowledge about the 
world and themselves. This knowledge derives from those who care and on whom 
we are dependent and on this awareness a new notion of the individual citizen and 
citizenship in general should be based (Sevenhuijsen 1998). These virtues of course 
also play a role in the practice of care itself (Bubeck 2002). Held (2002b:20) rightly 
states that ‘care as a value has great potential for recognition as a universal intrinsic 
value’ which does not need any religious or metaphysical presuppositions.4 In that 
sense an ethics of care approach also defines care as being the basis of important 
values and virtues for individuals. Individuals’ moral positions therefore depend on 
the ‘caring’ character, an idea I will explore further below using the position of Virtue 
Ethics.  
 
                                                 
4
 This understanding of a materialist morality which does not refer to metaphysical positions can also 
be found in early Critical Theory (see e.g. Horkheimer 1980a, b).  
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In order to position care in the context of economic, political and social 
circumstances questions of inequality, power relations, exploitation and equality 
need to be taken into consideration. Groenhout (2004) states that ethical 
assumptions often structure political decisions and the fact that caring is often 
positively associated with selflessness has inevitably consequences for political and 
economic processes. Bubeck (2002:173) argues that the ideal of the ‘selfless and self-
fulfilled carer (...) is a dangerous fiction that is imposed on women at their own cost’. 
Women’s (and other carers’) self-conception is therefore important and an ethics of 
care approach needs to both recognise the worth of caring ideals and critique related 
inequalities, injustices and dominations. To keep up care as moral value and basis for 
political achievement of the good society (Tronto 1993) the concept needs to 
incorporate the sphere of economics, politics and social status. Sevenhuijsen 
(1998:12) applies the concept of an ethics of care in order to design a revised notion 
of citizenship in which ‘connection, compassion and affectivity should be recognized 
as important sources of moral reasoning’. Lloyd (2004:248) in this context 
emphasises that the position of care ‘on the periphery of public life’ keeps carers 
outside the normal citizenship. Practically that means that a space for discourse is 
provided where the carers’ expertise and moral understanding is brought in 
(Sevenhuijsen 1998:14), where the notion of the carer, though, is not essentialised 
and fixed to his/her identity.5 Williams (2001) similarly tries to define an ethics of 
care as a programme for political intervention and for the construction of a new 
                                                 
5
 Held (2002b) acknowledges that a focus on bodies, emotions, embodiment etc. (i.e. a naturalism) 
can be attractive to feminist theory; that it can also, however, be a dangerous path to essentialisation.  
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citizenship which combines time and space for personal, caring and working 
practices.  
 
These positions see care as an expression of the possibility of a new citizenship and, 
eventually, as the basis for a better society. But carers do not get the political and 
economic support which could be associated with their role as those fulfilling 
important moral and social tasks. On the one hand caring for someone should be 
recognised as an inherently moral practice and it should be valued for this practice. 
Dependency on each other and relations with each other are the main culprit of 
moral practice. On the other hand, carers (and in particular women) should not be 
exploited and disadvantaged due to this ethics. Bubeck (1995) proposes an 
interesting way out of the dilemma. The values and virtues of care should not be 
restricted to the particular person (i.e. a selfless carer) but should become part of 
citizenship and care should hence be organised and carried out on a social level. She 
strongly argues that care needs to be seen as a burden which leads to the 
exploitation of those who care (usually women). Non-carers, Bubeck demonstrates, 
are materially (in terms of both money and time) better off than carers. The 
consequence is that exploitation cannot be ended within the current ethics of care, 
but that a notion of justice is required: 
‘people who hold the ethic of care are vulnerable to exploitation because they 
do not have the moral resources to prevent their own exploitation’ (Bubeck 
2002:176).  
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In an attempt to use a notion of women’s morality for politics, Tronto develops a 
‘vision for the good society that draws upon feminist sensibilities and upon 
traditional “women’s morality”’ (1993:3). Tronto’s goal is to ‘situate *care+ as an 
integral moral and political concept’ (1993:124) requiring a redefinition of care. She 
(Tronto 1993) states that the way care is currently constructed poses no threat to the 
moral order and therefore loses its potential for societal change. An emphasis on 
care also always causes the danger that care is romanticised and domesticated 
(Sevenhuijsen 1998). For a feminist ethics, ‘which aims to make traditional femininity 
the subject of critical discussion’ (Sevenhuijsen 1998:61), the link between ‘caring 
values’, relationality and gender needs to be dealt with critically. The identification of 
men with the creation of the human, which takes place in the public realm, and 
women with the reproduction of the natural and biological in the household (Held 
1990) naturalises the clear separation between the two spheres and they appear 
normal and essential to people. An ethics of care should thus not be a naturalistic 
ethic (Held 2002b)6 and Larrabee (1993:4-5) critically asks whether feminists should 
really refer to an ethics of care based on relatedness and responsiveness to others 
and she warns of a focus on the ‘womanly virtues’. 
 
Tronto’s attempt to formulate a vision of the good society is an interesting idea 
which takes up the attempt to see care as a model for a better society. I will describe 
Bauman’s position below (section 2.4) as an attempt to sketch a broader 
understanding of relationality. Care as an image of the better society will appear 
                                                 
6
 But Held (2002b) also immediately states that this ethic of care must be distant from a non-
naturalistic Kantian morality, as Kantian theories are unsuitable to deal with experiences of family and 
friendship. 
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frequently in the analysis of my research. With respect to possibilities of political 
intervention and change, Held (2002b) claims that feminists must deny that persons 
are merely the product of social and biological influences. In fact, people are moral 
subjects who shape and reproduce a discourse (using norms and values) and 
therefore their own position. Discourses thus provide a possibility to analyse caring 
ethics but are also crucial for the construction of the very ethics.   
 
The value of Tronto’s approach lies particularly in her inclusion of power and power-
relationships into an ethics of care. More precisely Tronto (1993:114-116) describes 
different forms of caring which are defined by the power relations in society: caring 
for somebody (here Tronto refers to aspects of financial and organisational ‘caring’) 
is done by the powerful whereas care-giving and care-receiving (the actual care 
work, which is the focus of my particular analysis) are identified with the less 
powerful. When it comes to the particular individuals who do the care work Tronto 
switches between an idealist and a materialist position asking: 
‘It is difficult to know whether the least well off are less well off because they 
care and caring is devalued, or because in order to devalue people, they are 
forced to do the caring work’ (Tronto 1993: 113). 
 
Reflecting Tronto’s arguments, Bubeck (1995) claims that the social context 
determines when, where, and who cares and under which conditions. The fact that it 
is mostly women who do this work must therefore be questioned. Here Bubeck 
argues that care as both an activity and attitude is deeply related to femininity 
(1995:160) and that the pressure on women to care is exercised indirectly through 
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social norms and institutions constituting power hierarchies which are reproduced in 
areas, such as everyday discourse, the media, literature and sciences. The 
importance of the gender aspect becomes clear when one takes the sexual division 
of labour into consideration. Men in fact are then caring as husbands and lovers, 
usually for their loved ones, women, on the other hand, are caring in their role as 
women (Bubeck 1995:163). Given that, women are exploited as carers due to the 
biased constitution of care: 
‘women’s material activity as carers is not only reproduced through the 
economic pressure of wage differentials, but also through psychological 
dispositions, emotional rewards, moral outlook, and cultural and moral norms 
and values and social pressure’ (Bubeck 1995:172). 
 
This quote demands an analysis of care on both the micro level of individual caring 
relations and on the social level. Also Sevenhuijsen (1998:21) mentions formal and 
informal rules and habits, interpretative conventions and implicit or explicit 
normative frameworks as constitutive for the moral construction of care in society. 
Moral discourses in her understanding encompass the ‘totality of rules, codes, values 
and norms which are used to justify behaviour by labelling it ‘right’ or ‘wrong’’ 
(Sevenhuijsen 1998:36). For my analysis this description of the ethics of care 
identifies an important aspect: the realm in which the caring values and carers’ 
dispositions and actions are shaped and formed. Discourses, which focus on the 
‘good person’ or the ‘ideal home’ (Noddings 2002), are very prominent in the context 
of care and an analysis using an approach that looks at the moral construction of care 
needs to focus on these discourses. Bubeck’s (2002) account also focuses on social 
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norms and institutions and women’s self-conception and ethics. She sees the social 
and historical context as crucial for an understanding of the construction of an ethics 
of care: 
‘since caring [is] an activity done by people situated in time and space and hence 
in particular social contexts, it is the social context that determines where, 
when, and by and for whom caring is done, and under what conditions’ (Bubeck 
2002:170).  
 
The ethics of care approach helps to come closer to an answer to the demands for a 
theoretical conception for the analysis of care. Norms and values are not linked to 
abstract individuals but are embedded in particular relationships of dependence and 
support. Moral practices therefore need to be seen as being based in specific 
situations between particular agents who relate to each other. However, the ethics 
of care approach has also raised some more problems which need to be addressed. 
Firstly, the ethics of care is based on particular characteristics, values and virtues 
which shape characters and identities of those caring. I will therefore use the 
position of Virtue Ethics in the following section to explore the links between 
individual dispositions and an ethical character further. Secondly, the ethics of care is 
focusing on particular situations. In order to move beyond the particular and to 
address moral problems and situations in a universal manner responsibility for each 
other needs to be understood also outside of these particular relationships. 
Bauman’s position inspired by Levinas’s theories will be discussed to sketch such an 
attempt. Similar to the focus of Virtue Ethics on the moral individual and the morally 
good person, Bauman does not centre his approach on grand moral principles and 
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theories. Rather, he sees responsibility as being directly linked to the morally acting 
subject. Allowing a focus beyond Virtue Ethics, however, responsibility is seen as a 
universal obligation. Thirdly, demands for an embeddedness of the ethics of care 
approach within a materialist framework taking claims of justice, equality and power 
relations seriously have been made from both within and outside the ethics of care. I 
will use Fraser’s work to incorporate these aspects into a newly shaped ethics of 
care. And finally, discourse has been identified as the major field of the construction 
of ethical positions, values and identities. Thus, in the final section of this chapter I 
will explore what discourse can mean and how it needs to be understood for the 
analysis in this research project.  
2.3 Virtue Ethics 
7
 
An ethics of care approach identifies (gendered) dispositions of caring characters in 
particular relationships. Relating to each other is based on particular values and 
virtues of caring individuals. Similarly, which I will show in the analysis of care 
discourses, moral practices are not thought of as the fulfilment of separate tasks and 
services; rather, the person of the caring individual is desired and required in this 
context. Virtue ethics as a theoretical position can be described as normative ethics 
emphasising virtues and moral character and it positions itself in contrast to both 
deontology and consequentialism or utilitarianism (Hursthouse 1999). The example 
of the caring situation in the family is one in which the fulfilment of certain practices 
                                                 
7
 The positions presented here can be contrasted with a more neoliberal strand of Virtue Ethics, 
exemplified by Gauthier (1986) who argues that ‘*w+e shall defend the traditional conception of 
morality as a rational constraint on the pursuit of individual interest’ (1986:2). Another approach of 
Virtue Ethics can be found in MacIntyre (1999) who sees knowledge of the virtues as being crucial for 
interdependent living.  
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(washing, cooking, putting to bed etc.) is ideologically bound to the presence of the 
moral person, the moral character and his/her disposition.8 Individuals’ 
responsibilities are related to their own character and their ethical constitution. 
 
The approach of Virtue Ethics raises the question of what sort of person one should 
be (Hursthouse 1999:17). Virtues, Hursthouse states, are concerned with actions and 
feelings, which explicitly includes emotions as being morally significant (1999:108). 
Slote (2001:4) emphasises that ‘the focus is on the virtuous individual and on those 
inner traits, dispositions, and motives that qualify her as being virtuous’. In this 
context it should be noticed that this is based on the idea that doing the right thing is 
not doing it for the right reason. Agent-based virtues should be characterised as 
warm (based on compassion and benevolence) and should reflect the person’s 
‘overall morally relevant motivation’ (Slote 2001:38). An action is then regarded as 
morally acceptable ‘if and only if it comes from good or virtuous motivation involving 
benevolence or caring (about the well-being of others)’ (Slote 2001:38).9 
 
The idea of being virtuous is obviously important for care as it could be argued that 
being motivated to care for others requires specific character traits and dispositions. 
Darwall (2002:3-4) elaborates on the conditions of a person’s good or a person’s 
welfare which cannot be explained rationally but which must be understood as being 
relative to the particular agent. What a person values is not the same as how much it 
                                                 
8
 The tension between ‘doing’ and ‘being’ will be discussed in particular in chapter 9.  
9
 This position is often compared to Christian Ethics in which a sin or a good action is defined by its 
motivation, and the moral character (see Žižek 2000). Interestingly, and this is hardly stated, Žižek 
(2000) highlights that a similar concept was also the basis of the propaganda trials in the USSR.  
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benefits him or her. What benefits the other would then be rationally wanted for his 
or her sake.10 The relationship between care and welfare is one in which somebody 
who cares desires and promotes this person’s welfare. Darwall (2002:15) 
furthermore differentiates between empathy and sympathy. While the former is 
related to respect, which means to take someone’s point of view as normative, the 
latter describes care, interpreted as taking someone’s welfare as normative. This 
distinction, in which the focus lies on the treatment of a person according to her 
welfare rather than her will, results from the conception that in care people desire 
things for a person for that person’s sake. Care can then be defined as a sympathetic 
concern which is rather agent-neutral than agent-relative (Darwall 2002:49). Actions, 
based on the idea of care, and care itself in particular, should be carried out 
according to its agent-neutral value, an intrinsic value of actions which orientates 
itself on the virtuous subject rather than on the view of the person one cares for. 
Slote (2001) argues for an agent-based approach of virtue ethics. In his approach 
benevolence plays a crucial role, as he states: 
‘The person who exhibits benevolence in her actions performs actions that, in 
agent-based terms, can count as morally superior to other actions she might or 
could have performed, namely, actions (or refrainings from action) that would 
not have demonstrated benevolence’ (Slote 2001:16-7). 
 
The Other in Slote’s conception is seen in a particularistic way (2001:211), which 
means that the ‘near and dear’ are closer in terms of caring than the general other. 
While duty is for Slote preferable over a self-absorbed character as an action out of 
                                                 
10
 This is a brief explanation of the essence of Darwall’s (2002) Rational Care Theory of Welfare.  
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duty and obligation is ‘at least not selfish’ (2001:70), a basis on love or universal 
humanitarianism (which is more feasible than universal love, due to love’s spirit of 
exclusiveness (2001:118)) represents the ideal moral character. Slote positions 
himself against selfishness, egoism and self-centred concern defending an agent-
centred discussion of morality.  
 
However, similarly to the ethics of care approach a focus on the selfless character 
can have negative consequences for those who care, in particular for women. 
Nussbaum (2006) discusses issues of care holding that a just society also has to take 
the ‘burdens on people who provide care for dependents’ (2006:100) into 
consideration. She convincingly highlights the fact that caregivers (and in the 
historical perspective these have been women) were not full citizens in the first place 
as they used to work inside the home. Although this perception has partly changed, 
society ‘still assume*s+ (…) that this work will be done for free, “out of love”’ 
(Nussbaum 2006:102), referring to a notion that discriminates mainly women and 
diminishes ‘their productivity and their contribution to civic and political life’ 
(Nussbaum 2006:102). The virtues of a caring person, thus, are potentially 
constructed in opposition of those seeking success, income and social status. At the 
same time the focus on the moral character can lead to an acceptance of negative 
actions. Even if the intentions are good certain actions (e.g. caring practices) can be 
bad (Fitzpatrick 2008). At the same time an idealisation of the moral character 
without the attempt for universal claims for equality and justice can lead to a 
situation in which morality and the moral character are thought of to be 
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reminiscence from the past. This idealisation of times gone will be discussed in 
chapter 6 where I present some evidence and analysis of this phenomenon.  
 
Nussbaum who calls for ‘care with both love and justice’ (2002b:205) tries to draw on 
specific aspects of Rawlsian Contract Theories but criticises their notion of free, 
equal, independent and rational individuals. Nussbaum (2006) questions the 
Rawlsian concept of mutual advantage and elaborates and develops her Capabilities 
Approach which focuses more on the individual’s capabilities and asks ‘what people 
are actually able to do and to be’ (Nussbaum 2006:70). The subjects in care and their 
circumstances are crucial for an understanding of care relations. Both people’s 
virtues and capabilities define the relations which are the basis of a moral mindset in 
society. If, like in my example, an elderly family member is in need for care this does 
not happen, however, in a neutral setting. Rather, very specific relationships, 
histories and emotions are present. Virtues are defined and formed in discursive 
contexts and these are at the same time not independent from socio-economic and 
political circumstances. Virtue Ethics helps to explain the demands on ‘caring’ 
individuals, caring characters and identities. An ethics of care needs to acknowledge 
the assumption that a ‘caring person’ is sought and desired within relations of 
dependency. In much of the discourses on care the specific acts are not valued (doing 
the right thing) but the character of the carer is evaluated (being the right person). 
Virtue Ethics has provided a starting point for a focus which is not restricted to 
particular human relations but which provides an attempt to investigate the general 
demands on being the good person. The question, however, remains whether or not 
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this focus allows an understanding of moral practice which moves away from the 
particular situation and sketches a universal approach. In the following section I will 
try to follow this path by introducing Bauman’s conception of responsibility for the 
other.  
2.4 Responsibility for the Other  
Bauman’s (1995) approach, inspired by the ideas of postmodernism11, rejects grand 
principles of right and wrong and rather follows an exploration of humans as 
‘existentially moral beings’. Bauman’s approach is strongly influenced by Levinas’s 
theories. Smart (1999:102) defines Levinas’s concept of an ethical relation as an 
asymmetrical face-to face relation, based on actual proximity and being prior to both 
logic and reason. When subjects devote their lives to others (i.e. those close to them) 
sacrifice manifests itself in this situation as ethical responsibility (Smart 1999). This 
sacrifice is based on Levinas’s argument that in the relation to the other one must 
notice the priority of the other’s concerns over one’s own:  
‘The good is the passage to the other, that is to say, a manner of relaxing my 
tension over existing in the guise of a concern for oneself, where the existing of 
the other is more important to me than my own’ (Levinas 2001:54). 
 
Morality is thus based on the relation to the other, and, more precisely, on the 
(unspoken) moral demand of the other. General humanity for Levinas therefore 
consists of the recognition of the priority of the other to the self (2001:235). Apart 
from the physical proximity Levinas (2001) identifies a moral proximity which can be 
                                                 
11
 For a discussion of postmodern ethics in the context of (health) care, see Fox (2000).  
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understood as love in which the individual responds to the other as unique 
individual.12 Caygill (2002) rightly highlights, that the individual is caught up in this 
process due to the (ethical) situation of proximity and also Levinas admits that ‘*i+t is 
always unpleasant to be responsible for the other. There is in the human condition as 
such an element of the unpleasant’ (Levinas 2001:100). 
 
How Levinas’s ethics can be applied to care is shown by Bahr and Bahr (2001) who 
criticise that self sacrifice used to be seen as a high virtue and is now rather regarded 
as self-defeating behaviour. Bahr and Bahr argue for a recovery of ‘the sacrifice of 
self’ in the interest of the other (2001:1232). The authors furthermore criticise the 
feminist ethics of care’s attack on self sacrifice as a virtue and hold the focus on the 
oppression of women responsible for the ignorance of the positive effects of care. 
Care, however, should be seen as a positive experience: 
‘Rarely *care for the elderly+ is (…) seen as an opportunity or blessing for 
members of the caring household, and a finding of positive outcomes from the 
experience of care is atypical’ (Bahr and Bahr 2001:1245). 
 
Taking the element of self-sacrifice out of care would reduce the ethical value of it 
(Bahr and Bahr 2001:1244). Bahr and Bahr (2001) argue for an acceptance of the 
unpleasant responsibility for those close to one, a situation that is criticised by 
                                                 
12
 Here an interesting similarity can be found in other religiously inspired writings. Buber (1958) for 
example emphasises that a relationship of love between the I and Thou is characterised by a 
responsibility of the I for the Thou. Consequently, the I is only constituted in the relation to the Thou, 
and eventually to the external Thou, God (Buber 1958:75).  
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Stocker (2001:160) who defines the demand of responsibility as unconditional and 
unceasing and who highlights the one-sidedness of this relation.  
 
Zygmunt Bauman follows Levinas’s positions to some extent in his ‘rejection of the 
typically modern ways of going about its moral problems’ (Bauman 1993:4) by 
rejecting normative regulations and universal claims in general. According to Bauman 
(1993; 1995), the fact that individuals are existentially moral beings means that 
everyone is faced with the challenge of responsibility for the other. The basis for 
ethical negotiations and consensus is thus personal morality in the form of moral 
responsibility and not vice versa (Bauman 1993). In that sense, Bauman introduces 
an interactive element in the sense that ‘being for’ someone is the basis of individual 
moral existence. Furthermore, Bauman emphasises that moral phenomena are 
inherently ‘non-rational’ contradictory impulses in which people are following ‘the 
habitual and the routine; we behave today the way we behaved yesterday and as 
people around us go on behaving’ (Bauman 1995:12). This, in my view, brings 
together Foucault’s conception of discursive formation (see later in this chapter) of 
social actions and Levinas’s notion of the (unconscious) responsibility.13 It also relates 
to what I have called everyday morality, in Bauman’s (1995) terms a ‘morality 
without ethics’. Responsibility, with reference to Levinas’s concept of uniqueness of 
the other puts the individual in the moral relationship (Bauman 1993:51). 
                                                 
13
 Bahr and Bahr also raise this point with respect to self-sacrifice in a Levinasian sense when they 
hold: 
‘Self-sacrifice tends not to be the result of conscious, rational decision making. Its voluntary nature is 
more reflexive than cognitive, more a matter of community identity, intuition, and reaction, than a 
realistic weighing of alternatives. It is a response to need, not an assessment of possible damage to 
one’s personal projects’ (Bahr and Bahr 2001:1250-1). 
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Institutional arrangements, such as the market or the state, have, in Bauman’s sense, 
the idea to release individuals from the burdens of this personal moral responsibility 
(1993:182).  
 
Bauman’s concept of general responsibility for the other does not follow a grand 
moral theory which states what is right or wrong. It does, however, provide the 
concept for a universalist ethics of care which goes beyond the particular 
relationship but which is based on people’s responsibility for each other. Whereas 
Virtue Ethics provides an understanding of ‘being good’ and the importance of a 
focus on the moral character, it remains concentrated on the individual. Nussbaum’s 
approach to define universal capabilities continues to be focused on the individual 
character. Bauman’s writings help to integrate this character into an ethics of 
relating (acting ethically in this sense means to respond to the demands of 
responsibility for the other), and at the same time, provides, due to its focus on 
responsibility for the other, a universal recommendation to act. Bauman’s position 
strengthens my proposed concept of an ethics of care in that it acknowledges 
relationships and the responsibility between individuals but also understands 
responsibility as a universal value of doing right. Not only close family members have 
responsibility for each other. Rather, moral responsibility means to react to moral 
demands of the other.   
 
So far it could be sketched what it means to be an ethical agent and how dispositions 
and virtues form the character of the ethical agent. Bauman’s approach added the 
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potential to see care as an expression of universal responsibilities between 
individuals not restricted to particular relationships. However, it remains open how 
these moral demands, responsibilities and actions are related to the economic, 
social, cultural and historical circumstances. The meeting of responsibilities and 
being an ethical agent are influenced by the situation we are living in. The care 
demands of the elderly person in my example depend on the economic 
circumstances. The availability of various forms of social care impact on how care is 
seen and understood; they also define whether or not people face a choice to take 
over responsibilities in the first place. Furthermore it remains unexplained whether 
or not the current situation can be changed or escaped. If moral responsibility 
precedes all thinking and can therefore only be rationalised ‘at the cost of self-denial 
and self-attribution’ (Bauman 1993:248) the moral crisis seems inevitable and 
unavoidable. Lee (1999) however argues for a strategic and social postmodernism in 
which a focus on the material circumstances is essential. Both Levinas’s and 
Bauman’s positions raise important demands of individuals’ moral attitudes; their 
strong focus on morality as prior to the sphere of rationality makes it difficult, 
however, to include the social and economic circumstances in which individuals have 
to act. Furthermore, a position for political and discursive intervention needs a more 
precise link between the socio-economic context and individuals’ moral 
responsibility. In the next section I will thus try to incorporate a materialist 
perspective into the ethics of care.  
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2.5 Materialism and morality 
So far moral practice has been described as relation between people in which moral 
dispositions and characters lead to care for the other. Care for the (particular) other 
has then been extended to a responsibility for the (general) other. Everyday morality 
is in Bauman’s sense not linked to particular grand theories and positions but rests 
on the individual character. In the discussion of the ethics of care approach I have 
already raised demands for an incorporation of a focus on power relations in society 
which shape and determine moral practice. In other words, the cultural, social and 
economic situation of ‘moral beings’ play a role in the shaping of an individual’s 
disposition as a moral character. Morality also creates power relations and social 
standing. The way ethical practices are constructed influences materialist 
circumstances in which individuals live. Morality, understood as an ‘individually 
binding norm system’ (Schmid Noerr 1997:160) in this sense can be described as 
restrictive and instrumental in maintaining power relations. In this section I try to 
incorporate this materialist perspective14 into the ethics of care. The social order, 
inequalities and power relations in society determine the consequences of care for 
those caring or being cared for.  
 
                                                 
14
 My interpretation of materialism is not based on a Darwinian ethics (see Blackledge and Kirkpatrick 
2002), nor does it refer to the narrow conception Williams (1980) sketches with its emphasis on the 
priority of nature over the mind; it rather resembles a tradition of Critical Theory influenced by the 
early Frankfurt School whose basic thesis is that the human being is dependent on the overall 
constitution of the world (Horkheimer 1980a) in its material, cultural and historical setting. As 
Williams’s (1980) rightly states, materialism does include a form of sensualism. However, the focus on 
sensual experiences includes the possibility that even the senses change according to the materialist 
setting (Horkheimer 1980a:30). 
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Trying to link a focus on the moral order of society with social and cultural 
inequalities, Honneth (2003) acknowledges the welfare state’s contribution to the 
creation of social esteem. Power in society and recognition of groups in society are 
affected by everyday experiences of injustices and moral disappointments. In order 
to do justice to everyone in society people’s status needs to be recognised. Social 
status for Honneth (1995) depends on societal recognition and individual relations; 
love, on the other hand cannot function as a starting point for a universal struggle. 
Normativity and what is seen as right and wrong, are not based on a definite sketch 
of the good society; rather they are related to the discursive formation of the very 
society (Honneth 1995). Honneth elsewhere argues that self-realisation, a basic and 
important good, can only be achieved ‘when subjects can experience intersubjective 
recognition not only of their personal autonomy, but of their specific needs and 
particular capacities as well’ (2003:189). What is seen as right and wrong in society 
directly impacts on an individual’s dignity, as Houston and Dolan point out: 
‘Yet, in all of this Honneth sees the possibility of value—consensus, of solidarity 
amongst social groups as to what counts as a laudable characteristic or 
contribution to the community. Solidarity arises as part of a ‘felt concern’ for the 
other’s value.’ (2008:461).  
 
Honneth provides a possibility to incorporate morality into a societal conception. In 
the societal struggle characteristics and virtues are defined and valued accordingly. 
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The outcome is a creation of a ‘moral consensus’15 which defines the moral order 
and people’s status in society. Whereas the link between a moral consensus and the 
creation of inequalities in Honneth’s account is illuminating the focus on recognition 
in interactions puts social and economic structures only secondary to misrecognised 
identities. Fraser (2003a, 2003b) rejects Honneth’s claim that subjective experience 
forms the moral positioning in society. In contrast, Fraser’s (2003b:207) approach 
‘begins (...) with decentred discourses of social criticism’ which she calls folk 
paradigms and which ‘mediate moral disagreement and social protest’ (2003b:207) 
summarised by Fraser as ‘moral grammar’. In that sense the moral order in society is 
not established by the process of intersubjective engagements and struggles 
between individuals and groups but shaped by the creation of a moral framework. 
This also allows Fraser (2001) to promote a notion of the universally binding instead 
of an idea of the good practice. Furthermore, approaches limited to one perspective, 
resulting in either a ‘vulgar culturalism’ or a ‘vulgar economism’ (Fraser 2000:111), 
need to be avoided. Disagreeing with Honneth’s focus on the sphere of cultural 
recognition, Fraser (2003a) argues for a ‘perspectival dualism’ which accepts that 
there is no ontological distinction between the cultural and the economic realm but 
only a historicised distinction.16 The strength and the importance of Fraser’s position 
lie in the recognition that both the economic situation and the status order in society 
determine people’s life circumstances. When she argues that the capitalist economic 
system has a moral-cultural dimension (Fraser 1989:118) she refers to the moral 
                                                 
15
 Honneth (1995) does not interpret ‘consensus’ in a homogenous sense. It should be rather 
understood as the outcome of collectively constructed moral expectations based on individuals’ 
struggles. 
16
 In this context Fraser (2003a) also argues against a simple poststructuralist anti-dualism. 
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grammar which goes hand in hand with economic injustices and often reproduces 
those.  
 
But how are the ‘moral grammar’ and the moral social order constructed in society? 
Fraser takes inspiration in Foucault’s writings in that she argues that norms have 
replaced laws. Individuals in a society are confronted with hierarchies, norms and a 
social order, they internalise norms and surveil themselves (Fraser 1989). Power can 
therefore not be located at specific sources, rather social ordering happens largely 
through individual self-regulation (Fraser 2008). However, Fraser holds on to a notion 
of universal justice and she argues that Foucault misses the possibilities for a 
normative perspective (Fraser 1989). 
 
A good example for this argumentation is Fraser’s discussion of gender and needs. 
Taking up a discursive understanding, she argues that ‘needs are culturally 
constructed and discursively interpreted’, this, however, does not mean that ‘any 
need interpretation is as good as any other’ (Fraser 1990:220). Rather, the 
interpretation of (in particular women’s) needs follows ideological gender linked 
dichotomies, such as the dichotomy of home and work (Fraser 1989). Fraser (1989) 
rejects a general divide between work and family and the separation of public and 
private spheres. She argues that due to the moral and economic constitution of 
society these are ideologically perceived as two different spheres. The ideological 
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public-private separations, however, can be found in both system and lifeworld.17 
What is needed, therefore, is to 
‘redress status subordination by deconstructing the symbolic oppositions that 
underlie currently institutionalized patterns of cultural value. Far from simply 
raising the self-esteem of the misrecognized, it would destabilize existing status 
differentiations and change everyone’s self-identity’ (Fraser 2003a:75).  
 
Deconstruction therefore is a conscious intervention into both the social and the 
cultural sphere. Feminism’s task Fraser (1990) identifies as reconciling more 
generally materialism and culturalism and in particular the public and private spheres 
for both men and women. Justice and equality are not achieved by simply 
recognising the disadvantaged and establishing their social identity (as Honneth’s 
work might suggest). Rather Fraser focuses on the ideology behind categories and 
their connection to institutions and the capitalist societal order as can be seen in her 
arguments in the context of gender inequalities:  
‘It suggests that an emancipatory transformation of male-dominated, capitalist 
societies, early and late, requires a transformation of these gendered roles and 
of the institutions they mediate. As long as the worker and childrearer roles are 
constituted as fundamentally incompatible with one another, it will not be 
possible to universalize either of them to include both genders’ (Fraser 
1989:128).  
 
                                                 
17
 Here Fraser questions Habermas’s (1989) relative static conception and terminology of the spheres 
of system and lifeworld.  
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Hence Fraser (2003a, 2003b) explains that the moral framework must be based on a 
synthesis of recognition and redistribution with an acknowledgement of political 
representation (Fraser 2005). The ethics of care approach has enabled an 
understanding of relationality and interdependence as the main fabric of society. I 
have also discussed, however, that values and virtues based on this ethics are 
strongly gendered and often lead to inequalities and injustices. A challenge of these 
consequences must acknowledge the way power relations work out in society. When 
Fraser (1989:122) argues that ‘the modern male-headed nuclear family is a mélange 
of (normatively secured) consensuality, normativity, and strategicality’ it helps to 
explain how it is possible that care is highly rated and acknowledged but that it 
coincides with low status and marginal economic and political perception. Because of 
the internalisation of norms and the ‘moral grammar’ negative outcomes of the 
construction of care are not widely challenged.  
 
The situation of a mother in need of care touches on people’s personal experiences, 
values and attitudes. Fraser’s focus on ‘decentred discourses’ (2003b:207) points to 
the sphere which ultimately shapes people’s ideas about right and wrong. People are 
inevitably confronted with divergent moral claims and attitudes, but, by drawing on 
the moral grammar, know what is socially desirable, expected and the right thing to 
do. Individuals have to react to different moral demands which are then judged 
against the broader everyday morality. When Valverde (2004:74) argues that people 
have to ‘juggle ethical responsibilities that emanate from diverse sources and elicit 
heterogeneous responses’, it needs to be added that these responses will be 
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evaluated against the moral grammar present in society. The construction of a 
common moral framework in society is also indispensable for what Habermas (1989) 
calls symbolic reproduction. In that sense societies must reproduce themselves 
materially and symbolically by establishing group solidarity, socialisation and cultural 
traditions (see Fraser 1989:115). Actual ethical practices and general moral norms 
stand in a dialectical interaction (Van Dijk 1991:33) and are historically reproduced. 
The existence of this continuation enables the persistence of a social order. I now 
want to turn to the sphere in which dispositions, norms and ultimately the ‘moral 
grammar’ are shaped and constructed.  
 
In all the different positions above there is a notion of moral construction of values, 
morals and identities. How relationships are seen and defined, how responsibility for 
the other is understood, or how ‘the good character’ is constructed, constitute both 
the ethical agent and moral practice. But so far there has been a lack of explanation 
of the very construction and formation of these categories, ideals and identities. 
Fraser’s account already suggests the realm of discourse as the context in which 
moral order is constructed. Recognising the importance of the discursive realm 
Fraser (1990:59) redefines Habermas’s (1989) public sphere as a multiplicity of public 
spheres of discursive relations in which ‘public opinion’ is created. Fraser also applies 
her model to care and states that the discursive formation leads to a situation in 
which all those involved in care are marginalised (Fraser 2003a). A moral framework 
is built on cultural and social values and defines status and power of groups in 
society. Some individuals have been denied ‘the status of full partners in social 
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interaction’ (Fraser 2003a:29). As these groups and individuals have not equally 
participated in the construction of the cultural values, Fraser characterises the 
situation as unjust. The discursive realm in which the moral order and the moral 
grammar is created and shaped is therefore of the main interest for the present 
analysis. It is crucial to take the who and how of the ‘framing’ of in-/justices into 
account (Fraser 2005).  
2.6 Discourse  
In this section I now want to turn to the process of a construction of the moral 
grammar, the moral categories, values, virtues and the everyday morality mentioned 
above. I have argued that the ethics of care approach that I propose strongly refers 
to discourse as the realm in which these categories are constructed. But what is 
meant by the term discourse? I will firstly define the concept of discourse used in this 
thesis and I will discuss its relevance in the context of care arguing that it is public 
discourse through which a concept of morality is reproduced. I have so far also 
emphasised the importance of the idea of the ethical agent in the construction of 
care and I will, thus, discuss the construction and the meaning of subjects and agents 
in my concept of discourse. Finally, taking up the claim for an inclusion of the 
material context into an ethics of care, I will explore the relationship between 
discourse and the material consequences and circumstances. This then should set 
the scene for the following chapter (3) in which I will lay out the methodological 
framework in more detail and where I will focus specifically on the operationalisation 
of discourse analysis. While I will discuss the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis 
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(CDA) extensively in the next chapter it has to be held at this point that my 
understanding of what constitutes discourse is heavily informed by this approach. 
This expresses itself clearly in the fact that I will draw on relevant literature from 
both theoretical and empirical work carried out within the framework of Critical 
Discourse Analysis.  
 
Defining Discourse  
A concept of discourse is not only to be found within the framework of Critical 
Discourse Analysis. In fact many different perspectives use some idea of discursive 
construction of identity, morality and social practice. I will point out the specificities 
and particularities of the concept of discourse used in this study, which is, as stated, 
heavily inspired by Critical Discourse Analysis.  
 
Care for elderly people which deals with the (care) needs of people in particular 
settings (informally or formally) should firstly be understood as a social practice, i.e. 
an activity exercised in a particular historical, social and moral context. This rather 
obvious assumption leads to the need to define the relation and mutual impact 
between the actual care work, the carer and the social and historical situation. I have 
stated above the significance of everyday morality, the moral grammar and its 
construction in and through discourse. As a starting point to define the field of 
discourse I use the highly influential work of Michel Foucault and in particular his 
concepts of discursive construction to specify the meaning of a concept that is often 
used and rarely clearly defined. I would argue that any method of analysis of 
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discourse needs to start with a description and identification of ‘discourse’ itself and 
its institutional realms (see Meyer 2001). From my methodological perspective, 
discourse can be defined as ‘an institutionally consolidated concept of speech 
inasmuch as it determines and consolidates action and thus already exercises power’ 
(Link, cited in Jäger 2001:34). Speech in this context, and in the understanding of 
most of the scholars of Critical Discourse Analysis, must not be reduced to actual 
speech acts; rather it refers to a broad bulk of written, spoken and other texts (e.g. 
pictures, films). I also want to emphasise the relation to actual action and power in 
this definition which is highly relevant for my project. But discourse goes even 
beyond the various forms of speech and includes social practices through which 
norms and values are reproduced.  
 
Foucault’s (1972) concept of discourse, in which knowledge is seen as historically 
situated and shaped, shows the significance of the sphere of discursive formation 
and its effect on the individual’s everyday practices. Care, as all other social 
practices, cannot take place in an independent self-defined and self-determined 
realm; rather it is based within a set of discursive practices, i.e. various discursive 
regimes. The strength of Foucault’s (1972) approach lies here in the rejection of an 
ahistorical, essentialising theoretical conception (Still 1994) of social practices. This 
also excludes a potential naturalisation of individuals (such as carers), practices 
(caring), or categories (independence). Valverde (2004:70) in this context argues that 
‘*a+uthenticity (…) is nothing but a culturally specific effect of particular material and 
discursive practices’. In other words, the categories have to be understood in terms 
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of its discursive construction. Themes, narratives and ideas, such as the focus on 
independence (see chapter 7) must not be seen as fixed and static but need to be 
analysed in its discursive context. McNay (1992:92) demonstrates the relevance in 
her application of Foucault, arguing that important categories and notions such as 
‘women’ and ‘mother’ must be seen as specific ideas of a historical development in 
Western societies.  
 
Discourse in the understanding of this study is also not a realm free from 
domination, power and subordination; it is not a concept that refers to a situation in 
which everything is constructed passively by the circumstances. On the contrary, 
discourse, even though manifesting itself in various realms of social life, reflects the 
social mainstream (Mautner 2008), i.e. what is socially expected, thinkable and 
standard practice. Mautner (2008) even argues that through discursive processes 
language is instrumental in constructing the establishment view. Wodak (2008:5) in 
her definition of discourse as 
‘linguistic action, be it written, visual or oral communication, verbal or 
nonverbal, undertaken by social actors in a specific setting determined by social 
rules, norms and conventions’, 
 
emphasises the relevance of social norms on discursive acts. In my study these social 
conventions, which Fraser and I describe as the moral grammar, form my greatest 
interest. While I will discuss issues of power below, I want to point to the fact that 
discourse is something that is shaped by different people and groups of people in 
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society. It is ‘socially constituted but also constitutive’ (Mautner 2008:32) in that it 
creates social reality.  
 
Individuals experience discourse as both social and psychological processes 
(Wetherell and Potter 1992). The reception of discourse and the articulation of 
discursive categories refer to ‘quintessentially psychological activities – activities of 
justification, rationalization, categorization, attribution, making sense, naming, 
blaming and identifying’ (Wetherell and Potter 1992:2). Wetherell and Potter’s 
(1992) analysis proves to give a very useful understanding of how discourse is dealt 
with in a cognitive sense. Their focus on the psychological sphere, however, is 
referring exclusively to individuals’ sense of reception of public discourse. Both the 
sphere of reception, in which individuals are actively participating, and the sphere of 
cognition of public discourses are, however, heavily influenced by the social context 
and the social dynamics of discourses. Wetherell and Potter (1992) argue that 
individuals are confronted with a social world that is highly complex and diverse and 
that we lack the cognitive abilities to fully grasp the richness and the complexities. In 
order to make sense of the world around us people draw on different repertoires 
(Wetherell and Potter 1992). These repertoires can be described as ‘resources’ 
(Wetherell and Potter 1992:46) and refer to predefined attitudes and ideologies that 
build the common knowledge of individuals and a common moral framework. Being 
confronted with discourses around us we reflect on them by referring to ‘categories 
and groupings already in place’ (Wetherell and Potter 1992:46). Horkheimer (1980a) 
already established the connection between a Freudian understanding of the 
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mechanism through which a sense of morality is transmitted and embedded in 
individuals and the social reason for the existence of this mechanism which, he 
argued, go beyond the individual soul (1980a:168).  
 
While the psychological processes must not be ignored, with Reisigl and Wodak 
(2001:27) I want to emphasise that discourse needs to be understood as a social and 
not as an individual action. In this understanding discourses ‘mark an ideological, 
social relation’ (Wodak et al. 1995:61, own translation) in that they are expressions 
of the social conditions and relations in society. Discourse is seen as the binding 
mechanism between individuals; discourse, as De Cillia et al. (1999:157) argue, 
makes us social:  
‘Through discourse social actors constitute knowledge, situations, social roles as 
well as identities and interpersonal relations between various interacting social 
groups’. 
 
What Wheterell and Potter (1992) describe as psychological ‘repertoires’ can hence 
be seen as culturally or socially acknowledged norms. This also fits in with Fraser’s 
notion of ‘moral grammar’, the morality which is created through discourse and 
which individuals draw upon. Discourses give structure to our understanding of social 
practices through an ‘internalised structuring impetus’ (De Cillia et al. 1999). 
Richardson (2007) for example describes news narratives in this sense as a reflection 
of our cultural assumption. Van Leeuwen (1995) sees discourse as the grammatical 
and rhetorical realisation of social action, in other words, as something profoundly 
social. In discourses, the social order, the social relations and the cultural norms are 
  
60 
translated into texts, speeches, narratives and attitudes. In that sense the relations 
on the macro level of society are translated into the micro-level of everyday routines 
(van Dijk 1991).  
 
Discourse on care 
In their study about the future of long-term care in Austria, Österle and Hammer 
(2004:103) point to the importance of the question of how to keep and raise the 
willingness of relatives and others to take over and carry out care services. They are 
hence emphasising aspects of commitment, duty and responsibility, in other words, 
the moral attitudes of society. The example used throughout this chapter of an 
elderly woman who needs care and support also raises the question of how people 
get to a sense of responsibility, duty and commitment. Williams (2004) similarly 
focuses on people’s willingness to do something for others. She argues that it is not 
feelings of individual obligation and duty that drive people but a more social sense of 
commitment, ‘negotiated according to what people think is ‘the proper thing to do’’ 
(Williams 2004:17). These negotiations about the ‘proper thing to do’ do not only 
happen in face-to-face dialogue between people; they are rather an expression of 
the broader social discourse. 
 
Discursive constructions have both ideological and materialist consequences for 
those being related to care in particular and society in general. Furthermore 
discourses are also one way to analyse society’s attitudes on care and carers. The 
way we speak, think and argue about care, the way care is portrayed in the mass 
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media and in political debates, which stories, narratives, terms and ideas we use to 
talk about care, these are all expressions of what care is in our society, which role it 
plays and how it is defined. Williams (1996:64) points to the fact that the ‘use of the 
term ‘discourse’ is a self-conscious attempt to move away from both the sharp 
distinction between ideology (ideas) and materiality (things)’. In other words there is 
not only a reciprocal, dialectic relationship between discourse and material 
situations; discourse can be seen as one expression of materiality and vice versa. Van 
Dijk (1991:6) in his study of racism in the media starts his analysis by a leading claim 
that  
‘The main assumption guiding this research is that ethnic prejudices or 
ideologies are predominantly acquired and confirmed through various types of 
discourse or communication, such as socializing talk in the family, everyday 
conversations, laws, textbooks, government publications, scholarly discourse, 
advertising, movies and news reports’.  
 
This points to one of the main presumptions of this work as well, namely that 
discourse is a fundamentally ‘real’ thing, experienced and felt through people’s 
bodies, their emotions and in their lives. As mentioned above, discourse is not 
reduced to texts and speeches; it also describes the embodiment of norms, 
reproduced through social practices.  
 
To reiterate this point I want to briefly discuss the construction of categories which 
people use in their day-to-day experiences. The family of the woman who is starting 
to need care and support can only make sense of this situation through categories, 
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such as carer, elderly, dependent, independent. These categories are understood as 
not being fixed in their meaning; rather, the sense and the connotation is defined 
and shaped in discursive actions (see Hall 2000). Categories used in the discourses (in 
newspapers or in focus group discussions) need to be understood from the user’s 
perspective but also in terms of their broader societal meaning. For the analyst this 
means to not impose categories onto the empirical situation but to try to critically 
engage with what is used in a specific historical, social and cultural context, as 
Voegelin (cited in Weiss and Wodak 2003:11) reminds us:  
‘man [sic!] does not wait for science to have his life explained to him, and when 
the theorist approaches social reality he finds the field pre-empted by what may 
be called the self-interpretation of society’. 
 
Similarly Williams (1996) also urges the researcher to deconstruct categories in order 
to understand the meaning for individuals. She argues that by ‘breaking up analytical 
categories (...) it also enables us to detach ourselves from the categories and 
meanings imposed by policy-makers, welfare managers or (some) social researchers, 
and to pursue what the categories of ‘single mother’, ‘the old’, ‘the disabled’, and so 
on, mean to those who inhabit them’ (1996:68). Characteristics are otherwise often 
ascribed in policy discourses (Taylor 1998) and then reproduced by the social 
researcher. In my empirical research (see also chapter 3) I tried to not impose 
categories onto the participants. I used the analysis of newspaper articles to identify 
terms, categories and narratives through which care is written about. Similarly in the 
focus groups I avoided introducing terms and categories myself as far as possible and 
I tried to draw on people’s own terminology and categorisation. Clearly, this implies 
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that the meanings of categories used in public discourse bear significance and are 
related to power relations in the social context. I have already discussed Fraser’s 
(1989) example of the existence of ideological gender-linked categories and 
dichotomies such as work/home in this context.  
 
Subjects  
But who has the power to shape the moral framework and the moral categories in 
society? And how is this power being executed? To what extent are the family 
members in the care situation confronted with ethical demands, responsibilities, 
duties and identities and to what extent do they shape the situation? In this section I 
want to describe the power and ability of subjects to actively constitute the 
discourses in question. 
 
Foucault (1979) offers a very interesting account of power which is not restricted to a 
one-dimensional way. He identifies a system which is characterised by the absence of 
one side of authoritarian holders of power and he rather emphasises power’s force 
in the individuals’ bodies, desires, habits, actions and practices (see also Fraser 
1989). In this understanding power is executed by all participants in social life, who 
through their actions (and non-actions) produce, reproduce and who are themselves 
produced by dominant structures. In other words, people are the subjects of and are 
subjected to power. Foucault’s conception of the power/knowledge relation, in 
which ‘*p+ower is not (...) evil’ but ‘strategic games’ (Foucault 1987:129), emphasises 
the modern aspects of power which are deeply embedded by individuals (Fraser 
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1989). People internalise power at the ‘microphysical level of bodies, thoughts, wills, 
conducts and everyday lives’ (O’Grady 2004:98) and individuals develop an 
internalised gaze. This gaze should be understood as some kind of self-surveillance 
not being forced upon individuals but consequently taking away some freedom of 
choice (Valverde 2004). For example, family members are not forced to engage in 
caring relationships. They are not forced to perform certain services and practices. 
People’s dispositions, however, are formed in and through moral discourses, in 
which they themselves participate. Norms, values and identities establish what is the 
right thing to do in a particular situation. Additionally, through their practices of care 
they reproduce and shape the discourse and the moral construction of care. Social 
practices constitute power so that the main realm of the execution of power lies in 
the everyday practices. Power can therefore also be described as normalisation 
(McNay 1992) in the sense that people experience identities, ideas, and social actions 
as normal and self-evident.  
 
This conception of power proves to be very useful for an understanding of the 
discursive construction of social practices and moral attitudes. However, Foucault’s 
(1987:114) description of ‘a whole network of relationships of power’ ignores the 
variation in people’s subjectivities. Clearly, social and societal structures affect the 
potential of shaping discourses. Economic and social status cannot be easily grasped 
with Foucault’s conception. The subject and the socio-economic conditions and 
circumstances of subjects are crucial for an understanding of how discourses are 
interpreted, shaped and reproduced. Without an acting subject the analysis of care 
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and carers remains descriptive as there is no potential for intervention and change. 
Whereas Foucault’s concept of self-surveillance has the potential to explain the 
specific situation carers are caught in, it fails to take the normative aspects, i.e. the 
ideological moral grammar, into consideration (see in this context also Fraser 
1989:21). Foucault’s approach in which he does not provide the possibility of stable 
subjects makes it difficult to define normative claims, which leads for example to the 
question why struggle is preferable to submission (Fraser 1989:29) or why care for 
the self is preferable to total self-sacrifice. Fraser (1989) then concludes that 
deconstruction has limited political implications and argues that the moral-cultural 
dimension of the capitalist system needs to be taken into account. The relative 
absence of the subject in Foucault’s account18 does distract from the material 
circumstances in which discourses, actors and social practices take place. Individuals 
do find themselves confronted with discourse, and are participating in discourse, 
they however also live in particular materialist, socio-political circumstances which 
must not be ignored, but which are to be seen as a qualifying component of 
discourse itself. Being wealthy does not only offer more extensive choices for the 
arrangement of care for a family member; it also shapes the understanding of the 
moral grammar significantly. The wish to be cared for in one’s own house (see 
chapter 5) for example is certainly influenced by the fact whether the property is 
owned or rented. Similarly public discourses are also shaped by political and 
                                                 
18
 It can be argued (see McNay 1992) that Foucault introduces the subject to his analysis again in his 
work on ‘The Care of the Self’ (1984). He claims, that the traditional understanding of care that ‘one 
must show others or to the necessary sacrifice of the self’ (Foucault 1987:115-6) should be challenged 
and replaced by an understanding of care taking place in ‘a system of reciprocal obligations’ (1984:54) 
in which the care for the self takes a big part in. However, the subject still remains highly invisible and 
a notion of acting cannot be identified.  
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economic agendas. The potential to influence moral discourses of the person who is 
confronted with a situation of a frail mother is different to the one of a politician 
who is in charge of allocating large sums of money to care institutions. In that sense, 
power to shape discourses is complex, ambiguous and multidimensional, the 
significance of structures of economic and social power, however, must not be 
ignored.  
 
Van Dijk (1991) for example in his application of Critical Discourse Analysis argues 
that elites to a large extent control the public means of symbolic reproduction. 
Wodak (2001:10) argues in her approach of CDA that ‘language is not powerful on its 
own – it gains power by the use powerful people make of it’. This clearly recognises 
the fact that power is executed in and through discourse; it also, however, includes a 
perspective on social actors. In that sense, different people and different groups of 
people vary in their abilities to shape, design and construct discourses not least 
depending on materialist circumstances. I do reflect on this component of discourses 
by analysing different realms of discourse, for example lay, professional and 
academic discourses (see Seymour 1999) on care. This recognition also requires a 
reflection on the context in which discourses are shaped and reflected upon. An 
example would be the target audience of particular newspapers. Van Leeuwen 
(1996) shows that the linguistic constructions of actors and actions differ according 
to the intended, or imagined target audience of the newspaper:  
‘In middle class oriented newspapers government agents or experts tend to be 
referred to specifically, and ‘ordinary people’ generically: the point of 
identification, the world in which one’s specifics exist, is here, not the world of the 
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governed, but the world of the governors (…). In working-class oriented 
newspapers, on the other hand, ‘ordinary people’ are frequently referred to 
specifically’ (1996:47).  
 
While I will focus on the specificities of the linguistic categories in the analysis in 
chapter 3 below, I here want to draw attention to the idea that moral attitudes, such 
as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ or ‘us’ and ‘them’ are dependent on the circumstances in which 
discourses are constructed and shaped. Social, political and economic power fosters 
the ability to construct dominant, hegemonic moral discourses. Relations, ideas, 
attitudes and identities that appear ‘natural’ or in everyone’s interest can therefore 
by covered in discourses shaped by those benefiting from the very relations 
(Wetherell and Potter 1992:31). To individuals discourses appear normalised and 
neutral.  
 
To summarise, social actors in the understanding of this study are defined as those 
designing discourse and are at the same time those being shaped and constructed by 
discourse (Weiss and Wodak 2003:13; see also Wodak 2001a, 2001b). But social 
actors do experience and are taking part in discourse within specific socio-political 
circumstances. The situation of the care needs within the family cannot be analysed 
sufficiently in an abstract way; rather the lives of the people are lived in very 
particular contexts. How the care discourses are internalised and reproduced is 
influenced by (and influences) the specific real life situation.  
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The relation to materiality   
For my understanding (and in fact the understanding of CDA) it has to be stated that 
discourse has substantial material consequences. In this section I will now briefly 
discuss the relationship between discourse(s) and the material world. I have already 
mentioned De Cillia et al’s (1999) claim that social actors are constituted through 
discourse, that individuals learn their roles, identities, attitudes, situations through 
participation in public discourse. The constitution of moral attitudes and ideologies is 
particularly important for this research. Through discourse and within discourse a 
moral conception of right and wrong or good and bad is established. Public discourse 
for social actors provides a possibility of a simpler understanding of the social world. 
In other words, due to public discourse’s ability to ‘demarcate the boundaries’ 
(Reisigl and Wodak 2001), i.e. to create categories, ideas and narratives, individuals 
create, shape, and are confronted with a morally structured world. People’s actions 
are then shaped by this moral framework. Even if we act in conflict with the societal 
arrangement we experience the existence of the moral grammar. In this sense the 
analysis of the discursive creation of ‘the carer’ enables an understanding of the real 
consequences for care and carers and its impact on an idea of free choice and 
identity. Discourse shapes what is socially do-able, say-able and which actions and 
non-actions are socially sanctioned in which way. The beliefs people hold personally 
play a subordinated role, as Fraser (1989) argues, in the sense that privately held 
beliefs and ideologies are less important than social practices. Similarly, the 
particular aspect of discourse (a speech, a newspaper article, but also an action such 
as a person caring for her mother) is particularly important in its representation of 
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the general moral framework. It will then also become clear that the discourse 
manifested in particular texts only represents a certain moral framework and should 
be understood as pointing to a broader societal structure, or, as van Dijk (1991:181) 
put it: 
‘The text is like an iceberg of information of which only the tip is actually 
expressed in words and sentences. The rest is assumed to be supplied by the 
knowledge scripts and models of the media users, and therefore usually left 
unsaid’. 
 
I want to briefly discuss the example of pain and suffering to demonstrate the 
relation between discourse and material experience. Without doubt, suffering is a 
very real experience, physically and psychologically. However, suffering is also a 
narrative and a social concept. What we describe as ‘pointless’ suffering depends on 
the social and cultural circumstances. Furthermore, when and in which context we 
use suffering as a narrative says something about its meaning as a concept for the 
construction of care. Fields of interest regarding the discursive construction of 
suffering involve beside other things the body and our emotions, both of which are 
related to real experiences and defined through discursive constructions. Nicholson 
(1995:44) for example emphasises that the body’s function ‘as a source of knowledge 
about the self, and a sense of the self as shaped by the external world’ is exactly the 
place in which social constructions manifest themselves. Discussing emotions, Craib 
(1998) similarly argues that those ‘arise in the interplay between our experience of 
the outside world, and the unconscious phantasies we construct out of the contents 
of our internal world, and our conscious, more rational attempts to make sense of 
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what we do and how we are in the world’ (Craib 1998:169). Discourse therefore is 
understood as a realm in which real emotions and feelings are shaped, constructed 
and interpreted. It, however, does not mean that those are not experienced as real 
and existing. The family members (the person in need of care and those confronted 
with the situation) experience the situation as real and immediate. My concept of 
discourse does not deny these experiences of suffering, worrying, nor does it ignore 
the ‘real’ emotions, feelings and desires involved. Rather, discourse means that 
people’s conceptions of the situation are heavily influenced by a moral framework in 
society. How the members in this particular family make sense of the situation is 
shaped by the societal moral grammar constructed through discourse. And 
discourse, on the other hand, enables an analytical tool to investigate the moral 
framework and the constructions which impact on people’s experiences, emotions 
and attitudes.  
2.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have sketched the theoretical framework that is underlying my 
research project. This framework is necessary in order to make clear how 
terminologies and methodologies throughout the thesis are understood. 
Furthermore the theoretical conception describes how I understand care and carers, 
which moral theories guide my thinking and which concepts I use in order to make 
sense of the discourses available.  
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I have described a discursively constructed ethics of care approach, an ethics of care 
which does justice to people’s strong feelings about relationships and their 
immediate surroundings and contacts. Firstly, the ethics of care approach provides 
the tools to situate moral practices as an expression of relationships between 
people. Dependencies on each other and care for each other are seen as 
quintessential moral practices. Secondly, ethical agents in this conception are 
characterised as embodying particular values and virtues which form their moral 
character. The position of Virtue Ethics has helped to understand that care as a moral 
practice is not an expression of right actions; it deals with people’s moral character. 
The carer is seen to be good and not only to do good. Thirdly, taking responsibility for 
the other’s needs is seen as a main character trait of the moral actor. Fourthly, the 
creation of people as ethical agents and care as a moral practice is not restricted to 
moral, emotional and cultural ideals but clearly also has a material expression and 
basis. Fraser’s work has helped to integrate this perspective into the ethics of care 
approach. Social status impacts on the moral understanding and the ability to 
interpret and participate in the creation of the moral grammar. Additionally care 
does not only have material consequences for those involved (carers and cared-for) 
but is in itself a concept which is, due to its focus on intimate relations and being 
there for each other, also constructed in contrast to demands of the material world. 
And fifthly, moral agents, moral virtues, moral identities and moral practices are 
formed and shaped in discursive processes. The moral grammar through which 
individuals make sense of relations, moral demands and processes is constructed in 
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the public discourse. Individuals draw on these discourses, participate in them and 
are also themselves shaped by them.  
 
The ethics of care which I describe in this thesis will often be positioned in opposition 
to both an ethics of work (see Williams 2001 who defines a care ethics in opposition 
to New Labour’s work ethics) and an ethics of rights and justice (see Bubeck 1995). 
How people become ethical agents and how dispositions, identities and values are 
shaped I described as the realm of discourse. In and through discourse everyday 
morality is constructed, shaped, internalised and reproduced. The moral grammar, 
the available moral framework people draw on, defines how care is understood and 
dealt with. In the following chapter I will present how the concept of discourse has 
been operationalised for the analysis.  
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3 Methodology  
In chapter 2 I have discussed the importance of discourse in the context of the 
theoretical and epistemological framework of this study. The present chapter deals 
with the empirical application of the concept of discursive analysis and the 
operationalisation of the methodological framework. I have tried to find a framework 
for the empirical analysis which allows both a focus on the underlying discursive 
structures, constructions, categories and narratives and an acknowledgement of 
people’s contributions to this research. I have worked with the framework of Critical 
Discourse Analysis as this has allowed flexibility and rigour at the same time. In this 
chapter I will describe how this methodological approach has been operationalised. 
For this endeavour I will first (section 3.1) discuss the methods of Critical Discourse 
Analysis and the rationale for applying this methodological framework. Focusing 
more on my epistemological assumptions and understandings, in section 3.2 I will 
discuss how discourse can be analysed. What are the main aspects to look at? What 
can be found out, and what can be claimed by empirical analyses of discourses? How 
can these aspects be operationalised? I will then discuss in more detail the two main 
genres of discourse analysed for this project, written text (section 3.3) and focus 
group discussions (section 3.4). How can newspapers and other written materials be 
analysed? Which categories are applied and how is the sample selected? This is 
followed by a discussion of the use of focus groups as a source of discourse material. 
I will discuss the usefulness of focus groups for the research questions being asked 
and I will recall the operationalisation of this method. Finally, in section 3.5 I will 
briefly present the two case studies, Austria and the UK, which are used for this 
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analysis. I will consider the specific social, political and economic contexts in which 
care systems operate. The evaluation of the specific discursive context will be 
completed by a brief depiction of the situation of care for elderly people in both 
countries.  
3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
In the history of discourse analysis there are various approaches which do not only 
differ in their methodological tools but, more importantly, in their epistemological 
positions.19 The discussion between Conversation Analysis (CA), Discourse Analysis 
(DA) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) can be seen exemplarily for this debate 
(see Schegloff 1997; Billig 1999). It seems to be useful to identify the particularities of 
CDA, also in comparison to ‘traditional’ conversation analysis. The extensive 
discussion (Billig 1999; Schegloff 1997; van Dijk 1999; Mey 2001) between authors of 
CDA (Billig) and CA (Schegloff) shows that, in contrast to CA’s postulate of an 
explanation of categories and events in the participants’ own terms, CDA includes 
some a-priori categories (van Dijk 1999), such as gender, power, class and denies the 
possibility of neutral investigation in general. Additionally Billig (1999) challenges a 
notion of the non-ideological postulate of discourse used by the approaches of CA. 
With CDA I argue that discourse has to be understood in its social settings as an 
ideologically and materialistically shaped social practice. As a consequence I have laid 
out the theoretical concept of this thesis in chapter 2 to enable the reader to be 
conscious of the categories and concepts used in the analysis. Related to this is also 
                                                 
19
 For a discussion of gender and discourse analysis, for example, see Baxter 2003; Lazar 2005.  
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Meyer’s (2001) claim that CDA denies a notion of ‘pure cognition’. In fact, both 
reception and interpretation of discourses are shaped by socio-economic conditions 
and other contextual circumstances.  
 
Therefore CDA does not claim to be restricted to an analysis of the specific discursive 
patterns and is not limited to a close reading of the texts. Rather, CDA is ‘critical 
because it is rooted in a radical critique of social relations’ (Billig 2003:38). For that 
reason power structures and social and cultural relations are at the very core of the 
focus of most work being done in Critical Discourse Analysis. As Wodak (2001a:2) 
formulates it, CDA’s strengths lie in  
‘analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, 
discrimination, power and control as manifested in language’. 
 
In doing that CDA tries to combine the social sciences with linguistic analysis 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999), seeing language as a manifestation of social 
practices and social relations. Wodak (2008:12) describes the way CDA goes beyond 
the linguistic categories to form a broader social-scientific approach:  
‘it attempts to transcend the purely linguistic dimension and to include more or 
less systematically the historical, political, sociological, and/or psychological 
dimensions in the analysis and interpretation of a specific discursive event’. 
 
For the study of the discourse on care I will specifically utilise Ruth Wodak’s 
‘discourse-historical approach’ (2001b; Reisigl and Wodak 2001) which is problem-
oriented, interdisciplinary and eclectic in its choice of theory and methodology. 
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Furthermore this approach is interested in the historical and cultural context of 
discourse, in particular the concepts of power, history and ideology (Wodak 2001a). 
Wodak (2001b) also offers some useful criteria for the assessment of the quality of 
CDA by presenting her approach of triangulation (see below). She distinguishes three 
levels of analysis: firstly, the text itself and the intertextual or interdiscursive 
relationships between different texts and discourses; secondly, the extralinguistic 
social level which describes the relationship of different social and sociological 
variables (e.g. gender and care) and for which middle range theories are appropriate; 
finally she identifies the broader socio-political and historical context of discourse 
and text. This approach enables an analysis of the reciprocal relationship between 
structure and action (see Fairclough 2001) as manifested in the discursive 
construction.  
 
Especially because CDA is not only a method but also a theory and an epistemological 
system the operationalisation of the methodological framework is often discussed 
insufficiently (Wodak 2008). In order to make my steps of analysis clearer I will also 
discuss some other authors from the methodological framework of CDA whose 
procedures I used in the empirical investigation. In particular van Dijk’s (1991) socio-
cognitive categories and van Leeuwen’s (1995, 1996) linguistic categories give some 
detail of how to look at discursive patterns and which modes of analysis can be 
applied. Even though discourse in this study is merely understood as a social practice 
I also use some of Wetherell and Potter’s (1992) arguments and ideas of their 
psychology-inspired analysis of discourse.  
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3.2 How to analyse discourse  
In this section I will discuss some of the basic ideas of the operationalisation of CDA 
in order to answer the question of how to analyse and evaluate discourse. I will 
specifically focus on newspapers and focus groups in the sections below; here I will 
first present some ground rules and basic ideas.  
 
In terms of the empirical work I follow Meyer’s (2001) advice that there is no clear 
dividing line between data collection and analysis. Rather, by collecting materials the 
analysis already begins and through the analysis criteria for data collection are 
defined (see below the discussion on the sample of newspapers). Similarly to 
grounded theory, the collection and analysis of materials is followed by further data 
collection:  
‘after the first collection exercise it is a matter of carrying out the first analyses, 
finding indicators for particular concepts, expanding concepts into categories and, 
on the basis of these results, collecting further data’ (Meyer 2001:24). 
 
This process then results in a combination of a hermeneutic rather than a positivist, 
analytical-deductive method (Meyer 2001) with linguistic categories. Albeit linguistics 
does not reflect the core of the method, categories such as actors, time, mode, tense 
or argumentation (Meyer 2001; Wodak 2001; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; van 
Dijk 2001) must be carefully identified, evaluated and analysed. This hermeneutic 
method inevitably includes interpretation and is therefore potentially at risk of bias. 
As mentioned above, Wodak hence proposes a system of triangulation in order ‘to 
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minimize the risk of critical bias’ (2008:12). I intend to use a combination of 
interrelated methods meaning that design and outcome of one method affect the 
design of the other methods. Wodak’s approach is based on Cicourel’s (1973) 
‘indefinite triangulation’ in which he, in order to avoid the shortcomings of 
traditional sociological methods (Cicourel 1964), argues for an analysis from various 
standpoints and for the use of different methods in an indefinite, reflexive setting. 
Triangulation in my project is carried out in four different parts. Firstly, triangulation 
of context (Wodak 2001b) which I described above as the three levels of context 
which need to be taken into consideration. This specifically means that I take the 
political, social, economic and cultural circumstances of discourses into account. 
Secondly, triangulation of cases (I use Austria and the UK as case studies); thirdly, 
triangulation of methods, through the use of discourse analysis of written materials 
and the organisation of focus group discussions. And finally, triangulation of data, 
using different publications and discussion groups.  
 
The specific parts under analysis such as newspaper articles and focus group 
discussions will be referred to as particular texts which all together form the 
discourse on care (see Wodak 2008). In terms of categories and what to look at I 
want to broadly distinguish between three levels, the level of content, the level of 
discursive strategies and the level of linguistic relationships (see Reisigl and Wodak 
2001). I will briefly discuss each of these three levels and their application in practice 
below:  
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Content 
In relation to the content of a text several aspects will be looked at: Firstly, what are 
the main topics of a particular text and a broader discourse (these include for 
example morality, dependency, self-sacrifice, family and kinship); secondly, what are 
the main narratives used to construct these themes (examples for narratives are 
carers as heroes, doing good for society, being a role model for society, love and 
responsibility, giving up one’s career for someone, community values). The analysis 
of these narratives and themes also includes a focus on the tensions and 
contradictions, both within a text and within the discourse in general (e.g. carers as 
heroes vs. abuse by carers). Another part of this analysis of the content forms the 
identification of the actors appearing in the discourse. Which subjects are mentioned 
and how are they referred to (e.g. carer, daughter, hero, friend, angel)? Van 
Leeuwen (1995) points out that ‘*a+s the power of social actors decreases, the 
amount of emotive reactions attributed to them increases’ (van Leeuwen 1995:88). 
Particularly because the discourse on care strongly refers to emotions and feelings, it 
is important to understand the reference to specific actors in the whole discursive 
constructions. Being referred to as ‘heroes’, ‘angels’ or ‘saints’ is closely linked to a 
rather vulnerable economic and social position. Vice versa, politicians in the context 
of care are often portrayed as bureaucratic and cold.  
 
Discursive strategies 
The second level of text analysis is referred to as discursive strategies. This can be 
understood as how specific values, meanings, attitudes and ideas are produced in 
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the discursive materials. This, beside other aspects, includes which terms and words 
are used, for example whether a specific narrative is being told by using high value 
words (words that are generally associated with positive meaning, such as love, 
compassion, family20) or low value words (such as control, party politics21, 
selfishness, duties, care as commodity). Which myths, rituals, symbols and pictures 
are used and created in the text and the discourse? These strategies, which can be 
seen as the discursive realisations of attitudes and ideologies, also focus on how 
actions are talked about. Van Leeuwen (1995) for example distinguishes between 
transactive actions (actions through which others are affected) and non-transactive 
actions. He argues that ‘the ability to ‘transact’ requires a certain power, and the 
greater that power, the greater the range of ‘goals’ that may be affected by an 
actor’s actions’ (van Leeuwen 1995:90). The distinction between the carer and the 
cared-for person is a good example in this context. The way actions by the carer are 
described in the discourses is clearly a sign of transactive actions, with the ability to 
affect others, while the cared-for person is constructed as not having the power for 
transactive actions him/herself. Additionally, the power of social actors is also 
emphasised by attributing cognitive rather than affective actions to them (van 
Leeuwen 1995:87).  
 
 
                                                 
20
 Clearly some of these terms can have negative connotations for some people. The notion of family 
for example can represent negative experiences for some people or an old-fashioned institution of 
societal organisation for others. However, even those people have to be conscious of the mainstream 
connotations of family as a positive concept. The terminology of dependency and independence is 
another important example in this context (see chapter 7).  
21
 In chapter 8 I will discuss the ambivalences in people’s ideas about politics. Party politics in 
particular, however, was continually referred to as a negative concept in relation to care.  
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Linguistic relationships  
Linguistic relationships form the last level of text and discourse analysis. These can 
be seen as the consequence of the manifestation of the two levels discussed above. 
Reisigl and Wodak (2001) list several processes that can be identified in the discourse 
such as exclusion, inclusion, suppression, backgrounding, passivation, categorisation, 
specification, genericisation, assimilation, collectivisation, aggregation, 
impersonalisation, abstraction and objectivisation. In other words, this level of 
analysis tries to identify what the consequences are of the use of certain strategies, 
terms and narratives. In chapter 7 for example I will discuss the construction of 
dependency in the discourse. Old people or people in need of care are described in 
the discourses through objectivisation and passivation. The lack of power is 
represented and reproduced by their appearance in the stories, narratives and 
contributions about care.  
 
Obviously, discourses are varied and multifaceted. In both newspapers and focus 
group discussions there were variations, ambivalences and disagreements. However, 
what is constitutive of care is the dominant discourse. What is being said and written 
as a result of expectations, notions of normality and hegemonic ideas?  
3.3 Newspapers and other written materials  
News items provide information. They are also, however, similarly to all other forms 
of discourse, produced and shaped in particular social contexts. In other words, 
news, like other forms of text, ‘should be studied primarily as a form of public 
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discourse’ (van Dijk 1988b:vii). Newspapers are undeniably one main source that 
shapes and determines public discourses. Aldridge (1994:18) reminds us that ‘the 
media have the potential to set the news agenda in terms of both topics and 
discursive framework’ and that the media help to define what is both acceptable and 
socially thinkable (Aldridge 1994:35). In particular this latter aspect is extremely 
important in this study and the main reason for the choice of newspapers to analyse 
the discourse on care. Newspapers can be seen as a representation and reflection of 
dominant discourses, using narratives, expressions, ideas and ideologies that can be 
expressed publicly and which are hence thought to be shared widely. What, for 
example, is constructed in the public realm as morally right and wrong? The 
usefulness of an analysis of newspapers as a representation of broader discursive 
and societal structures and dynamics results furthermore from newspapers’ 
transmitting function between the day-to-day experiences and the broader social 
structures and ideologies. The analysis of newspapers helps us to understand how, as 
van Dijk (1991) argues, relationships on a macro level are translated onto the micro 
level of everyday events. 
 
I agree with van Dijk (2001:99) that it is an illusion, that ‘a complete discourse 
analysis of a large corpus of text or talk’ is possible. Therefore a selective sample 
must be constructed, fitting the criteria described above. According to Meyer 
(2001:18) most CDA studies work with ‘typical texts’, meaning texts which exemplify 
the discourse under investigation. Inevitably the problem of defining typical texts 
arises. Many CDA scholars recommend theoretical sampling as the most appropriate 
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strategy and suggest that the sample should be re-considered during the process of 
research. This means that my sample was not fixed in detail before the start of the 
analysis and needed to be adjusted throughout the research process. For example, I 
realised that I had started with a sample that was possibly unbalanced in terms of 
the political positions of the newspapers. Hence I included more newspapers in both 
countries than originally planned. The choice of newspapers reflects the attempt of 
generating an exemplifying but nevertheless representative sample. Different 
newspapers reflect different ideologies and try to build up some shared identity with 
their readership. Different newspapers, for example, follow different ideas of what 
and how human beings are (e.g. selfish, rational, caring) and how a decent society is 
composed. It could be said that the relationship between readers and their 
newspapers is based on the provision of ontological security (see Richardson 2007) 
by ‘creating a system of shared values’ (Reah 2002:40). The sample inevitably entails 
the most popular (i.e. best selling) newspapers (Kronen Zeitung; The Sun)22. It 
furthermore reflects a combination of ‘tabloids’ and ‘broadsheets’ as well as a 
reflection of the political spectrum from what are considered to be working class and 
rather sensationalist papers (Kronen Zeitung, Österreich; Daily Mirror, The Sun), 
middle range papers (Kurier; Daily Mail) to quality newspapers, ranging from 
conservative to liberal papers (Die Presse, Der Standard; The Times, Daily Telegraph, 
The Guardian).  
 
                                                 
22
 Sources: Audit Bureau of Circulations (2007); Österreichische Auflagenkontrolle (2008) 
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In summary, the study is based on a sample of six British daily newspapers (The Sun, 
Daily Mirror, Daily Mail, The Guardian (including The Observer), The Times, Daily 
Telegraph), and five Austrian newspapers (Kronen Zeitung, Österreich, Kurier, Die 
Presse, Der Standard). Both have been analysed over a period of one year (August 
2006-August 2007). The choice of the sample is based on Wodak et al.’s (1995) and 
van Dijk’s (1988a) studies (for a discussion of various differentiations of newspapers 
see Bednarek 2006). 
 
How to analyse written materials 
Similarly to Richardson (2007; see also Leeuwen 1996 and Mautner 2008) I use 
Wodak’s process of analysis starting with the micro-textual level (and here I explicitly 
refer to the use, the choice and the meaning of certain words and the construction of 
sentences). As Richardson (2007) points out, when writing articles, journalists, who 
represent ‘part of a dominant cultural elite’ (van Dijk 1988a:x) choose one word, one 
category and one term over another one and give in this way a certain meaning to it. 
This is followed by a mid-level analysis (which includes for example a discussion of 
modalities, i.e. the speakers’ attitudes, judgements and evaluations, an analysis of 
other presuppositions prevalent in the text itself and an identification of rhetorical 
tropes such as metaphors). The last step builds an evaluation of the narratives and 
plots being used to tell a story, to report news or to construct a commentary. Also, 
doing justice to a context-aware evaluation, it must not be forgotten in the analysis 
of texts to think about the aspects that are absent. Aldridge (1994:3) rightly asks: 
‘what does not make the news?’  
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Above I have already described the process of analysing discourse and the steps that 
are performed. Here I only want to refer to some specificities of analysing 
newspapers. Analysing the actors appearing in newspaper articles for example, a 
particular focus on the power relations seems useful. Van Leeuwen (1995, 1996) 
explains how news items differentiate actors by status and importance. In my study 
this is particularly interesting in the context of the elderly, which are often described 
as vulnerable, passive, or are not identified as actors at all. Generally one can see 
how ‘the elderly’ are often collectively established as a passive entity (similarly 
articles refer to ‘old folk’ or the ‘loved ones’). Aldridge (1994:114) also states that the 
representation of elderly people in the media is often characterised by a ‘done-to 
vulnerability’. Other important actors in newspaper articles on care are carers (with a 
differentiation between informal and professional carers), families as collectives, 
politicians and ‘experts’. Status and power differences are expressed through the use 
of direct quotations and the description of certain actions as active and others as 
passive. Other aspects in newspaper articles are the use of particular sources (‘expert 
knowledge’), writing styles and the use of pictures and other illustrations. As 
described above, the identification of key themes and narratives is obviously one of 
the main aspects of the analysis.  
 
One characteristic of newspaper articles is the use of headlines. Headlines, which are 
usually chosen by the editors, serve an important function to point out the intended 
main topic of an article (van Dijk 1991). Van Dijk (1991:51) emphasises that headlines 
need to be understood as a ‘subjective definition of the situation, which influences 
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the interpretation made by the readers’. In that sense headlines directly refer to 
people’s routines (see above) and the interpretation of a report is determined by 
these familiar scripts in people’s minds so that ‘readers would have to make an extra 
effort to derive an alternative main topic from the text’ (van Dijk 1991:51). Headlines 
therefore bear a ‘semantic, cognitive and ideological relevance’ (van Dijk 1991:52) 
for the understanding of a text. Due to these reasons I have analysed headlines 
separately, in order to get an overview of the discourses on care and the 
construction of the main ideas presented in the very discourses. I have composed a 
list with all headlines used for articles on care over a particular period. This enables 
an analysis of the main themes, concepts and terms being used in order to illustrate 
articles. One example of tools for the analysis should be mentioned: the use of 
personal pronouns in headlines, for example in ‘Why we must all care for the carers’ 
(Daily Mail, 21/02/07) or ‘How can we say we are civilised when we treat our elderly 
no better than prisoners?’ (Daily Mail, 23/01/07). By the use of personal pronouns 
emotional proximity and familiarity within society and between the reader and the 
author are assumed and constructed. Certain family relations are emphasised and a 
process of backgrounding others and the construction of us vs. them is established.  
 
But the analysis of texts must not end at the particular written word. Equally 
important, though difficult to estimate, are the spheres of perception and cognition 
(Aldridge 1994). Aldridge (1994:18) rightly points out that it is nearly impossible to 
know whether the readers or viewers are able to deconstruct a news item in the 
same way as the researcher. Is the reading other people get from a text, and their 
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interpretation and understanding, different from the one proposed by the trained 
researcher? This is one of the reasons for the use of focus groups in this study. In 
particular I used materials (pictures and quotes) from newspaper articles and asked 
the focus group participants about their opinions, feelings and ideas about them. I 
then evaluated these contributions and related them to my own analysis.  
 
Process  
The analysis of newspapers was carried out in three steps. First, I conducted a pilot 
study for each country. My MA dissertation (Weicht 2006), covering the period of 
July-August 2006 could serve as the pilot study for Austria and I carried out a 
separate pilot study in the UK, consisting of three newspapers (The Sun, Daily Mail, 
The Guardian) over a three months period (January-March 2007). Through this pilot 
study I familiarised myself with the field and I constructed preliminary categories for 
the analysis. The second step was a preliminary text search carried out over the 
internet. This enabled an identification of a vast range of articles on care in various 
newspapers. I ordered these articles and extracted reoccurring themes, narratives, 
terms and concepts. The third step was a search and analysis of ‘typical texts’ in their 
various original contexts. I could draw on my pre-selection in order to identify 
important, common and relevant materials in the way they originally appeared in the 
newspapers. For this endeavour I used the newspaper archives of the British Library 
(London-Colindale) and the Austrian National Library (Vienna).  
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3.4 Focus Groups23 
The analysis of the written word also bears some shortcomings. A newspaper report 
is always a static material whereas discourse is additionally taking place in dynamic 
interactions (see Charon 2001:160). Discourse does not exist in a vacuum detached 
from real people and socio-economic circumstances. In fact, I argue with reference 
to the theoretical framework, that individuals interpret and internalise discourse in a 
specific way which is affected by gender, status, and the socio-economic situation. 
Hence it is essential to me to also take the sphere of ‘reception’ into account, i.e. the 
question of how people experience and articulate the social discourse on care and 
carers. Critical Discourse Analysis gives important insights into the construction of 
themes and categories and the context of a discursive action. However, as Wodak 
(2007) rightly pointed out, CDA sometimes lacks a documentation of the reception of 
the very themes, i.e. how people interpret, internalise and communicate discursively 
constructed norms, values and identities. Van Dijk (2001) for example calls for an 
inclusion of the cognitive-psychological reception of discourses. For this purpose I 
decided to use focus groups to find out whether or not categories and themes 
identified through CDA are also reflected in the day-to-day language of individuals.24  
                                                 
23
 For the empirical research ethical clearance had been gained from the School of Sociology & Social 
Policy, University of Nottingham. Before the start of each focus group discussion informed consent 
had been obtained from all participants. I provided information sheets for all participants to take with 
them which included information on the participants’ rights to withdraw at any time of the discussion 
and my future use of the data recorded. Participants were then asked to complete informed consent-
forms and at the beginning of the (recorded) discussion I emphasised again these important ethical 
conditions of the research.  
24
 For the analysis of the sphere of ‘reception’ it is crucial, as Crossley (2002) interestingly points out, 
to emphasise that interviews and focus groups present a situation of social interaction and social 
construction itself: ‘when people made reference to their thoughts and attitudes during such 
interactive episodes, they were not simply ‘reflecting’ something that already existed in the heads, but 
performing certain social actions’ (Crossley 2002:1472). Hence, with the use of focus groups I wanted 
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Focus groups are, as Bloor et al. (2001) put it, the ideal method to identify group 
norms and understandings (see also Wilkinson 2004). Similarly, May (2001:125) 
emphasises focus groups’ possibility ‘to explore group norms and dynamics’ and 
states that focus groups are the best way to get as close as possible to normal 
conversation manners. From a CDA perspective Wodak (2008) also emphasises the 
strength of focus groups in creating a ‘semi-public’ genre. The goals of the use of this 
method can be summarised as identifying the categories, themes, norms and values 
people attach to care and as analysing whether or not these factors reflect the ones 
described and identified through CDA of newspapers and other written texts. In 
contrast to interviews I wanted to use the characteristic of focus groups ‘to study the 
ways in which individuals collectively make sense of a phenomenon and construct 
meanings around it’ (Bryman 2004:348; italics added) in a way that best resembles 
everyday interaction.  
 
Another interesting aspect with respect to the combination of focus groups and CDA 
is Scollon’s (2001a, 2001b) ‘Mediated Discourse Analysis’ approach. He argues that 
CDA must refer to categories and definitions used by participants and he tries to find 
out ‘how (…) participants themselves define the key social actions’ (Scollon 
2001a:159). Scollon uses focus groups (beside other methods) at two stages of his 
approach (see also Meyer 2001): at the stage of identification of the data materials 
and sources and later on to check the results. I agree with Scollon’s claim that the 
                                                                                                                                            
to identify people’s conception of discourse but I also added one sphere of discourse in which 
meanings, norms, values and identities are shaped.  
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researcher wants to ‘understand how important or salient the categories which have 
been identified are for the population being studied’ (2001a:158). It is my task 
therefore to find out whether the data has validity and reliability for the participants 
themselves. However, I want to emphasise one additional aspect, namely focus 
group’s potential to analyse people’s experience of and reflection on discourse. As 
Scollon (2001b) rightly suggests, the historical and cultural setting of focus groups 
plays a crucial part for the functioning of the method and its potential outcome. 
Krzyżanowski (2008) who uses focus groups in the context of CDA describes them as 
a ‘semi-private’ sphere of society. The views expressed in the focus groups he sees at 
the borderline between public, collectively held views and views of selected small-
scale groups and individuals. He therefore argues that focus groups are the ideal 
realm to analyse how 
‘the public sphere influences (...) individuals’ views on politics and society and 
how, conversely, the ideas crucial to the ‘social’ (individual) level penetrate (...) 
into politics, into the media and into other constituents of the public sphere’ 
(Krzyżanowski 2008:169).  
 
However, some limitations need to be discussed. Bryman’s summary (2004:359-60) 
of the difficulties of the use of focus groups such as less control, difficulty of analysis 
of data (themes and patterns), difficulties of organisation or time-consuming 
transcriptions have been taken seriously and could be dealt with through appropriate 
and extensive planning. Other limitations however, such as ‘problems’ of group 
effects and that the participants are more prone to express culturally expected views 
than in individual interviews (Bryman 2004), are, according to the aims of the use of 
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this particular method and the type of research questions being asked, no limitations 
but, on the contrary, explicitly those issues I am interested in. Whereas Bloor et al. 
(2001:17) emphasise that ‘focus groups are not a good source of data on group 
behaviour or attitudes, since intra-group variations will be underreported’ the 
intended result of this investigation is not a comprehensive survey of everyone’s 
opinion or attitude; rather I aim to understand the reaction and internalisation of 
discourses on care and the values, norms, and attitudes people express in 
negotiations of positions which are close to everyday discussions. In fact I want to 
use the possibility that 
‘The group is a socially legitimated occasion for participants to engage in 
‘retrospective introspection’, to attempt collectively to tease out previously 
taken for granted assumptions’ (Bloor et al. 2001:5-6). 
 
For my empirical study I conducted 10 focus groups (4 in the UK and 6 in Austria) 
with 46 participants in total (23 participants in each country)25. I used both pre-
existing groups and groups of strangers. The former’s advantage lies in the fact that 
hierarchical structures, codes and social contexts in which ideas are formed in 
everyday life (Bloor et al. 2001) are present and that the groups therefore reflect as 
much a real life situation as possible. Whereas existing groups might offer a more 
natural environment to talk about emotional aspects in a familiar, often experienced 
                                                 
25
 Two other people in the UK reacted to my search for participants. They would have liked to 
participate in a focus group but were unable to do so. Having received from me an overview of 
themes and topics for the discussions they sent me some of their thoughts on care for elderly people 
by email. I compared these comments to the discussions in the focus groups and noted that they were 
very similar to the discursive expressions in the organised focus group sessions. Obviously, this 
practice reaches beyond the framework of my methodology but I wanted to appreciate their interest 
and willingness to take part in this research. Their contributions also reflected the general discourse 
on care.  
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setting they can also cause the problem that a particular group discourse is not 
representative for the general social discourse. The organisation of groups of 
strangers, on the other hand, might offer an account of more general social 
discourse, but this ignores the reality of discourse taking place in a specific historical 
and social setting, usually between people who already know each other. The 
participants were recruited through local organisations, clubs, church groups, 
political parties and informal networks. I wanted to avoid an all too heterogeneous 
group composition as this often causes lack of depth of information (Bloor et al. 
2001:20). However, in some of the pre-existing groups a more heterogeneous 
composition (for example in terms of age) was inevitable but the fact that people 
shared something else (group membership) and/or knew each other was of benefit 
for the outcome of the particular session. Recruitment was relatively difficult and 
many people I contacted were concerned that they would not ‘know enough’ about 
the topic under discussion. It proved difficult for me to communicate that these 
groups were not conducted in order to generate specific information and knowledge. 
I was rather interested in people’s stories, experiences, attitudes, associations and 
emotions. I therefore also changed the materials for the recruitment (letters, emails) 
throughout the process. Eventually most people participating in the groups 
recognised some relationship with care. Either they themselves had caring 
experiences, were close to situations of care or they had opinions and knowledge 
about the topic. The focus groups consisted of three to seven participants and they 
lasted between 1 ½ hours and more than 2 hours. These so called ‘minigroups’ 
(Bryman 2004) could offer the characteristics of group discussions but also allowed 
  
93 
more personal accounts and stories. The focus groups took place in various venues in 
Austria and the UK, in private apartments, in participants’ apartments, in church 
venues, in political party venues and once in a pub. Following Bloor et al.’s (2001:39) 
warning that ‘*t+here is no such thing as a neutral venue for a focus group’ I tried to 
be conscious of the impact of these venues during the analysis. Especially the session 
conducted in the pub lacked the characteristics of the usual setting of a focus group 
as the room the group (which consisted of people who hardly knew each other) had 
booked for this occasion was not available. I think, however, that the fact that people 
had to sit very close to each other and had to talk very loud, created some group 
identification.  
 
My own position can be described as a facilitator in a rather informal setting, trying 
to foster discussion and to point to interesting themes and topics. This method 
enabled a free discussion (which also allowed drifting away from the prepared 
questions and themes) between the participants, which was not reduced to 
responses to the researcher (see Crossley 2002:1480).26 In some of the groups, 
depending on the dynamics of the discussion, I used a focusing exercise (Bloor et al. 
2001:42) by showing pictures and quotes taken from newspapers. At other times, 
particularly when I felt that people wanted to share their stories, I decided that the 
focusing exercises would not be necessary and in the worst case distracting. I used a 
broad list of themes (such as families, care homes, own experiences) I wanted to 
                                                 
26
 It is important to note that the analysis of the focus group discussions does not focus on the 
individual level of the socio-economic characteristics of each participant in the groups. I am rather 
describing the discourses happening in the groups and the themes, narratives, opinions and ideas 
emerging from these group discussion processes. See in this context the discussion of my 
understanding and my use of the concept of discourse as an explicitly social practice in section 2.6.  
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discuss but the main aim was to wait for a discussion emerging out of the 
participants’ interests, stories and opinions. In the analysis I could then devise a list 
of secondary topics (Krzyżanowski 2008) which were not introduced by myself but 
which were brought up by the participants themselves. I also tried to involve all 
people into the discussion but in order not to drift away too much from a real life 
situation I did not want to enforce equal participation. That also meant that I allowed 
that some participants were more prominent than others and might have dominated 
parts of the discussion. After reflecting on the first groups, however, I decided that 
this would just be a representation of real life situations and that dominant opinions 
and meanings can prove to be an important source for my analysis. Generally it can 
be said that the focus groups proved to work very well, for participants were very 
active and engaged. Some group internal power hierarchies have to be taken into 
consideration, but again, this reflects day-to-day experiences of conversations and 
discourses. I also had extremely positive feedback from many participants who also 
expressed their gratitude to have been offered the chance and the space to talk 
about care and their experiences and feelings about care. This also brought to my 
attention a general discomfort with the care discourses in society in which it is not 
‘fashionable’ to talk about care and being old or ill. People also said that they would 
not want to ‘bother’ friends and colleagues with these issues and that the focus 
groups were thus a gratefully accepted opportunity for them. Reflecting on the 
general atmosphere during the groups I think people started to realise that they do 
not have to present ‘expert knowledge’ but that it is their own experiences, feelings 
and ideas I was interested in.  
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3.5 Two case studies  
The empirical analysis of this study focuses on two national case studies. As van Dijk 
(2001) notes, it is simply impossible to cover all aspects of a discourse in one area. 
However, by choosing two cases a moral framework could be identified and the 
mechanisms of the respective discourses could be analysed. The two cases represent 
exemplifying cases in Bryman’s (2004) sense in order to illustrate the broader 
analytical processes. Following Bryman’s advise that a carefully considered choice of 
cases is essential in order to find ‘a suitable context for certain research questions 
(...) to examine key social processes’ (2004:51) I chose Austria and the United 
Kingdom as countries for the analysis.  
 
Having emphasised the importance of the contexts for a Critical Discourse Analysis 
above, I want to now focus briefly on the two national contexts of Austria and the 
UK, with particular interest in the structures of care for elderly people. Although I am 
aware of the huge range of literature on welfare regimes (see Abrahamson 1999 for 
an overview) the present study is not explicitly basing itself within this field as the 
typologies usually do not focus on moral values, norms and identities. What can be 
held, however, are similarities and differences between the two countries which 
serve as cases for the empirical analysis. Both countries are characterised by a 
European historical development with its moral and philosophical foundation 
influenced by a Judeo-Christian-Muslim ethical tradition. Furthermore both countries 
are operating with a capitalistic economy, influenced by the development of social 
democracy in the 20th century. The UK and Austria as the exemplifying institutional 
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backgrounds do therefore reflect cases with similar societal structures, which allows 
to treat the discursive practices as being based in a similar context. These countries, 
however, do also reflect traditional differences with respect to (welfare) state 
regimes within the borders sketched above (see Daly and Lewis 2000; Abrahamson 
1999). Whereas the institutional organisation of care is different in the two 
countries, informal care is extremely important in both (see also Österle 2001). Also 
in the context of the analysis of discourse a brief description of the two cases is 
important as van Leeuwen (1996:34) put it: 
‘a given culture (or a given context within a culture) has not only its own, specific 
array of ways of representing the social world, but also its own specific ways of 
mapping the different semiotics on to this array, of prescribing, with greater or 
lesser strictness, what can be realised verbally as well as visually, what only 
verbally, what only visually, and so on’.  
 
Austria  
The Austrian care system is strongly based on informally provided care, usually 
within family settings. In 2007 413,468 people received the cash payment for people 
with care needs (which I describe below; Statistik Austria 2009a, 2009b). 80 percent 
of people are cared for at home by close relatives, of whom 80 percent are women 
(Österle and Hammer 2004:36). Interestingly, men caring for relatives are usually 
retired whereas the majority of women caring are under 55 years old. Only between 
4 and 5 percent of people being 65 or older live in institutional settings (retirement 
homes and nursing homes) and 5 percent of those 65 and older receive some form of 
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formal home help (Österle and Hammer 2004). This exemplifies the general trend in 
Austria of a ‘de-institutionalisation’ (Österle and Hammer 2004:38).  
 
In Austria long-term care is formally organised by the payment of ‘Pflegegeld’, a 
financial benefit based on the hours of care that are necessary (see Badelt and 
Österle 2001). The intention and goal of the ‘Pflegegeld’ can be found in §1 of the 
relevant law, the Austrian Pflegegeld-Gesetz where it says:  
‘The purpose of the ‘Pflegegeld’ is to compensate for care-related additional 
expenditures in order to assure the necessary care and support for care-
dependent people as far as possible and to improve the possibility to lead a self 
determined, needs-oriented life’ (BPGG:§ 1, own translation).  
 
One explicit goal of the implementation of this law was to financially secure and 
support the possibility of care within the family (see Badelt et al. 1997:2) and to 
therefore strengthen the (personally felt) responsibility to care. This conception of 
care obviously requires many people who are willing to perform care services in an 
informal context. When Österle and Hammer (2004:69) summarise the various 
factors which are relevant for the design of informal care, traditions, role-
descriptions and emotional bonds play a crucial role.  
 
The fact that care is still largely seen as a family issue, which is also reflected in public 
and political discourses, is challenged by demographic developments related to an 
ageing society and changing family structures. Care work, and in particular the 
organisation of round-the-clock care, place a large burden on family members, 
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emotionally, financially and physically. In Austria the answer for many families has 
been the employment of migrant carers working and living in the house of the 
person cared for. In Austria there are approximately 40,000 people employed as 
carers in private settings (Bilger et al. 2006). The large majority of these people are 
women from Eastern European neighbour countries (in particular Slovakia). The live-
in arrangements are usually organised by specialised agencies and the carers work on 
a fortnightly cycle. This example of rotational (Bettio et al. 2006) or pendulum 
migration (Glucksmann and Lyon 2006) is a situation which inevitably raises several 
difficulties for the construction of care as emotional labour based on proximity, love 
and intimacy. Central features of the meaning of care are reciprocal relationships, 
love, affection and intimacy (van der Geest et al. 2004; Lynch 2007). In relation to 
migrant carers in Austria these relationships are emphasised and reciprocity is not 
only mentioned in relation to financial exchange but migrant carers are constructed 
as benefitting also emotionally from the relationship. In August 2007 the fact that 
many Austrian families employ migrants to care for their elderly relatives became an 
issue of public concern. Since then live-in arrangements with migrant carers have 
been a widely discussed topic in the political realm, as well as in newspapers and 
other public media. The newspaper discourses use ‘ageing’ as a concept that society 
undoubtedly faces and which requires new ideas and initiatives. Migrant carers are 
subsequently constructed as the logical actors in a situation of complex care 
arrangements. The employment of strangers in personal, intimate settings, however, 
creates a paradoxical situation and raises many moral, cultural and social 
considerations. Whereas issues of economics and legal and practical matters do play 
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an important role the construction of care as an issue of love, relationships and close 
family bonds has fostered the emergence of other factors underlying the discussion 
on the employment of migrants.  
 
The topic of migrant carers will appear in several chapters in this thesis. As this was 
one of the main issues in the public discourses in 2007 and 2008 the topic was also 
prominent in the focus group discussions. I will not focus in detail on the specificities 
of the discourse on migrant carers (see Weicht); I rather want to use this particular 
discourse to demonstrate how the general moral construction of care is reproduced. 
 
United Kingdom 
Also in the UK care for elderly people (and others who need support on a continuous 
basis) is mainly done informally, mostly in family settings. In 2001 the total number 
of people providing care was 5.9 million (Doran et al. 2003). 9 percent of men and 11 
percent of women (HM Government 2008) are carers, while the more time intensive 
care is largely carried out by women. Thus, in total 70 percent of care is still done by 
women (HM Government 2008). The National Strategy on Carers, published in 2008 
describes carers as ‘*p+eople who care (...) because they want to help the people they 
care about’ (HM Government 2008:5). In that sense the political goal is mainly to 
support carers in this process and therefore to enable a better, healthier and more 
efficient provision of informal care arrangements. Greener (2004) points out that 
especially under New Labour, health discourses were more and more dominated by a 
focus on consumerism, choice and independent decision making (see also 
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Glendinning 2008). To increase individual choice the UK seeks to design an individual 
budget scheme through which care should be financed (Glendinning et al. 2008).  
 
In the UK the discourse in newspapers has been comparatively small. Specific 
newspapers (in particular The Guardian and Daily Mail) have featured articles and 
commentaries on a regular basis whereas other newspapers (in particular The Sun) 
only rarely publish articles on this topic. It was striking that financial aspects played, 
compared to the press coverage in Austria, a large role in both the reporting on care 
in newspapers and the focus group discussions. Also the possession of property and 
problems associated with it in times of care needs were discussed frequently. Widely 
reported were cases of abuse or maltreatment of elderly people in care homes. 
Additionally particular groups of carers, such as ‘young carers’ (see Becker et al. 
1998; Dearden and Becker 2004), were sometimes discussed in particular 
newspapers (especially in The Guardian), they rarely featured, however, in the focus 
group discussions.  
 
A problem arising repeatedly was that many people in the focus groups in the UK did 
not associate informal care with the term ‘care’ and did not identify a husband who 
supports his elderly wife as a ‘carer’. This led to difficulties in the recruitment phase 
(as people were reluctant to come to a focus group due to ‘insufficient knowledge’) 
but could be used fruitfully in the discussion groups, once they took place. Many 
people expressed gratefulness for the recognition of caring parties, other than the 
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formal care providers. Care homes were discussed in very negative ways and ‘real 
care’27 was brought in opposition to the institutions.  
                                                 
27
 In this thesis I will use the term ‘real care’ not to describe the material expression of care but to 
refer to the idealised form of care as constructed in the discourses. In order to improve the readability 
I will not use parentheses every time.  
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4: Relationships: Who’s caring? 
4.1 Introduction 
In this project I describe the moral construction of care. I will explore what care 
means in society, why people care for each other and how the moral context of care 
can be described in relation to the specific economic and social circumstances. The 
discourses on care feature many defining narratives and one of the strongest themes 
is the issue of relationships. The family has always featured very prominently in the 
discussions on care and the theoretical framework has also focused on the centrality 
of close relationships for an understanding of what care means. It is therefore useful 
to start the analysis of the moral construction of care by looking at these 
relationships. Who are the actors mentioned and thought of in the context of care? 
Which subjectivities are presented and how are relationships described? In all 
contexts the family is constructed and imagined as the quintessential care 
relationship. The family is described as the main realm in which care takes place and 
in most descriptions the family links of both carers and those cared for are 
emphasised. In that sense care is thought of primarily as a family issue. However, the 
topic of relationships reaches far beyond a focus on families as subjects and actors of 
care for elderly people. Rather, the importance and significance of relationships is a 
defining feature of what care is understood to be. Why is the family so central in the 
discourse on care and which ideals, values and associations are transported with 
these narratives? In this chapter I will demonstrate that the idea of family represents 
particular values and ideals associated with care for elderly people. The centrality of 
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family thus stems to a large extent from what care means to people and how it is 
constructed in everyday live. An aim of this chapter needs to be, however, to avoid 
falling into the pitfall of a simplifying reduction to the notion of an ideology of 
‘familism’ (see Williams 1989)28.  
 
In section 4.2 I will present the close discursive links between family and care and I 
will discuss the extent to which care is thought of as a family issue. Why is the focus 
on family (and other traditional, intimate bonds) so prominent in this field? While 
Giddens’s (1991) description of modernity challenges certain traditional forms of the 
ideological context of care work, such as the relevance of local community, kinship or 
religion, the necessity of some kind of care for dependent people still remains (and, 
due to demographic developments, increases), and so does the need for relations of 
trust and ideals for living. At a time of modernisation which encompasses an 
idealisation of innovation and marketisation even in the field of care (see Scourfield 
2006), tradition is often seen very sceptically as an obstacle to a progressive, modern 
and emancipated construction of society. Nevertheless tradition must still be 
recognised as an important sense of single authority (Giddens 1991) describing the 
right way of social living and it is therefore also ideologically organising care work in a 
society. The tradition is based on a strong role of the family and informal networks 
for the execution of care work. Beck (1998) thinks about the family as a ‘zombie 
category’, as an ideal which is dead but still floats around.  
                                                 
28
 Familism in this context can be described as an ideology that implies ‘an effective continuity 
between informal and formal care’ (Cowen 1999:10) with a strong focus on the family as the ‘normal’ 
organisation of care.  
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Section 4.3 will focus on the underlying values of family relationships, such as 
responsibility, duty, commitment, love and guilt. I will ask whether these aspects are 
inherent to family care or whether they are sentiments which can also be located in 
other intimate relations. One example of alternative care arrangements, the 
employment of migrant carers in Austrian households, will be explored briefly in 
section 4.4. The development of late capitalist societies has produced a focus on 
individuals and self-chosen relations. Traditional bonds are an expression of an 
idealisation of the past. Bertram (2002) shows that, within sociology, the fixation on 
the crisis of the family has led to a shift to theorising privacy instead of family. While 
applied ethics usually focuses on questions of who owes what to whom (see 
Fitzpatrick 2008:148) I want to move beyond this understanding of care within 
families and focus rather on the values and ideals which are produced by an 
emphasis on the centrality of the family for care. Phillips (2007:59) points out that an 
academic ‘emphasis on individualism and selfishness of modern families has led 
some commentators to conclude that there is a decline in moral values and 
commitment to care’. Using in particular Smart’s (2007) critique of the theories of 
individualisation I will, however, demonstrate that, even in times of changing 
demands on traditional family structures, the values and ideals associated with 
families remain stable. Silva and Smart (1999:6) argue that not only have family 
arrangements altered; the new living situations have also affected changes in 
economic and social structures (see also Smart and Neale 1999). From a social policy 
perspective one could raise the question of how to keep and raise the willingness of 
relatives and others to take over and carry out care services as one of the most 
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significant issues for the design of modern societies in order to sustain this 
historically developed system of care provision (Österle and Hammer 2004:103). This 
does not mean that the traditional family will be presented as ‘a cultural icon and 
political anchor’ (Fineman 2002:216); I rather want to investigate and explore the 
long held assumptions that family care is to be done out of love, duty and obligation, 
a stereotype that results in lack of choice and agency on behalf of families (Phillips 
2007). Alternative forms of care arrangements are always discussed in contrast to 
family possibilities and judged against the latter. An aim of this chapter is thus to 
solve the tension between a discourse on declining family structures and the focus 
on families in the context of care. Moral ideals and sentiments such as responsibility, 
duty, love and guilt underlie the moral concept of family care. This construction of 
care as being closely linked to the family has direct and immediate consequences for 
all involved in care relationships, be it family or not. It also particularly affects all 
other care arrangements which are evaluated against the ideal of family care. Hence, 
it is necessary to raise the question of what constitutes family. What do people 
associate with it and how can family be described in the context of care? This will be 
explored in section 4.5.  
 
If family is fundamentally linked to care, care could be seen as a defining feature of 
families. Fink (2004:15) highlights that ‘the delivery and receipt of care (…) is a 
dynamic process in which the lives of both parties are woven together, disrupting 
any simplistic division between dependence and independence’. In other words, 
does the construction of care lead to the construction of family-like relationships? 
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Before concluding this chapter, section 4.6 takes up the idea of family as reflecting 
people’s ideals about caring. If family care is mainly seen as an ideal representing 
certain values and virtues, to what extent are relationships constituted through care? 
One main objective of the chapter therefore is not simply to find out who is caring 
and by whom do people want to be cared for; but to understand how family 
relationships are thought about and constructed and what this means for other 
relationships in the context of care. 
4.2 Care as a family issue  
‘One who cares for his relatives at home shows heart with that (…). And everyone who 
wants to care within the family should receive help’ (Kurier, 22/11/06) 
 
In this section I want to focus on people’s own understanding of care and people’s 
own construction of family as the archetypal relationship of care. One very obvious 
indication of the association between care and the family is the use of and the 
reference to terms describing family relations in the discourse. In the following two 
examples, which both deal with abuse of elderly people in care homes (see also 
chapter 5 on ‘home’), family situations are mentioned. The terms ‘grandmother’ and 
‘wife’ indicate the immediate association of elderly people in need of care with their 
families, a conception which can be found in most contributions to the public 
discourse.  
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‘Grandmother dies after care home staff ignored head injuries’ (Daily Mail, 
14/03/07) 
‘Victory for man who “rescued” his wife from care’ (Daily Mail, 14/01/07) 
 
The basic system 
Apart from these semantic indications, the focus groups have clearly shown that, 
when asked to talk about care, people usually focus on some family experiences. 
Additionally, care within the family is seen as the basic system, or, in other words, 
the most ‘natural’ arrangement.  
 
Vanessa29: But what I miss somehow, is care within the family 
Adam: Yes, indeed, I just wanted to 
Vanessa: that’s basically (...) the basic system, as it used to be. There used to be an 
extended family 
Walter: Yes 
Vanessa: it’s gotten less 
Walter: Who wants that? 
Vanessa: But, exactly, who wants? (...) But, who, uh, I think, you shouldn’t just look at 
it from the younger generation’s viewpoint, or of those, who care, uh, but should look 
once, how the old person is dealing with it. If we now speak of old people. Most of 
them don’t want to go into a home at all.  
                                                 
29
 All names of focus group participants have been changed. The focus groups in Austria were 
conducted and transcribed in German and I later translated the extracts used in this thesis.  
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The example above demonstrates that family care is what is expected to be 
preferred widely. Family is the basic system against which all other possibilities of 
care arrangements fall inevitably short. But the extract also includes a reference to 
the idea that families and family care are always in decline and rather a thing of the 
past (an aspect that will be explored further in chapter 6). Lisa in the following quote 
also expresses these two aspects associated with family relations. Seeing family as 
the preferable option but acknowledging a decline of family commitment: 
 
Lisa: I have just recently had this conversation, (...) for me the best would be to be 
comfortable within the family bond. However, somehow, that’s the way things go, it 
rather is like that, that older people are somehow, some kind of shifting off is 
happening.  
 
As mentioned above, I will explore the notion of a decline of family care further in 
chapter 6; here it is important to understand that family care is seen as the 
objectively ideal and perfect situation and, if possible, would be preferred by 
everyone. Clarke (1995:31) points out that even many professionals in the field of 
care refer to an imagination of a time in which ‘the elderly person resided with their 
offspring who cared for them’. He furthermore argues that the fact that more and 
more elderly people live on their own is a sign of declining family values. The relation 
between care arrangements and what these say about family values and family 
bonds is an important feature to understand the centrality of the family for the 
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construction of care. Clarke, however, points out that there is also ‘evidence that the 
current generation of elderly people prefer care from independent sources rather 
than from the family’ (1995:45) and concludes that increasing resources create 
choices between different options of care provision. My research, however, 
demonstrates that the close ideological link between the family and the provision of 
care is affecting these choices greatly, not least in an emotional, ideological and 
moral sense. On the contrary, the economic situation is often seen as hindering the 
preferred option of family involvement: 
 
‘And it is perceived as being really unfair that Granny and Grandpa need to go into a 
home, just because there isn’t enough money (…).It can’t be that old people are 
pushed off into homes because care support is not affordable and the young ones in a 
family work and don’t have time for their parents in need of care’ (Kronen Zeitung, 
16/08/2006) 
 
Again, family care is the normal, preferred option and it is due to outside influences 
that care is not happening within the realm of family anymore. Another newspaper 
commentary from Cohn-Sherbok in The Guardian identifies the implicit link between 
families and care in much of the public discourse:  
 
‘In desperation we looked at the various books dealing with the care of old people. 
Invariably such volumes have a patronising tone and refer to parents as Mum and 
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Dad. They take it for granted that children will be determined to do their best for their 
parents whatever the personal or financial cost. The appeal is always to emotion, to 
sentimentality and to family loyalty’ (The Guardian, 24/03/07). 
 
Obviously, as this extract suggests, it is difficult and hard for relatives to object to the 
idea of ‘natural’, affectionate care within the family and a decision for a nursing 
home, or in general, institutional, professional care needs to be made against a 
moral discourse emphasising care within the family and by family members. But why 
is the discourse on care in the public sphere so focused on the context of the family? 
 
Normative assumptions 
Both sociology and social policy have a long history of writing on care relationships in 
general and family care in particular. Exemplarily I want to point to three 
contributions which have influenced much of the thinking about care in the last 20 
years. Firstly, Clare Ungerson (1987) in her groundbreaking study of qualitative 
interviews with family carers identified a generalised idea of family obligations. She 
argues that a particular normative belief of family roles and responsibilities 
determines the process of negotiations of roles and care duties. Family bonds in 
particular are defined by their propensity to care, especially between spouses: 
‘at an ideological level in our society, marriage is regarded as the supreme caring 
relationship, rivalled perhaps only by the mother/infant bond’ (Ungerson 
1987:51). 
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Ungerson particularly focuses on the process of becoming a carer which, she argues, 
is intrinsically linked to taking over a particular role within the family. Especially for 
women, taking over a carer role for a family member often means that this ‘woman 
becomes identified as a ‘carer’ for ever and anon’ (Ungerson 1987:56).  
 
Secondly, Qureshi and Walker’s (1989) contribution also focuses on the care 
relationship but in particular on the experiences and the living of care relationships. 
The authors describe a very close and direct relation between the family and care 
and they describe caring relationships between elderly people and their families as 
‘the bedrock of ‘community care’’ (Qureshi and Walker 1989:5-6). They also highlight 
the ideological function of family care, as the simple existence of family care makes 
people already feel cared for. The preferences of elderly people by whom they want 
to be cared for Qureshi and Walker (1989:123) list as spouse, daughter, daughter-in-
law, son, other relative, non-relative. However, this hierarchy reflects a normative 
ideal of preferences, which the authors describe as  
‘a traditional Western normative preference structure. The rules are that close 
relatives are preferred to more distant ones, any relative is preferred to a non-
relative, and female relatives are preferred to male relatives’ (Qureshi and Walker 
1989:123). 
 
Preferences for caring relationships are also the main theme of the third study by 
Finch and Mason (2000; the study was first published in Finch and Mason 1990). 
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They ask the question: ‘in what sense do people support their kin because they see it 
as ‘proper thing to do’?’ (Finch and Mason 2000:193). The authors identify ‘a degree 
of public normative consensus’ (Finch and Mason 2000:200). This consensus about 
family responsibilities must not be understood as an absolute agreement; rather 
there are 
‘well understood principles which can be mobilised when you are working out ‘the 
proper thing to do’ in practice. People do have an understanding of what would be 
generally accepted as proper, but they use it as a resource with which to negotiate 
rather than as a rule to follow’ (Finch and Mason 2000:211).  
 
The ‘unwritten rule’ is therefore affected by the specific circumstances a family is 
living in.  
 
In all three contributions the family is the main focus of care and the identification of 
the family as the main context and realm of care for elderly people is not really 
questioned. When Quershi and Walker (1989:271) argue that they ‘have shown (...) 
that the family can provide the very best and the very worst setting for the care of 
elderly people’ there is still an underlying assumption that the family is the ideal 
realm for care. While later sources (for an overview see Phillips 2007) indicate a 
variety of care arrangements these three sources are still extremely important. The 
description of family care and people’s preferences has not changed significantly, at 
least as an ideal. Family care still encompasses the normative function Finch and 
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Mason (2000) describe. In any case, family care is seen as the standard against which 
care quality and satisfaction is to be measured. Furthermore, all those highly 
influential contributions arrive at the question of responsibilities and obligations 
within family relationships. What is described in these three texts is an ideal of care 
which is persistent in people’s minds and discourses. I want to use these sources to 
critique the notion of family care as being literally reduced to family bonds. 
Alternatively, family care needs to be seen as an expression of desires, values and 
wishes which are at the heart of care discourses. Another aspect which needs 
attention is the reduction of relationships to caring relationships once care is 
provided. Henderson and Forbat (2002) rightly point out that for most people not 
care is the defining feature of a relationship, but interpersonal dynamics. Policy 
making, however (also influenced by research on family care) often reduces 
relationships to their caring features. 
4.3 Responsibility – Duty – Love - Guilt  
In this section I now want to turn to the moral questions raised at the end of the last 
section, which are underlying the idea of family and care.  
 
Responsibility 
Who is thought of as being the ‘obvious carer’ (Ungerson 1987)? Who should be 
doing what, when and why to meet care needs of elderly people? To understand the 
complexities of care relations Finch (1995) advertises a ‘commitment model’ in which 
‘we see responsibilities as commitments which are built up over time between 
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specific individuals’ (1995:54). The following extract is a discussion on family 
responsibilities, a question introduced by me as the facilitator. However, it is 
important to note that in this case the question is about a rather abstract notion of 
who, generally, bears the responsibility. It will later be shown that general, abstract 
principles and ideas about responsibility do not always coincide with decisions, 
feelings and opinions arising in real life experiences.  
 
I: Who do you think has the (...) responsibility to organise minding, care? Is it the 
family, is it society, is it the person herself? 
Ingrid: Yes, principally it’s based in the family of course. And (...) that they arrange 
that with the relative, what she wants, because on that it’d depend, wouldn’t it? (...) 
But, generally of course, the family is the first (...) 
Ida: So, especially the children, because, at the end of the day the parents have also 
cared for the children, haven’t they? In most cases *laughs+ (...). So therefore one has, 
I think, indeed a certain responsibility, to then also care for the parents.  
Ingrid: Yes, I also think so, yes. 
 
The main theme raised here is the one of filial responsibility which Finch (1995:55) 
describes as ‘commitments between a particular child and his or her parent(s) 
develop[ing] by a complex process based fundamentally on reciprocity’. Finch sees 
the main aspect of filial piety in making sure that the elderly person is kept within the 
family, which refers to a stigma of institutionalisation and which will be discussed in 
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chapter 5. In this section I want to analyse the construction of filial responsibility and 
in particular focus on the idea of reciprocity and its meaning for the general 
construction of care relationships. Ivanhoe (2007) describes filial piety as a basic 
human virtue which, albeit subject to changes in the cultural, economic and 
ideological conditions of society, remains to be based on a special relationship 
between parents and children:  
‘While traditional beliefs about filial piety may be out of date, the fact that 
humans have an enduring, distinctive, and emotionally charged relationship with 
their parents remains as true today as it was in the past and as true in the West as 
it is in the East’ (2007:297).  
 
The relationship between children and their parents and the questions of 
indebtedness are one example of the construction of care responsibilities within 
families.30 In a later section of this chapter I will analyse more broadly what family is 
and how these responsibilities translate into an idea of family (see also Fitzpatrick 
2008); here I want to emphasise the reproduction of family responsibilities to care in 
the public discourse. How people talk about care and family shapes an understanding 
of who is responsible to deliver, organise and finance care for elderly family 
members.  
 
                                                 
30
 Grundy and Henretta (2006) discuss in this context the particular situation of those who are 
confronted with demands to provide care for their parents and their children at the same time.  
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Duty 
Normative ideas about family responsibilities cannot be disentangled easily from 
particular relationships. In other words, cultural norms and conventions are both 
source and consequence of specific situations between people. A similar argument is 
made by Finch and Mason (2000:199) who state that ‘*i+n general, people do not 
seem to ‘count’ the quality of the relationship as a factor which legitimately puts 
limits upon the obligations of children to their elderly parents’. Limits are rather put 
in place by other responsibilities held by individuals. However, I will argue that there 
is a difference to be noted between general expectations and beliefs and personal 
actions, emotions and opinions. In the following discussion ‘family commitment’ is 
seen to not be expected anymore as much as it used to be. Interestingly, a clear 
distinction between responsibility and commitment is formulated which is partly 
explained by a change in culture and economic needs and pressures:  
 
Bea: And so if they’re local, yes, they can pop in, for limited times. And I do think they 
have a role. I do think that children should be, aware, of the situation. In my case it 
was one of my sons who came one time and said Mum you’ve had enough. What are 
you going to do about it? (...) 
Fran: But there’s less today of an elderly person coming to live with you. That used to 
be more 
Bea: Oh yes,  
Catherine: Yeah, my granddad came to live with us 
Fran: The family commitment, you know (...) you cared for your family, you know 
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Bea: I don’t think that that’s expected now so much. 
Fran: Well, no, it doesn’t happen, I know 
Bea: No, it doesn’t happen. 
Catherine: I think, it’s, of cause, it’s the culture, isn’t it? Two people have to go out to 
work 
 
In the following discussion, when Larry raises the question of responsibility for 
elderly people Pamela immediately mentions the family as the main unit. Will, 
however, starts to question this straightforward identification: 
 
Larry: Who has responsibility? Is it the state, is it the family? 
Pamela: It’s the family in England (...) 
Larry: Is it community? I don’t know. 
Will: again, I, I sometimes take issue with the family, uh, because, I, very briefly, I 
remember uh, been asked to go down to, to South-Wales to work, and I said, oh no, I 
can’t, I can’t move too far from the East Midlands, because my parents are there, and 
this guy says, but why? I said because I feel responsible. And he said, you didn’t ask to 
be born (...) It was your parents who made the decision, you have no real 
responsibility. Now, I know society confers responsibility (...) and guilt (...) to look 
after your parents. And that (...) but this is quite important because, (...) some people 
are looked at and ostracised, because they’re not looking after their elderly, you 
know, parents, and, (...) I would do it in a Christian way, but not because they are my 
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parents. I would look after them, as I would look after anyone. And I think, uh, I think 
there is an issue here that we shouldn’t sort of, oh, wow, you know, he’s, he’s got 
children, (...) they shouldn’t really have that responsibility even though society does 
confer on that.  
 
This discussion is an example of a very interesting dynamic that could be observed in 
the focus groups. Will describes the abstract principles of family responsibility and 
discusses to what extent people have the duty to care for their parents. He also 
argues that children are expected by society to care for the parents and are 
denounced if they do not live up to these expectations. The idea that children are not 
responsible to care for their parents because they had not been present at the stage 
of being given birth is also emphasised by Ivanhoe (2007). Similarly to his conception 
of filial piety as the recognition of others as objects of concern, Will himself on the 
other hand said that he would care for his parents, as I would look after anyone. This 
tendency was relatively widespread, to distinguish between general principles and 
rules and personal motivations. Two aspects are particularly important: First, this 
paradox points to an ideal of care being done out of love, rather than out of duty and 
principles. Second, people often say they would generally agree with certain 
principles (e.g. children are not responsible for the care of their parents) but they 
themselves would not act accordingly. This again shows a reoccurrence of the 
distinction between abstract rules and the emotions of particular relationships. Care 
therefore needs to be understood as a particular relationship between people (see 
also the discussion on the ethics of care in chapter 2).  
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Love 
Love as the basis for caring and reciprocal relationships is, in Ivanhoe’s (2007:304-5) 
terms, the ‘only appropriate response’ to the love given by the parents, which should 
result in ‘keep*ing+ in mind the nature of their love and, in the warmth of this light, to 
cultivate reciprocal – yet distinctive – feelings for them’ (Ivanhoe 2007:304-5). These 
feelings of love as a basis of care relationships should form the ideal for society and 
communal living. Gordon Brown’s (then Chancellor of the Exchequer) contribution in 
a newspaper reproduces this strong relationship between care within families, the 
ideal of love, and the model for the whole society: 
 
‘Among the men and women who do so much for Britain are our carers. The six 
million loved and loving carers of those close to them are the very heart of our 
compassionate society and an immense force for good’ (Daily Mail, 21/02/07). 
 
Responsibility in the sense of duty is thus more often replaced by a notion of 
responsibility out of love. Smart (2007) argues that both love and commitment are 
important for functioning relationships of care. Separating the two would bear the 
danger of seeing commitment as good and care out of love as unreliable. She 
furthermore argues that a  
‘focus solely on commitment reduces the individual to a one-dimensional being, 
cognizant only of duty, and it robs the person of precisely the realm of the 
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‘magical’ and transformatory which imbues much of daily life with meaning’ 
(Smart 2007:78).  
 
Smart’s claim of the combination of love and commitment is obviously important; in 
the discourses, however, the notion of love is even more prominent. In her 
qualitative interviews Ungerson (1987) noticed a strong gender difference regarding 
the ideas of responsibility and love used in the discussions. Women were much more 
likely to refer to normative obligations and expectations while ‘the word ‘duty’ was 
missing from the men carer’s vocabulary’ (Ungerson 1987:92) completely. Men, 
Ungerson explains, rather referred to love as the reason for their caring. While it has 
to be noted that these were mainly men caring for their spouses, which inevitably 
involves certain associations with love, Ungerson’s (1987) claim is interesting in that 
the expression of duty refers to a sense that is ‘generalizable from one relationship 
to another and it is largely unconditional’ (1987:92). Love, on the other hand, is 
bound to a specific relationship between two people, and seems to be emphasised 
much more in the current discursive construction of care relationships. Giddens’s 
notion of a pure relationship (1991:88), which is characterised by intimate, 
unconditional love and the absence of economic or other outside interests, might be 
a useful approximation of the idealised caring relationship which demands 
commitment for both the other individual and the social relation itself. Care out of 
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love would be an expression of a relationship between specific others while a focus 
on commitment would reproduce abstract, normative rules and rhetoric.31  
 
Guilt 
Another frequently mentioned issue in the context of family responsibilities is the 
feeling of guilt if one does not care or does not care enough for his/her relative. In 
the following extract Helma talks about the possibilities of arranging a live-in carer 
for her mother who could take over most of the caring tasks she is performing at the 
moment:  
 
Helma: So, I have to say, under certain conditions, I could imagine it with every other 
person, but not with my own mother. I wouldn’t want to do it with my own mother. 
(...) 
Uta: Then you can only put her into a [care] home 
Helma: Yes, I would have to show this strength  
Uta: Would you put her into a care home? 
Helma: I, I would probably (...) until the end of my life, have to fight feelings of guilt 
 
What is striking in this example is the clear focus on the family relationship. While 
she can principally understand it if relatives do not perform the care work 
                                                 
31
 Giddens (1991:92) does mention commitment as a characteristic of the pure relationship. However, 
he defines commitment as going beyond love. My use of commitment in contrast to relations of love 
emphasises the former’s basis in objective rules.  
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themselves, the situation with her mother is different. A difference is made between 
general rules about commitment and duty, and personal feelings of obligation (based 
on love for the particular other). Feelings of guilt are explained as being irrational 
and wrong (as one should not feel responsible to care out of general rules) but they 
occur due to the normative ideals of care out of love and the ideal of loving family 
relationships. Bahr and Bahr (2001) in this context even favour care as self-sacrifice 
and see it as a high virtue. They criticise self-sacrifice’s connotation of self-defeating 
behaviour and argue that family reality differs to the normative, ideologically based 
idea of the primacy of individual freedom. Hence Bahr and Bahr consequently call for 
a recovery of ‘the sacrifice of self or extensions of self, in the interest of priorities of 
persons whose needs we see as more pressing than our own’ (2001:1232). They 
furthermore argue that changes in the conception of care (e.g. making it paid work 
and/or part of the market) would decrease the element of self-sacrifice in care 
(2001:1244) and would thus reduce the ethical value of it. It is important to 
understand that these ideas can be found in public discourses and people’s own 
experiences. The moral superiority of care out of love (and maybe even self sacrifice) 
constructs an ideal of family care with very demanding connotations.  
4.4 The construction of quasi-kin relationships 
So far it has been argued that care relationships, which are constructed as family 
care relationships, are not necessarily restricted to relationships between kin or 
spouses. Because family in the context of care refers strongly to an ideal of particular 
(moral) values and virtues also other relationships are included in the discourse on 
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family. In this section I will use the example of the discourse on migrant carers 
working in and with Austrian families. In Austria one answer to the demands of care 
for elderly people in combination with a shortage of relatives who can or want to 
take over care has been the employment of migrants working in families and 
households. This example of rotational (Bettio et al. 2006) or pendulum migration 
(Glucksmann and Lyon 2006) clearly is a situation which consequently raises several 
difficulties for the construction of care as intimate labour. If, on the one hand, care is 
based on emotional proximity, love, intimacy and family settings, and the empirical 
situation, on the other hand, shows a widespread employment of migrant carers, 
how can these tensions be justified, discursively and morally? Care within family 
settings delivered by migrant workers is discussed in several national contexts such 
as the Mediterranean welfare states (see Bettio et al. 2006; van der Geest et al. 
2004; da Roit 2007) or in Singapore (Mehta and Thang 2008). In the latter case 
Mehta and Thang argue that  
[i]n the eyes of the society, as long as the elder person is kept within the family 
fold, his or her co-resident adult child is perceived as filial, even though most of 
the physical (and even emotional) care is being provided by a nonfamily member 
such as the foreign maid’ (Mehta and Thang 2008:57). 
 
Fictive kin 
Barker in her discussion of care for the elderly outside family settings in the USA 
emphasises that often in these situations ‘strangers act like kin’ (2002:159) and she 
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identifies a development of these carers towards ‘fictive kin’, a process which is 
based on and allows for emotional proximity and social intimacy. Interviewees in her 
study refer to themselves therefore as being ‘just a friend, not a caregiver’ (Barker 
2002:160) and define their work, similarly to family members’ labour, as a moral duty 
(2002:164). The cared-for in her interviews likewise emphasised the kin-like 
relationship and referred to the ‘grandchild I never had’ (2002:165).32 Similarly 
Karner (1998) discusses the development in which carers are ‘adopted’ as fictive kin 
which again suggests that the quality of the relationship might serve as a 
replacement for higher status and payment. Bettio et al. (2006:272) summarise this 
development as a ‘transition from a ‘family’ to a ‘migrant in the family’ model of 
care’ emphasising the inclusion of the migrant worker into the family setting.  
 
In Austria migrant carers are discursively included into family settings and are, 
through a process of discursive argumentation, constructed as belonging to the 
family under question. One example from a newspaper writes about ‘families, who 
sacrificially care for their relatives at home with Eastern European help’ (Kronen 
Zeitung, 08/07/07), indicating that migrant carers are helping families to care, rather 
than simply taking over their caring tasks. The question arising is thus whether or not 
the establishment of a kin-like relationship is necessary and to what extent this 
creation of the fictive kin can be demonstrated discursively. The analysis of the 
                                                 
32
 Interestingly, Barker also notes that in particular younger male carers (under 45) used kin terms. 
She argues that ‘*t+his is just one strategy by which they normalize their otherwise suspect 
relationship with their mainly very elderly female dependents’ (2002:165). Due to the fact that the 
migrant carers in Austria are almost exclusively female this interesting aspect will not be discussed any 
further here.  
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Austrian discourse shows some aspects of references to kin-like relationships and 
bonds (the two are grown together (Kurier, 13/08/06)). Migrant carers are 
constructed in sharp contrast to professional workers as good friends who help us 
(Der Standard, 14/02/07). The following quote from Kurier (06/09/06) colourfully 
highlights the different aspects of the process of an inclusion of migrant carers into 
the family: 
 
‘Two qualified Slovakian supporters took the family’s heart by storm. The two women 
devotionally looked after the 91 years old mother, who found new courage to face life 
in her own familiar home’ 
 
I also used this newspaper quote in the focus group discussions in Austria and people 
seemed to agree with the possibility of extending the family in that way. The 
following discussion shows that the possibility to be included into a family (through 
care) is also discursively related to certain cultural and social attitudes and identities 
associated with the women working in Austrian houses: 
 
Walter: That the two qualified Slovakian, of course, if they are doing the work well, 
that they took the family’s heart by storm, is clear, isn’t it? (…) 
Barbara: they have a specific charm, they have, these people 
Walter: but as you rightly say, they have a, a very motherly and womanly quality 
Barbara: yes, yes, they have a specific 
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Walter: (…) not too hard 
Barbara: not too hard, they become, yes 
Walter: that also counts for the Hungarian women, like, they do, there is also a 
Barbara: uhum. yes, is also still softer. 
 
In this quote there are very problematic assumptions about gender and ethnicity. 
There is also, however a nostalgic element present. It almost seems that because 
these women are better in practicing family they are welcome to care for elderly 
people like family members. Intimacy between people is possible because these 
workers are in their identity constructed as being similar to family members. Many of 
the descriptions of the intimacy performed by migrant carers entail a reference to 
the family setting as a sign of an ‘adoption’ of the migrant workers:  
 
‘When Mr B. got dementia, Kati and Maria entered his life. Today, the two Slovaks 
are for the family more than only cheap care-workers’ (Der Standard, 14/02/07). 
 
Becoming part of the family includes a rejection of the label care worker. These 
women are particularly not seen as employees or professional workers, but rather as 
informal, familial friends or family. In the following extract from a focus group two 
members of a family talk about their experiences with two migrant carers who cared 
for their (grand)mother who is living with them in the house. I quote this discussion 
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in some length as it is a very useful example to demonstrate the process of inclusion 
into a family.  
 
Caroline: Yeah, we also indeed often call our Slovaks, uhm, the Slovakian angels 
[laughs].  
Gita: Yes, now, for three years I have now had the same ones, mother and daughter 
(...) and she again had also a daughter, there was also a grandchild, (...) because the 
woman who was not with me at that moment, was then caring for this other child. 
(...) And mother and daughter have switched places at mine, and this really was one 
unit indeed. 
Brenda: they were lovely, yes. The really were (...) 
Caroline: Yes, it is, they have actually become part of the family. (...) 
Gita: they have just belonged to the family - but unfortunately it has now been the 
case (...) that the mother got ill now herself, and she’s got rheumatism, that she 
couldn’t work anymore and hence, the daughter could of course also not go to work 
anymore (...) Yeah, now I’ve lost both, right. (...) Because of that I needed two new 
ones, and there I have also noticed with my mother that she was in heavy decline, 
because then she’s (...) since then she is absolutely incontinent, which she hadn’t 
been before (...) 
Caroline: Yeah, with the Slovakian nurses I must say, they really become part of the 
family, (...) this daughter indeed, who cared at ours, she also brought her daughter 
with her to ours from time to time, during school holidays or so. (...) They’ve also 
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brought their dog with them once, because they didn’t know where to put it, because 
the friend was also not there, so 
Gita: You also know the problems of these Slovaks 
Caroline: You really become personal [familiär].  
Gita: and you discuss the problems, your own, with them 
Caroline: The Slovaks, then we also, from time to time, it maybe was like that, that 
we did it, half an hour, or an hour, if my father was there then, we went for a coffee 
with them and things like that (...) it is like that, they become part of the family. 
Absolutely.  
 
The discussion starts with a representation of the carers’ identity as ‘angels’. There is 
also a description of the links that have developed over time and various aspects 
characteristically for a close family bond are mentioned (discussing each other’s 
problems, knowing each other’s friends, going out for a coffee). Additionally, the 
importance of this familiarity for the wellbeing of the cared-for is emphasised. As a 
consequence migrant carers are constructed as quasi-kin ‘with all the ambivalence, 
obligation, exasperation, trouble, joy, and pleasure that kin relations entail’ (Barker 
2002:166 with reference to Sussman). Brigit Anderson in her discussion of migrant 
workers quotes one woman saying that ‘the problem is they treat me as a family’ 
(Anderson 2000:123). The recurring discussion of the commitment, the reliability and 
the ‘angel-like’ devotion to the elderly people demonstrates the ideological relation 
to a moral grammar based on family responsibilities. I argue therefore with 
Glucksmann and Lyon (2006:6.4) that the employment of migrant carers ‘is done in 
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order to sustain the practice and ideal of family care as delivered through love and 
personal connection’. It can be said that the construction of migrant carers as kin-like 
members of an informal network does rely on (obviously gendered) notions of 
closeness, intimacy and affection. Understanding care not only as a practice but also 
as a cultural and moral symbol in society can help to explain the paradoxical situation 
identified by Glucksmann and Lyon (2006:6.4): 
‘much of the labour of care is performed by a relative stranger in a cultural 
context which prizes kinship in care. This might help explain the widespread 
depictions of fictive familial ties and the caring qualities of the migrant women 
themselves’ 
 
A relationship is emphasised which relies on physical proximity and social intimacy in 
which migrant carers are discursively constructed as intimate friends or family 
members. The following extract also demonstrates the enormous intimacy that can 
result from the very relationship, and which, eventually, is used in the discourse to 
describe the relationship between cared-for, migrant carer and the family:  
 
Ida: And my mother also has, (...) when I came to visit her at the end in the hospital 
(…), she was hardly approachable anymore, (...) and, when the carer came to visit her 
then in the hospital, her eyes were gleaming. (…) And in her arms she then also died. 
(...) 
Ingrid: This was her attachment figure 
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Paul: attachment figure, exactly.  
Ida: There she was sparkling, because Martina, that was absolutely her favourite. (...) 
there she was really gleaming, with me she wasn’t gleaming, and with Martina she 
was gleaming. And in her arms she also died. 
 
Using the example of the employment of migrant carers in Austrian families I could 
demonstrate that the discourse on family care can be extended to other care options 
as well. It has also been shown that the discourse on migrant carers reproduces the 
notions of what family is, and how care and being there for each other within a 
family is constructed. In other words, ‘family’ beyond ties of kin is possible. If the 
discussion is used to understand what family means for people it can be argued that 
family is characterised by notions of love, intimacy and being there for each other 
and care within the family is understood as being based on ‘affective, quasi-familial, 
and asymmetrical relations’ (Bakan and Stasiuskis 1997:10).  
4.5 What is family? 
The family is thought of as the central realm in which care relationships take place 
and I have described that values and ideals of care are closely linked to a 
construction of the family. I have also argued that these values and ideals can be 
found beyond the family, in other words, intimacies can be contracted out and 
employees are constructed as fictive kin. In this section I investigate the meaning of 
family in people’s understanding of care and responsibilities. Smart (2007:7) argues 
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that the term family ‘generally conjures up an image of degree of biological 
relatedness combined with degrees of co-residence’. Williams (1989:75) draws 
attention to the state’s relationship to the family in terms of dependency, 
domesticity, reproduction and sexuality. Social and public policy making requires an 
image of what family constitutes and Williams elsewhere (2004:34) asks whether 
there is ‘a new normative family emerging from law and policy?’ If this image, 
however, does not live up to the empirical situation of carrying out family 
responsibilities I suggest to rethink the concept of family and focus more on the 
underlying moral and ideological values people associate with family.  
 
Are accounts such as Beck’s (1998; see also Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001) notion 
of family as a ‘zombie category’ and Giddens’s (1991) idea of a development towards 
‘pure relationships’ what Smart (2007:20) calls ‘a cultural Zeitgeist in which 
increasing despair about families is on the verge of becoming conventional wisdom’? 
With Smart I would argue that families still have enormous meaning for the 
arrangement of people’s everyday lives and in particular for an understanding of care 
and the construction of care. Clarke (1995) reminds one that families are not stable 
units and that family means different things to different people and lived family 
practices constitute the idea of what family is (see also Morgan 1996). Williams 
(2004) puts the effective social practice therefore in the centre of her analysis and 
focuses rather on what we do than on what we are. Smart (2007) also adds 
imaginations and memories to a complete picture of what family means. While these 
accounts are certainly true there still is an element of what family traditionally 
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means. In any case, family does describe certain values and ideas which strongly feed 
into the discourse on care and caring relationships.  
 
Describing family 
In describing what family means one needs to be careful to distinguish between 
descriptive and normative understandings of family. How do people understand 
family? According to which meanings do they act and how do people think families 
ought to function? Fitzpatrick (2008) describes two main models for understanding 
family relations. The ‘Indebtedness Model’ describes family responsibilities as ‘a 
moral repayment’ for received care (either seen in terms of reciprocity or in the 
sense that emotional bonds established between parents and children create 
responsibilities and the positions of responsible actors in later life). The ‘Friendship 
Model’, on the other hand, focuses more on independent actors.33 Phillips (2007) 
additionally points to the family solidarity framework to understand the role families 
play in care (see also Bengtson and Roberts 1991; Bengtson et al. 2001). I have 
already discussed how responsibilities are understood in the public discourse on 
care. Here I want to draw attention to what these responsibilities tell about an 
understanding of family relations. The question cannot be reduced to ‘who owes 
what to whom?’; rather a focus is needed on what the expressions of responsibility 
mean for care and those who do the care work. In other words, to what extent does 
the understanding of family affect the concept of care and vice versa? In any of the 
                                                 
33
 Ivanhoe (2007:307) disagrees with a notion of friendship to describe filial relationships: ‘For 
friendship characteristically exists between equals or at least between people similar in status, power, 
and abilities’. 
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above mentioned models families are understood as relationally and emotionally 
laden networks, not as conglomerations of fixed roles (Fitzpatrick 2008:154). Even 
though Ungerson (1987:94) describes family relations as a bond which is ‘based more 
on willing and highly committed acceptance of an ideology of what family 
relationships should be like rather than on any particularly strong emotions’ the 
analysis of the discourse on care points to an inclusion of an ideal of emotions into 
the understanding of the family. Families are the incorporation and the realm of 
exchange, reciprocity and affect (Qureshi and Walker 1989) based on a mutual 
reinforcement of personal feelings and normative values (Walker 1995:207). 
Williams shows the importance of the meaning of people’s personal relationships 
(and the quality of these) with their children, partners, kin and friends for their very 
own sense of identity and happiness (2004:73) and Twigg (2003) points out that 
emotions and feelings within relationships are crucial for care.  
 
The naturalness  of family 
In the discourse the notion of family as a loving bond of individuals who are 
committed to each other often manifests itself as a focus on the ‘natural’ form of 
family (Fineman 2002), in which family and family care are understood as natural 
processes, as the two quotes below exemplify: 
 
Fran: That in a way is almost a natural process, isn’t it? Looking after the people of 
your family. 
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Ingrid: But, care for relatives, that is generally a normal, human, social duty, I’d say. 
 
Ungerson (1987:129) also describes this ‘naturalisation’ of family involvement in care 
through which particularly women thought they ‘fulfilled their sense of duty to their 
parents’. Family care in this context is embedded in a specific moral discourse, which 
does refer to an ideology of ‘natural’ traits, practices and identities of women which 
‘bear such a close resemblance to the practices based on the experiences of 
mothering and hence are construed as ‘natural’ aptitudes of women’ (Ungerson 
2000:636). The next extract is an example in which the natural process of family 
involvement in care is described by the use of references to animals. The process of 
‘learning’ to care and to be there for your relatives is described as a natural cycle, 
which, unfortunately, is disturbed by modern cultural influences and economic 
pressures.  
 
Will: We care for our own children (...) 
Larry: look at (…) the animals  
Will: *it’s+ natural to care for our elderly. But, (...) in between, we get greedy and 
selfish. (...) And other elements of man comes into play, and we become, we lose, 
well, I’m afraid, the present generation of parents, not all by any means, but a lot of 
children are brought into this world, because, uh, it’s expected. (…). And so, they, this 
caring element doesn’t seem to be quite the same as it used to be, so maybe adults 
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are not learning the skills that they should be, in, how to care for children and, 
stopping off work, for a few years, I’m not saying whether it’s the woman or the man, 
it could be either, (...) and working a relationship up, that seems to be getting diluted, 
and so forth. And that is a worry that the next generation may not have the care 
skills, (...) they may just not have a clue, how to care for their (…) parents.  
 
It is important to see the emphasis on the natural connection between family 
relations and the care of elderly people in these accounts. The idea of family as a 
reciprocal relationship is reproduced but the emphasis is on natural feelings, 
emotions and love, rather than on considerations of justice or fairness. In a 
commentary in The Guardian on children exploiting their elderly parents Alexander 
Chancellor says: 
 
‘But it appears that children are the main culprits. How can they be so callous? Their 
parents are sitting ducks, of course. They tend to trust their children and can’t 
imagine that they would want to do them any harm. (…) It seems incredible that they 
should allow greed to override their natural affection for, and duty of care towards, 
the men and women who brought them into the world and nurtured them through 
childhood’ (The Guardian, 23/02/07, emphasis added). 
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The natural bonds are emphasised and duty of care is described as being related to 
natural instincts and feelings. The aforementioned reciprocity should not be 
misunderstood as resembling an economic exchange; rather, the ‘natural’ relation 
and affection between people favours an ideal of care given as a ‘priceless gift’. And 
the notion of a gift involves an idea contrary to payment and financial exchange. In a 
commentary, launching new policies for carers, Gordon Brown emphasises 
particularly the pricelessness of care and sketches care as being rooted in love for 
those close to one: 
 
‘It is far more a matter of love than of duty – caring that expresses itself in the 
priceless gift of sustained and dedicated support for people close to them’ (Daily Mail, 
21/02/07). 
 
Family care as love labour 
Because care is associated with love and the idea that ‘unconditional love lies at the 
heart of the family experience’ (Kendrick and Robinson 2002:294) non-family care 
arrangements challenge the ideal and the idea of the family itself. If someone rejects 
to care for his/her own relatives the family relations between those people are 
questioned. Due to the construction of family as the natural unit in which care 
happens, family care is seen as a very distinct form of care arrangement, specifically 
in relation to emotional needs, as Marion for example argues:  
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Marion: Of course, psychologically, I think it is more ideal, if it was the family, and the 
being there for her (...). Because, (...) the family knows what the elderly person needs. 
(...) My mother, my grandmother doesn’t need to talk. I know what she wants.  
 
This points to a differentiation of forms of care made by Lynch (2007) in which she 
describes love labour as one form which, due to the necessary emotional 
involvement, cannot be substituted by formal arrangements. Adam in another focus 
group session highlights that care within the family involves many different aspects, 
particularly tasks such as cleaning, nursing and cooking but also emotional 
engagement. Family care is therefore seen as the one form of care in which an 
elderly person can really feel at home. With this form of care tasks are not artificially 
divided; rather the boundaries between minding, being there for someone and 
caring are blurred. Adam furthermore emphasises the possibility that the whole 
family (including the elderly person) can and should be involved in contributing to 
the wellbeing of the family: 
 
Adam: so that everyone, uh, had his tasks, and was therefore contributing to the 
general well being of the family.  
 
The question of what constitutes family care in particular and the ideals of family in 
general is especially important for an understanding of other options of care 
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arrangements. Social and economic changes often require care and intimacy to be 
imagined in new (family) settings (see Roseneil and Budgeon 2004) and I have 
described the process of the creation of fictive kin above. If current notions of 
intimacy and care are not directly linked to a traditional, ideological understanding of 
family how do ‘non-normative intimacies’ (Roseneil and Budgeon 2004:138) define 
the constitution of family? If family refers to a moral and emotional framework 
rather than to links between people based on kin and marriage, alternative forms of 
care are possible. In other words, is ‘family environment’ without ‘family care’ 
mentioned in the discourses? One example has been demonstrated in the discussion 
of migrant carers and in the following extract Nathan describes an alternative form 
of living for elderly people which comes close to his first preference of being cared 
for within the family: 
 
Nathan: Within the family, or within an environment that is a Christian environment. 
I’ve seen in Canada (...) my uncle (...), he is actually living in a complex that is a huge 
complex, that consists of tower blocks of flats that families live in. (...). And they have 
the ability to do, to what we would call a rest home situation which doesn’t involve 
nursing care. There would be a rest home in place, so he could move from his 
apartment, when he could no longer cope, from the apartment into the rest home if 
he then needs nursing care he could move into the nursing home. 
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Metha and Thang (2008) in a contribution on Singapore also challenge the traditional 
idea of family care, arguing that this image does not reflect the complexities of family 
care in which also other players, such as domestic workers, exist. Family thus can be 
understood as an expression of particular values and ideals, which are not 
necessarily bound to kin ties. Ambivalences can be noticed in people’s understanding 
of family: On the one hand, family values are extended beyond the traditional limits 
of blood and kin ties, on the other hand, family represents more than people having 
responsibilities for each other. Rather, relationships tied to care are constituted in a 
particular way, sketched in relation to the image of family care.  
4.6. The re-constitution of relationships  
If ‘family’ is an image against which care relationships are constructed, the process of 
the constitution is essential for an understanding of the very relationships. In this 
section I focus on challenges caused by care relations to families. The main aim is 
thus to analyse the extent to which shifts in relationships, which are caused by caring 
practices, determine the formation of new relationships.  
 
Separating care aspects 
One aspect mentioned frequently is that not every aspect of care should be done 
within the family. There is a discursive image that physical nursing care could be 
done outside the family setting: 
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Fran: It depends on your needs, surely  
Christine: It does, doesn’t it?  
Fran: Incontinence and yes, physical needs, which need nursing, really nursing. That 
personal stuff, really, you’d rather get nursing, than somebody from the family, 
wouldn’t you? 
 
A clear differentiation between care as an emotional closeness, as being there for 
each other and care work in the sense of performing physical tasks is created. In 
chapter 8 I will focus more on this separation and in section 4.4 I have already 
discussed the possibilities of contracting out intimacies. For relationships it is 
important, however, that physical care can only be outsourced if it is clearly 
separated from emotional and intimate minding. This is one reason why migrant 
carers have been included into family settings as their work (and role) bridges both 
aspects. Whereas care work can possibly be outsourced the aspects of loving, 
relational care are inherently family related ideals.  
 
Mary: I can only speak for myself (...), for myself it would be emotionally more 
comfortable if somebody would care for me who is from the family, who does already 
know me for a while. So, yes 
Marion: emotionally, yes 
Mary: of course, that’s what I said. 
Marion: the other thing is 
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Vera: and especially, I think that this person, the person in need of care, she just 
notices that family members, these well known and close persons, are there, yeah. 
Indeed, that this person is not left to his own, (...). I believe they feel that, they do 
notice it.  
 
Thus, it is seen as reasonable if physical aspects of caring are performed by care 
workers. This allows a focus of family care on the characteristics discussed above: 
emotional support, love and being there for each other. In that sense formal care 
services can actually strengthen family ties (Qureshi and Walker 1989) if they allow a 
more rigid separation between physical work and emotional, intimate attentiveness.  
 
Rejecting the notion carer  
Baldwin (1995) emphasises that financial remunerations for caring for an elderly 
person can threaten the carer’s standing in the family as it challenges norms and 
values of ‘normal’ family life and family relationships. The following extract 
exemplifies how care can challenge a particular form of relationship in which a 
person feels that an official recognition as carer (in order to claim benefits for carers) 
would undermine the family ties: 
 
Betty: It’s the issue that was raised earlier when people are afraid to claim benefits. 
(...) Do I really need, is it for me to claim the benefit, or being called a carer or not 
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while all I do is this, this and this, what I normally do, without realising that this is the 
job of a carer? It, it’s the same sort of, uh, it’s the cash (...) really, do I claim benefits, I 
care for her anyway, or shall I be paid for something I’m doing all the time, you 
know?  
Nathan: I think too, it puts it in a different relationship. (...) It changes the 
relationship. [some agreeing] And, a lot of us would think it changes the relationship 
so therefore I wouldn’t want to be classed as a carer.  
 
Clearly, an arrangement in which people are paid for their care work challenges the 
notion of a loving family conception. The uneasiness with the term and the identity 
of a carer can also be seen in the following example taken from The Guardian in 
which a daughter talks about her relationship to her mother who is in need of 
support: 
 
‘Should I really claim to be her carer? After all, she’s not living with me and I’m not 
responsible for her every minute of the day (…) Carer really is too grand a term. What 
I am engaged in is brinkmanship’ (The Guardian, 20/01/07). 
 
Henderson and Forbat (2002) describe these ‘unwanted identities’ of people who do 
not want to be reduced to an official term. The relationship would be challenged by 
the inclusion of such an attribution: 
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‘The terms care, carer, and caree prevent the construction of assistance being 
expressed as a normal component of the relationship. The terms suggest 
‘otherness’, which places meaning outside of the interpersonal arena. This 
highlights a tension between meanings conveyed in policy and those constructed 
by care participants in their lives’ (Henderson and Forbat 2002:683).  
 
The relationship which is based on family ideas and values would be threatened if 
images and narratives of other areas of life would penetrate. People who are asked 
to combine roles as carers with other activities as family members (Twigg 2003:425) 
are confronted with discourses which create caring either as part of a family identity 
or as paid work. Alfred in the following example points to the situation that also 
elderly people themselves might not really want to move into their children’s home 
as this would change the relationship they have with their kin.  
 
Britta: I’m surprised that so many are still cared for at home (...) now, I will feel 
responsible for my parents for all my life, but I can’t imagine 
Alfred: I think that’s natural 
Britta: If you have a half decent relationship, yes. But I can’t imagine it, that I take my 
parents into my home, and give up my job, and (…) 
Alfred: that’s also the question whether the parents would want that then, right?  
 
Challenging identities  
Family roles but also dependency relations (see also chapter 7) can be challenged by 
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a reversal of roles. Typical for that are parent-child relations in which the parent now 
becomes dependent on the care of the child: 
 
Eloise: I would have, somehow earlier, made sure, that it has to be a home somehow, 
yes. Because, I think, it was uncomfortable for both sides. Because the mother felt of 
course, to be mothered, by the own daughter *laughs+, that’s somehow funny.  
 
Similarly Claire talks about the challenges arising from the situation in which she 
cared for her father in her own house:  
 
Claire: And I have really, like you imagine it in a care home, cared for him. Of course 
the role play was there, yeah, because there was now no mother.  
 
In chapter 7 I will focus in more detail on the constructions of independence and 
dependency which also underlie the relationship between carer and cared for. For an 
understanding of the importance of relationships for care it needs to be noted here 
that caring relationships are fundamentally based on these dependency relations. It 
is also important to note that most relationships people engage in are not exclusively 
based on contractual arrangements. The family for example is a combination of 
mutual reciprocity and one-sided support, played out on a basis of emotions, feelings 
and social structures (see Fitzpatrick 2008:155). And the realm of emotions and 
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feelings is in particular the ideal that is emphasised in relation to family care. In 
discussing the case of migrant carers in Austrian families I stated that family values 
can be extended beyond traditional kin relations. In the remaining part I now want to 
turn to formal care arrangements and how relationships between cared-for and 
formal care workers are constructed in contrast to the construction of family care 
relationships. In the first discussion extract Helma talks about her experiences as a 
volunteer in palliative care and the relationships emerging with the people she is 
dealing with: 
 
Helma: And then, in this time, because this is of course some kind of intimacy, 
unbelievable relationships develop (...). Uh, something very nice, (...), in fact 
something really new. And that *they+ then with him, or her, in most cases it’s 
women, but we also have some men who do that, talk about the most intimate things 
of their lives. Simply because it’s a need.  
 
The following discussion shows exemplarily how relationships with care workers are 
negotiated in contrast and in comparison to family relations. Vera presents a very 
common view that care workers are, in contrast to family carers, emotionally not 
involved with the person in need for care. However, Mary disagrees and describes 
how for her mother the situation is clearly different. Interestingly, she uses two main 
arguments in favour of care workers. Firstly, professionalised, and therefore more 
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qualified care, and secondly, the inability to distance oneself from the engagement 
with the people cared for:  
 
Vera: And with a family member you don’t have that, so, you do have emotions and 
those you take with you, whatever, *it’s+ not possible, you can’t switch that off.(...) 
And a professional *carer+ just doesn’t take it with him, must not take it with him. So, 
yeah, they must not identify with, I think, [laughs] with the situation and so (...) 
Mary: No, I don’t really think so. So, firstly, I hope and I think, that there’s a difference 
of quality, because at the end of the day there’s a lot of medical professional 
knowledge behind it. (...) And secondly, I think, it is not true (...) that you have some 
distance from it, because I see it with my mother. She’s working in care and, maybe 
she should be able to do it, but often it is very difficult to, yeah, switch off, and also to 
really keep the distance. And she, so I experience that with her, she’s taking a lot of it 
into her daily life, that’s a big topic in conversations. It comes up, it’s certainly half of 
the time we’re talking, is about her work, and about the cases she is dealing with, 
also in the hospice. So it, it moves her massively, and it also gets to her. So it is not 
true that you can simply switch off. And I do think that, that she’s doing professional 
work, and high-quality work. So 
Vera: Yes of course.  
Mary: Insofar I think that it is just a prejudice, and she has indeed learned methods 
to, yeah, to deal with it, but she’s still taking it with her into her life. And I’m not sure 
in how far it gets to her even more, because she’s confronted with a number of cases, 
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than, than for example, uhm, care in the family, where it is just one case, that gets to 
you. So, I’m not sure, whether it is not a bigger burden.  
Vera: Yes, but, you have to, if that happens to your husband, or to your child, or to 
your families, so with a close family member, you have emotions, yeah, I mean, 
memories and, (...) a whole life spent with this person. So, a care worker, even if she 
is very qualified, they always try to research and investigate the biography of this 
person, that’s clear, but they, they don’t have the experiences with this person at all. 
(...) And especially, I mean, this emotional connection, yeah, you have, you have 
experiences with this family member.  
 
How the two women talk about professional and family care in this discussion 
exemplifies the idea that care is intrinsically based on emotions and feelings of love 
and closeness. Care is also based to some extent on an idea of sacrifice, as discussed 
above. At the same time, interestingly, the idea of professionalisation seems to 
contradict the notion of selfless care to some extent. In order to ‘defend’ the image 
of care workers, Mary needs to emphasise their inability to distance themselves from 
these emotions which, and this is discussed frequently in other groups, arise through 
the experience of caring. An understanding of care built on trust, commitment, 
relationships and love can be interpreted as a protective cocoon that enables 
‘ontological security’ (Giddens 1991) which affects the creation of identity 
significantly. Because people can draw on repertoires of values about care and 
commitment, worked out through relationships with others (Williams 2004: 41-2), 
they gain a secure self-understanding and a conscious (or even proud) position as a 
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carer. In situations in which these values are challenged (such as care relations 
outside the family setting) a dichotomy between loving, emotional being there for 
someone and professional care work seems to arise. The general dichotomy between 
care work and the emotional aspects are also often challenged by experiences. 
Qureshi and Walker (1989) for example argue that people often feel that caring for is 
an expression of caring about. However, they agree that a differentiation between 
practical work and emotional engagement could be possible:  
‘Affective benefits can be delivered independently even though, within a 
particular caring relationship, the expressive and instrumental aspects of caring 
may be inextricably mixed. Warmth, affection and interest do not have to come 
wrapped around practical tasks, and neither is the performance of practical tasks 
necessarily accompanied by such expressions in either the informal or the formal 
sector’ (Qureshi and Walker 1989:23).  
 
This idea will be taken up again later in this thesis (chapter 8).  
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented data to describe how relationships in the context of 
care are strongly defined by values and virtues associated with family care provision. 
I have demonstrated that in public discourse the family is positioned as the main unit 
and focus in the context of care for elderly people. Even though it is obvious that 
there are also other actors involved in the provision of care the family still remains 
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the main association. This happens through an emphasis on values and virtues linked 
to the family so that family care always becomes the point of comparison. People 
seem to be confronted with two opposing cultural discourses: firstly, families are 
seen to be the ideal care framework and secondly, care within the family is due to 
economic and social developments not always possible anymore.  
 
The family as an institution has experienced substantial changes over the last 
decades, though no signs of fragmentation (Fitzpatrick 2008:143); in the discourse it 
is still the main association in the context of care. In that sense all other options 
available are judged and evaluated in relation to values such as emotional intimacy, 
traditionally associated with the family. However, I have also argued that this does 
not necessarily mean a straightforward assumption that family members are seen to 
be responsible for the provision of care for their elderly relatives. Rather, a complex 
web of principles, emotions, affections and beliefs, influenced by public, normative 
ideas, determine individual attitudes and responsibilities. I also demonstrated a 
possible differentiation in the public discourse. People do express abstract ideas and 
beliefs about responsibilities which do refer to notions of justice and fairness. At the 
same time, however, these rather abstract principles are compared to personal 
relationships in which emotions and feelings equally shape the idea of 
responsibilities.  
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This points to a broader theme which can be called the relationality of care. In 
chapter 7 I will focus specifically on these relational aspects. For the moment it is 
enough to understand that certain values about care relationships and how and by 
whom care should be done are heavily affected by values about ‘proper’ family 
situations. Svašek (2008:222) points out that ‘rules about “proper” emotional 
behaviour (expressed in discourses, enacted through practices and felt through 
embodied experiences)’ are internalised through family practices. Thus, how family is 
normatively seen to be, influences the ideal caring situation. The values emphasised 
in the discursive construction of the family strongly refer to an idea of ‘natural’ traits, 
attitudes and opinions. Not out of abstract principles one should want to care for 
his/her parents but out of a natural desire to do so. In other words, the ideal of care 
is care out of love and not the fulfilment of a commitment. Care as the labour of love 
inherits this idea of emotional attachment and intimacy (see also Hochschild 2003a). 
Additionally, the family is seen as the natural realm in which dependency and the 
need for care can take place; these concepts are therefore privatised into the family 
unit (Fineman 2002:218). Family norms are often the result of legislation and 
justified biologically (Scott 2004). This chapter also showed that families are the 
result of moral constructions of values and virtues and that therefore families cannot 
be seen as ‘incarnations of the truth of nature’ (Scott 2004:231). When Silva and 
Smart (1999) advise a linking of benefits, taxes and pensions to practices of care 
instead of forms of family or marriage (1999:11) they recognise the potential of care 
to create forms of ‘family’ beyond the restricted normative understanding.  
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The question was raised whether family values are restricted to relationships of kin 
but the analysis of the Austrian migrant carer discourse showed that these values can 
also be reproduced beyond the immediate family. It can therefore be said that the 
notion of family can be rethought as being defined by certain values, virtues and 
practices, which are strongly related to care. It is not by definition, however, a kin or 
blood relationship. In practice the work of care and the feelings related to it go hand 
in hand but in the discourse a separation between the physical work aspects of care 
on the one hand and love for the cared for on the other hand seems to take place. 
This again raises the question of the possibility of other care options, e.g. the 
employment of professional care workers. Due to the discursive construction this 
becomes questionable as Groenhout (2004:27) for example warns that ‘[w]hen a 
relationship becomes one of rational calculation rather than one of care, the 
relationship is no longer sustainable’. In chapter 8 I will focus on the discursive split 
of intimacy and the market and its consequences for the construction of care but at 
this stage I want to draw attention to Zelizer’s argument that traditional proponents 
of a family model of care use this split against any involvement of financial 
transaction in the realm of care:  
‘Note that opponents of state-paid family caregiving invoke the now-familiar dual 
ideas that the intrusion of the marketplace into the sacred space of the family 
inevitably brings corruption, while introducing sentiment into the workplace 
reduces efficiency’ (2005:171).  
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Because care is seen as being closely linked to concepts such as affection, love and 
intimacy it is related to a particular kind of relationship. Interestingly, people talk 
about caring for their mother, with the help of a Slovakian woman; but they say 
putting away to a care home. This is an example that shows that some forms of care 
are completely taken out of the family bond. Subsequently, because the care home 
does not offer family care, the relationships within the institution can never be real 
caring relationships in the ways they have been constructed as ideal or idealised 
family care relationships (I will discuss the geographies of care in chapter 5).  
 
So far the question of what does care mean could be answered by highlighting the 
focus on values and virtues of family relations. I have shown that care requires a 
certain form of relationship and equally that care produces relationships. Care in that 
sense is understood as a particular form of relationship itself. The link between 
family ideals and care also leads to a situation in which care is constructed in a way 
how family is ideally lived and practiced. I have argued that a focus on who owes 
what to whom, on issues of reciprocity, duty and obligation misses an essential 
aspect of the construction of care as ‘anti-market’ form of care. In this form of care 
the family is the main realm because the family and the own home (see chapter 5 
below) secure a care relationship protected from the market-logic based system. At 
the same time a focus on individualism and post-familial relations seems to be an 
over-reaction to changing social structures. Values and ideals incorporated and 
represented by families remain the main feature of what care means to people and 
what being there for each other means to people. It is not an archaic universality of 
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the family (Burkart 2002) which makes family such a persistent aspect of the 
discourses; rather it is the meaning these relationships bear for people. ‘Family’ in 
the context of care is not (only) about who but about how care is thought of. Care so 
far can be described as an expression of family values such as intimacy and 
emotional relation. But care is not restricted to an image of close relationships. In 
order to explore the question of what it means to live an ideal life, other aspects 
associated with care need to be evaluated. In the following chapter I will focus 
therefore on the specific living arrangements which build the realm in which care 
takes place.   
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5 Geographies of care  
 
‘Caring tends to be associated not only with women, but with those private places where 
intimate relations with women are found. Specifically, caring is associated with the home 
and family’ (Hilary Graham, cited in Parks 2002:22). 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 4 I have demonstrated the ideological links between relationships and the 
ideal of care. I have argued that the construction of family is a representation of an 
imagined ideal which can also be embodied by non-family members. People’s homes 
bear a particularly important meaning as the nexus of intimate relationships. In this 
chapter I will discuss the geographies of care in more detail. The meaning of care is 
closely linked to an idea of the good life and the utopia of the home represents an 
important part of this ideal. The dichotomy between loving, affectionate care, and 
professionalised, institutionalised work will be situated in people’s understanding of 
spaces and places of caring. To understand the consequences and mechanisms of 
this reproduction the idea of ‘home’ must be seen in two separate, but inevitably 
interlinked ways. These attributes are reflecting common sense notions of the word 
‘home’ but go beyond them, in the sense that they represent a particular meaning in 
the context of care and being cared for. First, ‘home’ should be described as an 
ideological realm symbolising values attached to care. ‘Home’ therefore is 
constructed as the quintessential realm of care in which different images, emotions, 
attitudes and situations can manifest themselves symbolically, as Holstein argues: ‘It 
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connotes family, security, comfort, treasured memories, and even “independence”’ 
(cited in Parks 2002:11). Secondly, ‘home’ is a particular physical space in people’s 
minds and it is therefore associated with particular feelings towards this very place. 
These two aspects are produced and reproduced in public and private discourses and 
are therefore deeply embedded in people’s understanding of care. I will first (5.2) 
examine the relevance of home as a concept, discussing its meaning in academic and 
public discourses. I will analyse the distinctions between the physical space of home, 
the materiality of owning a property and the emotional associations with home. This 
will be followed (5.3) by an illustration of how home is constructed in the discourse 
on care. For this endeavour I will use the discourse on migrant carers in Austria as an 
example in which the ideal of home is created and constructed. I will show how 
home represents a central feature of what it means to be cared for. Discussing 
migrant carers’ roles in the household will help to understand the relationship 
between the place of care and its meanings and connotations. 
 
Parks (2002:11) points out that ‘home care symbolizes all the positive associations 
we have with hearth and home’, a space in which a ‘“kinder, gentler” form of health 
care’ can be delivered and in which people ‘can remain in the bosoms of their 
families’. Traditionally, the home used to be the space in which informal care is 
located; the market and the public space are identified with formal care. Taking up 
Said’s idea (2003) that an imagination of home also needs an imagination of other 
places in order to establish what is not home, I will describe the discursive image of 
the care home in section 5.4. Institutional care places are constructed as the 
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antipode to loving, affectionate care and they feature prominently in people’s stories 
and narratives. What real care is must be understood by grasping how care homes 
are constructed. The question arises, whether or not the ongoing blurring of 
boundaries between formal and informal care is also related to a challenge to the 
notions of different spaces in general and the ‘home’ space in particular, as 
suggested by Milligan (2003). In section 5.5 I will analyse this creation of dichotomies 
in some detail. Feminist criticism of the public-private distinction will be used to 
show the effects of the creation of a dichotomy of spaces, between the loving, caring 
space at home and the cold, institutionalised space of the care home. In the 
conclusion I will take up the theme of ambivalence which characterises many of the 
issues discussed. People’s feelings, associations but also opinions and arguments 
about care show an ambivalent relationship to places in general and home in 
particular. Before I turn to the issues of nostalgia in chapter 6 I will discuss the 
meaning of these ambivalences in relation to an idea of what people imagine as ideal 
care.  
5.2 The meaning of home  
Being at home is for many people the quintessential expression of feeling 
comfortable, safe and welcome. Some authors describe home therefore as a place 
where one feels ontologically secure (Easthope 2004), where one’s identity is shaped 
and kept. The link between home and people’s identity is based on the physical 
space but also on an imagined closeness with this physical space. Bachelard 
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(1969:15) in his book The Poetics of Space describes the relationship between the 
material house and the ideas associated with home: 
‘The house we were born in is more than an embodiment of home, it is also an 
embodiment of dreams. Each one of its nooks and corners was a resting-place for 
daydreaming’.  
 
Stereotypically home represents ‘warm’ feelings and positive associations with 
family, love and comfort. Images of being cared for and being cared about reflect 
similar sentiments and feelings and home becomes a central feature of positive 
imaginations of care. In the literature home is a contested concept (Easthope 2004) 
which conveys various meanings for both individuals and society in general. Whereas 
Bachelard (1969) emphasises the importance of images, dreams and imaginations for 
the lived experiences of a place, Massey (1995) focuses on places as locations of 
particular sets of social relations. Easthope (2004) shows that home means places 
which are inscribed with social, psychological and emotive meanings. Similarly to 
Massey (1995) Easthope (2004) disagrees with a rigid definition of home and favours 
a procedural meaning of home for places are always in the process of creation. In the 
context of care the meaning of home represents, on the one hand, the realm of 
caring, where care is delivered and experienced; on the other hand, home represents 
a sentiment of what care is and which symbols and images are attached to it (see 
Martin-Matthews 2007; Andrews and Phillips 2005; Conradson 2003). Home 
inevitably embodies all those aspects at different times for people. In the following 
sections I want to identify a few of the main features of people’s associations with 
home.  
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The materiality of home 
I first want to discuss the material aspects of the property, of the house and of the 
possession and use of one’s own home. While home relates to many emotive values 
and ideals it also needs to be understood as a system of boundaries in which one can 
be in control, in which one can hold possessions and in which one has the power to 
exclude others. Martin-Matthews (2007) therefore refers to home as a relation of 
territory and boundary, of control and cooperation and of symbolic significance. 
Blunt and Dowling (2006) emphasise that physicality/materiality and 
emotions/feelings always influence each other, that those spheres are not separate 
but bound to each other. This conception of home does justice to the theoretical 
framework (see chapter 2) in which the emotional sphere and the materialist world 
are intrinsically connected to each other. The understanding of the creation of an 
ideal of home is inherently related to economic possibilities and structures. Owning a 
property, a notion that was particularly prominent in the UK discourses, is significant 
in several ways: In the discussion about people having to move into institutional care 
settings, the aspect of having to sell the property to pay for the care home is often 
mentioned as important materialistic consequence. This expresses on the surface 
repugnance against being forced to sell a property which people have, over many 
decades, invested their lives in. But the aversion goes beyond that. As I will establish 
later in this chapter the care home is related to other-determined, other-controlled 
living. By having to sell one’s property the psychological aspect of having to give 
away one’s home reinforces and exacerbates the aspect of giving up one’s 
individuality and personal identity. Losing one’s home means that one has no control 
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over his/her surroundings. Milligan (2003:466; see also Young 2005a) refers in the 
following statement to the fact that losing one’s private home also means to lose the 
power related to home: 
‘Institutional spaces are not seen as belonging to residents but to staff, with 
significant areas of the home ‘off-limits’ to residents and their families who, in 
turn, have limited ability to establish spatial exclusion. The application of the 
term ‘home’ is thus something of a misnomer and the power balance exhibited 
within the private space of the domestic home is reversed.’  
 
This quote also points to the fact that the feelings associated with home, and the 
material possession of a property, are not separate aspects in people’s experiences. 
Rather, the possibility to exclude others and the protection of one’s own sphere are 
inherent to the idea of owning a place. Gal (2004:261) therefore argues that while 
‘“Private Property” is a defining feature of a capitalist economy’ the idea of private 
represents at the same time ‘those intimate relationships that are ideally protected 
from economic calculation’.  
 
The discussion on home, and with it the construction of an ideal of home, happens in 
particular socio-economic contexts and is therefore bound to and influenced by the 
economic circumstances underlying care. And these economic and social 
circumstances lead Parks (2002) to argue that a positive notion of home is 
exploitative and alienating for those providing care work in it. Simply because care at 
home ‘falls outside the market economy’ and because it is therefore socially and 
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politically invisible (Parks 2002:19), it exploits those who have to fulfil unrecognised 
and unvalued work; work that is largely not even understood and recognised as 
work. The home has a particular ideological meaning that hides socially necessary 
work away from public recognition and adequate economic remuneration. This 
reiterates Fraser’s (2003a, 2003b) claim for both recognition and redistribution. In 
the locus of the home it becomes clear that recognition of marginalised groups (e.g. 
those caring) is closely linked to economic inequalities. Only those who can afford it 
can afford the ideal of home.  
 
Blunt and Dowling (2006:100-1) argue that public discourses present 
‘a dominant or ideal version of house-as-home, which typically portrays 
belonging and intimacy amongst members of a heterosexual nuclear family, 
living in a detached, owner-occupied dwelling, in a suburban location’. 
  
Phillips (2007:117) shows the impact of class or educational levels on the access to 
home care. She demonstrates that the higher the education, the greater the 
geographical distance between parents and children, which inevitably influences the 
possibilities to provide and/or arrange care at home. In these situations the idea of 
home as a luxury, in the sense that only those with sufficient funds can afford the 
positive associations with ‘home’ is at least partly challenged. This discussion will 
again be taken up again in chapter 8.  
 
Feeling 
Additional to the materiality of the house, associated feelings, emotions and 
  
161 
sentiments play an important part in the meaning of home. Again, for the 
construction of care at home these associations are extremely important as they 
affect people’s preferences and wishes for their living conditions. The following 
extract from a discussion exemplifies some of the most common associations with 
the own home as a familiar space and a well-known environment. The affirmation of 
this familiarity contrasted with the unknown, unfamiliar and hostile realm of the care 
home is however not reduced to the practicability of living, as might appear at first 
glance. The home is associated with comfort, safety, and feeling at home whereas 
the institutional space is thought of as potentially hostile, mean, and lonely. When 
Adam argues that in a care home people are on their own and have to manage alone 
without any help, the experience of an individual within the space of a care home is 
constructed as secluded, lost and isolated.  
 
I: I’d like to briefly talk about care at home, (...), that’s what all have said actually, it is 
better for those who are cared for? (...) or, it’s easier, or more comfortable, if that 
happens at home? (...) 
Barbara: Yes, the familiar environment.(...) 
I: What are, what are the reasons, that it is nicer, better at home? 
Adam: Because the cared-for person has probably lived there for 20, 30, or 50 years, 
in this environment, knows the people (...) and if he’s now going to move somewhere 
else, he doesn’t know anyone, he doesn’t know how mean the people are. He doesn’t 
know the house customs, he is, if he’s getting away from home in the first place, he 
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has no support at all, he’s on his own, and he’s dependent on them, right, on, on the 
whole system, dependent on the carers (...) 
Barbara: Then, additionally, the old people very often start being dement  
Adam: yes 
Barbara: they then don’t have a proper sense of orientation; (...) they don’t know 
anymore where their things are. At home, they know exactly, this I have there, that I 
have there, and this they forget again in a new environment, if they have dementia 
for example (...). 
 
Barbara’s reply, in which she introduces dementia as another factor that worsens the 
experience of a loss of familiarity, points to the aspect that home is also the space 
that provides an established self-identity. People with dementia might lack memory 
and a coherent self-narrative, and therefore they also lack ‘home’. The meaning of 
homelessness as a socio-economic phenomenon can easily be extended to the loss 
people experience if they have to move away from their life’s narrative. This process 
is then visualised by a move into an institutional space, and the apparent absence of 
home even more. This feature of home as providing the story of one’s life is a very 
prominent association in the discourse. Young (2005a; 2005b) describes the home as 
an extension of bodily habits, particularly for older people who are marginalised in 
society and whose expression of their own identity is somewhat limited to their own 
home. Similarly, Milligan (2003) sees the home as an embodiment of identity and 
self-expression, as an anthropological space. In the home, Milligan argues, there are 
limits to the ‘extent to which an individual can be objectified and depersonalized – 
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stripped of their history and identity – to become anonymized within a collective 
(institutional) regime’ (2003:462). This feature of an anthropological space, in which 
people are by definition (of home) independent subjects within a familiar 
environment, feeds into the association between family and home.  
 
Home as an extension of family  
Underlying many of the discussions on care in general and the idea of home in 
particular is the assumption of care as a family issue, as described in chapter 4. The 
idea of place and space in which care takes place is of utmost importance in the 
context of the discussion of possible solutions and alternatives to family care (see 
also Mallett 2004). The home, with all its aforementioned attributes and associated 
feelings, well summarised by Young’s (2005b) idea of dwelling, is the physical 
manifestation of what is commonly associated with family life and being comforted 
by a familial environment. Mallett (2004:63) argues that home ‘locates lived time 
and space, particularly intimate familial time and space’. In the quote below there is 
also some underlying notion of blame (of the family and/or the state). The 
importance attached to the own home has important consequences for family 
members and often results in feelings of responsibility and guilt. People often 
express that securing care for their elderly relatives in their own homes (or in the 
relatives’ homes) would mean for them to fulfil their duty as a relative. That people 
are not preventing it that relatives have to move into a care home, is a recurring 
theme which underlies feelings of guilt and discomfort. The following extract from a 
focus group discussion represents this relation between feelings of family obligations 
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and the home as a physical space. The discussion also points, however, to the 
meaning of home for the reproduction of family relationships: 
 
Caroline: I think, always the question with bad conscience. It is, I believe, not only the 
conscience which says (...) she has raised me, she has always been there for me, she is 
my mother, and now I put her away? And shift her off? (...) they have somehow still a 
bad conscience then. Plus there is still the question, would my mother maybe have 
lived longer if she had stayed at home? In the known environment. 
Gita: Yeah, my mother wouldn’t live in a *care+ home anymore.  
Caroline: Because many seal themselves off, they retreat, 
Gita: Neither my aunt 
Caroline: if they come into a care home 
Gita: They both hadn’t lived anymore in a home 
 
It is this projected association between the home and the idea of care as a family 
issue that particularly defines women’s role different to men’s. Extensively discussed 
by feminist writers (e.g. Held 1990) the house is the realm of the private and 
traditionally associated with women. Family relations are still seen as the most 
protected form of privacy, against the public world of markets, bureaucracy, politics 
and paid employment. The emphasis of the importance of home has hence a 
particular gendered connotation of family relations. Parks (2002) points to the 
gendered consequences due to a construction of home in relation to family values: 
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‘Caring is tied not only to women but to the private sphere where intimate 
relationships flourish. This is primarily the sphere of the home and family. Since 
women have been linked historically to the private sphere of the home, the task 
of caring again comes full circle to an association with women. And women 
internalize this association with caring such that feelings of guilt arise if they are 
charged with not caring enough or, worse, not caring at all’ (2002:21).  
 
These feelings of guilt bear a heavy burden, in particular but not exclusively for 
women. By reconstructing the realm of home as a sphere of comfort, security and 
familiarity, family members and especially women are put in a vulnerable situation. 
Bearing the responsibility of providing, ‘home’ for their relatives becomes a task that 
is not limited to practical arrangements but more and more based on a symbolisation 
of home. The own wish and the own position within family relations are then partly 
defined by the availability of home for frail elderly people. Vanessa, in the following 
extract, exemplifies that and also links the importance of securing a home for her 
mother explicitly to her identity as a woman.  
 
Vanessa: And again, it was the men who were rather in favour of a [care] home. (...) 
And we’ve seen, however, that it goes relatively quickly, and therefore I said, no way, 
there’s no question about it. We give her the time at home. (...)  And she also wished 
that very much, to be at home. 
  
Blunt and Dowling (2006) point to the long-existing ideological separation that men 
build and dwell and women preserve. They argue that the idea of the home as a 
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retreat is a male construction ‘for whom home is a refuge from work, but certainly 
doesn’t describe the lives of women for whom home is a workplace’ (Blunt and 
Dowling 2006:16).  
 
Living Preferences 
‘Who wants to go into a home anyways?’ (Kurier, 23/10/06) 
 
A theme and narrative that also appeared frequently in the discourses is the 
emphasis, or the assumption, of the preference of care at home rather than in 
institutional settings. Discursive argumentation strategies such as ‘every old person 
wishes to stay at home’ or ‘old people want to live and be cared for at home’ show 
the unquestioned and unchallenged assumption of the choice for the own home. 
This is furthermore reproduced by warnings about taking old people out of their 
familiar environment and to ‘push them off’ into a home, or even ‘to deport them’ to 
a home. This is constructed as a bipolar opposition to people’s wish for a self-
determined life, away from any institutions. The home, in contrast to 
institutionalised, other-controlled existence, entails a possibility of independence, 
and independent living. Maria describes what independent living means for her:  
 
For me it means living in one’s own home surrounded by one’s own familiar 
belongings and lifestyle. It means privacy. It means still being able to get out to the 
theatre/cinema/social gatherings if desired 
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Kontos argues that it is one particular feature of home that it ‘unlike many other 
accommodation options available to frail older people, does not compromise their 
independence’ (1998:168). Home can therefore be seen as by definition enabling and 
guaranteeing independence for those living in it. People living in their own homes, 
being visited by carers, or even living with a live-in carer (such as in the case of the 
migrant carers in Austria) are not necessarily ‘more independent’ than people in 
institutional arrangements. It is the connotation of ‘home’, however, that secures 
this experience of independence for people. Kontos similarly states that home is 
associated with independence 
‘by defining a space that is controlled by and is uniquely the domain of the 
individual. Home is a space in which to pursue personal interests and also, as it is 
resonant with experiences and expectations, it is a vital facet of self-identity’ 
(1998:189). 
 
Clearly, independence is here not necessarily linked to real living situations but is 
rather a result of the definition of home and its attached values. In chapter 6 I will 
discuss the imagination of independence at home and the idea of ‘dependent’ living 
in care homes in more detail. Here I simply want to point out that the ideological 
construction of the home has important consequences for how people see 
themselves. Living at home (and being cared for in one’s own home) represents an 
independent life style combined with a familial and familiar atmosphere. Other 
arrangements will inevitably fall short of this ideal. In the following section I will 
demonstrate the importance of the idea of home for the construction of care within 
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family settings. The discourse on migrant carers in Austria demonstrates that home is 
enabling a family situation even though family members are absent.  
5.3 The realm of intimate care –migrants caring in ‘homes’ 
I will describe the example of the Austrian discourse on care in some more detail in 
order to illustrate the consequences and meanings of the association between home 
and family relations or communities. As mentioned in chapter 4 the discourse on 
migrants who are living with elderly people in their apartments in order to care for 
them reproduces the general dichotomies present in the discourses on care. 
 
The analysis of the discourse on migrant carers in particular suggests that the home 
is constructed as the sphere in which informal care based on affection, love and duty 
can be practiced, even when performed by non-family carers. Bettio et al. (2006) 
observe a widespread aversion against institutionalisation in Italy and link this to the 
motivations to employ migrant carers (see also Degiuli 2007). Similarly the analysis of 
the Austrian discourse suggests that the home is constructed as the sphere in which 
informal care based on affection and love can be practiced, even when performed by 
non-family carers. In other words, the employment of migrants as carers in people’s 
own homes, described by Martin-Matthews (2007:231) as ‘strangers who attend to 
her in the most intimate settings’, reproduces the idea of home as the realm of 
family care and the notion of family care is therefore extended to non-family 
members. The following newspaper extract clearly shows the kin-like function of 
migrant carers in the household. Starting with the terminology of ‘Granny’ the whole 
  
169 
description of the situation suggests that living together at home is constructed as 
the building up of a family relationship. The last sentence then presents the 
alternative (here mentioned as the only alternative – a limitation often found in this 
particular discourse), the care home. It becomes clear that the carer prevents the 
cared for to be ‘pushed off’ to a care home. 
 
“When Anna is gone, Granny gets ill.” 
Anna does really everything that comes up. She cooks, washes, does the housework. 
But over everything else she faithfully looks after “Granny”. For many years Granny is 
dependent on others’ help. The almost 90 years old woman has Alzheimer and is 
bedridden. Additionally, a chronic lung disease causes problems. Anna helps Granny 
onto the wheel chair, washes her, supports her with the daily tasks. “But especially 
during the night she is there”, Margit says. “That’s the greatest thing for us. But only 
the illegals do that. Otherwise one cannot afford that.” (…) Today everything’s 
different. “The two are extremely close. Every three to four months, when Anna goes 
to see her family in Slovakia, Granny gets ill. She relapses – and that every time.” (…) 
A care home, however, is out of the question for the family. Margit: “Mother always 
refused to be pushed off.” (Kurier, 13/08/06)  
 
For family members’ performance of intimate, affectionate care the most important 
feature is the provision of care in people’s homes and the analysis suggests that 
family members can fulfil their moral duty, resulting from their familial connection to 
the person in need, at least partly by arranging their relatives to be cared for in their 
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own house. Mehta and Thang (2008) focusing on the situation in Singapore argue 
that there society approves of people’s filial responsibility as long as care at home is 
ensured. Reflecting the Austrian discourse, Der Standard (07/02/07) writes that it is 
beyond doubt that the goal of policy making in the context of care is to enable care 
and minding at home. Thus, migrant carers who live with the cared-for ensure the 
execution of informal care, also in replacement of family members. People whose 
moral duty might be thought to be actively involved in intimate care for the elderly 
can be engaged by ensuring that their loved-ones are saved from or prevented from 
care in institutions. And in this context migrant carers take the role of domestic, 
informal carers and are therefore able to provide the services that are usually 
restricted to family members. When the Kronen Zeitung (08/07/07) therefore writes 
about ‘families, who sacrificially care for their relatives at home with Eastern 
European help’ the inclusion of migrants into the home seems to correlate with an 
inclusion into the family. Migrant carers living with the cared-for person are 
constructed as the logical actors who ensure informal home care: 
‘Thank god they exist, the good women from the new EU-East (…), four truthfully nice 
supporters from Poland (…) lived one after the other with her and cared for her’ 
(Kurier, 16/08/06). 
 
The constructed ideal care relationship described in chapter 3 can therefore be 
established by living with the cared-for person. Due to the strong link between the 
own home and real care and the importance of the former for the latter migrant 
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carers are constructed as the only available option for people. Anything else 
(especially institutional solutions) would challenge the idea of care itself: 
 
The first impression: There are two that really get along well – even though they see 
each other 24 hours a day. For two years, since Mrs P.’s stroke, the young nurse 
Maria cares for the 67 years old Viennese. (...) [L]egal 24 hours care is too expensive 
(and difficult to get) and she panics to go into a care home: “I have experienced that 
with my mother. I don’t even want to think about it.” What’s left? Maria. (Die Presse, 
14/08/2006)   
 
In the context described above 24-hours care is only discussed as care ‘at home’. 
Even though a reference to care at care homes can be found the label is almost 
exclusively attached to care within the own home. The following extract is a reader’s 
comment that appeared in an Austrian newspaper in response to the political 
discussion on the then illegal status of employing migrant carers in people’s own 
homes. It describes the possibility of people staying at home and being cared for in 
their own houses as a situation that is honourable and which should be supported. 
Politicians and the political process is criticised for interfering with what is happening 
in the own home. This links to the argument about the construction of the public and 
the private sphere, the idea of natural communities and the interference of politics 
and bureaucracy (see chapters 6 and 8). Politics is constructed as the opposite to a 
natural arrangement of care: 
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We have really reached a point in the state of Austria! Now, apparently, you get 
already penalised if you don’t push your helpless, old parents off into a care home, 
but let them be cared for by foreign care workers in their own familiar home! This 
falls under the sector of humanitarian help and this is, as one knows, tax free! As 
many employers enrich themselves without paying taxes the state should reduce the 
employment of the many thousand illicit workers in the construction industry and 
other areas and not slash at private individuals who don’t want their own flesh and 
blood to die dishonourably. (Kronen Zeitung, 19/08/06). 
5.4 The care home – institutionalised other-determined living  
In the sections above I have pointed out that the home is ideologically and 
discursively linked to ‘warm’ feelings about closeness and intimacy. The discourse on 
migrant carers working and living in Austrian households has shown that their role is 
constructed as preventing people from being ‘put away’ into a care home. In this 
section I want to focus in more detail on the construction of the antipode to the 
home, namely institutional care arrangements. If care is so closely linked to 
someone’s own home, is care in an institution a contradiction in terms? Which 
consequences does a construction of care homes as quintessential ‘cold’ and 
intimacy-free places have for the ideal of care?  
 
In the context of care the notion of home is often compared and opposed by another 
ideological construct, the care home. In all the focus group discussions the topic care 
home came onto the agenda, usually without being introduced by the facilitator. 
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Frequently, participants tell stories and anecdotes about the life and situations in 
care homes and demonstrate knowledge about the legal and political circumstances. 
These anecdotes and narratives can usually be characterised by negative 
connotations, emotions and opinions. Similarly to the discussion of home, care 
homes feature very prominently in people’s ideas, stories and narratives about care 
and old age. However, rather than seeing it exclusively in the context of particular, 
personal experiences, care homes need to be understood as a concept, symbolising 
‘homelessness’ as defined above. The concept of care home stands for an 
institutionalised, professionalised and de-personalised form of living, and hence is 
constructed as the counterexample for dignified living and loving care. Furthermore, 
the discursive construction of the care home already points to a general ideological 
aversion against professionalisation and institutionalisation, an aspect I will discuss 
more prominently in chapter 8. The broader dichotomy is reproduced in the 
construction of home and care home as two opposing symbols. The archetypical 
opposite to independent, self-determined living is the institutional arrangement. The 
care home symbolises everything that challenges a good and fulfilled life and by 
using this symbol people can express their fears, worries and negative feelings about 
old age, being frail and needing care. People in the focus groups argue that in care 
homes, dementia is rising, that people are closing off, that they are forced into an 
unknown environment, an alien environment with alien people where there is no 
individuality and no dignity. Whereas the own home (i.e. ‘home’) secures 
individualisation, individual meaning and personal identity (see Young 2005a) the 
care home is a ‘placeless space’ (Twigg 2000b), a site that lacks anthropological 
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meaning for those inside. Milligan (2003) uses Marc Augé’s (1995) concept of non-
spaces to describe the institution as a site in which personal histories, narratives, 
feelings and identities are absent. That the care home is definitely more impersonal is 
an expression that refers to this lack of subjectivity and individuality.  
 
A word and concept that is reoccurring and which seems extremely important in the 
construction of ideal care is dignity. It is almost generally assumed that dignified 
living cannot take place in an institutional setting but is related to the own home, the 
presence and proximity of people close to one. Ingrid clearly understands a dignified 
life as living at home, by oneself: 
 
Ingrid: That’s the bad thing, I think. In the home they not only take their (...) 
individuality, they also take their dignity.  
 
The possibility of dignified living in a care home is then often rejected and denied. 
Ingrid describes the situation when a family member moves into a care home as a 
very brutal solution and that people do not want to put away their relatives. The 
discussion on migrant carers above has shown that for many family members it 
seems to be an essential part of their relationship with their relatives to avoid and 
prevent care in a care home. The following two extracts illustrate that. First, Ingrid 
speaks about a promise given to her mother which symbolises the close and familial 
relationship between them. The care home almost symbolises the outside world that 
would penetrate their relationship and their bond. The second is an extract from a 
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newspaper article about a woman caring for her husband at home. Again, the 
relationship is defined by their mutual aversion against care and living in an 
institutional space, the care home.  
 
I: And why, what was the motive, to do it like that, and not (...) a care home? 
Ingrid: Because I have, when my mother was still doing well, I promised her to never 
put her into a home. (...) And this promise I’ve kept. 
 
“I would never put him into a care home” 
She employed a nurse for three nights. For 211 Euros. “But that drove me mad”, her 
husband says with a soft voice. “You are shepherded that much and still you feel 
constricted if someone comes after you even to the loo.” (…) As long as it is medically 
justifiable her husband should stay in the environment he is used to. “That’s the only 
thing I can give him in this situation”, she says. “I would never put him in a home. 
With this illness it is so important to have somebody around. Those who are alone 
don’t have a chance to get better.” (Kurier, 13/08/06)  
 
Caroline and Brenda focus on the experiences of people at home when they describe 
the shortcomings of institutional care arrangements. In the home, they argue, care 
can be really experienced, even by dement, and possibly even paralysed people. In 
other words, people can still experience and sense home. In the care home, 
however, this experience is taken away and cannot possibly be made: 
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Caroline: The environment, she is at home in a house, really normal. Even though she 
can’t, in a sense, express it, realise it, but the feeling is there. The family, the familial 
situation there (...) you do feel that, she does indeed sense it. Even though she can’t, 
anymore (...) express it. 
Brenda: Yes, you’re feeling that through all senses 
Caroline: Exactly! And in a care home this is, of course, gone 
Brenda: Whether she’s smelling it, or, or seeing, or, yeah, you do sense that indeed. 
(...) 
Caroline: Exactly, exactly! In the care home this is of course gone, it’s a cold 
environment 
 
Neglect, abuse, starving 
Neglect and abuse are regular themes appearing in newspaper articles about care 
homes. By making it the primary narrative a particular link is established between 
care homes and the occurrence of these practices. The following examples chosen 
from several UK newspaper headlines are reflecting the relevance of these themes: 
 
Half a million old folk are mistreated says charity (Daily Mail, 06/02/07) 
Elderly ‘need new rights to protect against abuse’ (The Times, 15/06/07) 
Catalogue of abuse in NHS care homes (The Guardian, 17/01/07) 
Damning report highlights ‘harsh reality’ of care for elderly (Daily Mail, 10/01/07) 
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Issues of neglect, abuse or mistreatment also play an important role for the analysis 
of the article-internal context34 as care and carers are often discussed in the context 
of news on abuse cases. Some newspapers (e.g. The Sun) focus particularly on these 
issues and care is mentioned mainly in this context. Mistreatment and awful living 
conditions are also continuously recurring themes in the discussions. The first 
associations with care homes are often stories, experiences and emotions related to 
maltreatment. Many people do have own experiences or know stories about 
problematic practices in care homes and a general anger with care homes can be 
noticed. Brenda for example speaks about the experience that carers in homes do 
not take the time for patients, that they put the food there and cleaned it up again. 
Useless, because she couldn’t eat anything anyways.  
 
Brenda calls this an eat or die practice, and this kind of problem is mentioned in 
many different contexts. Similarly Peter tells a story about a care home a friend of his 
went into. In his account some classical aspects of maltreatment appear, such as the 
massive rooms and the television constantly being switched on:  
 
Peter: (…) the difference between care homes (...) the one that Lucy was in (...) it was 
horrendous (...) and, uh, Lillie quite openly said if she’d have to stay in there she 
would have committed suicide. Even though she didn’t believe in suicide, uhm, but 
there was a sort of place where it was a massive room, (...) sort of set off into smaller 
                                                 
34
 The term ‘article-internal context’ refers to the particular stories and themes in which care appears 
in newspapers (see chapter 3).     
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places by bookshelves but would be Television in each section and they’d be on 
different programmes, all very loud. 
 
Another symbol for the unattractiveness and undesirability of care homes are stories 
and images of smelling, cold and dirty places. John’s statement can be taken as an 
example for associations many people share about care homes: 
 
John: And then slowly, you start getting a picture. Uhm, but I suppose if I go into a 
care home and if I, if I smell, unfortunately can’t but say urine, that immediately puts 
me off (...) if I go into that place.  
 
Another reoccurring image related to care homes, that could be said as symbolising 
the ‘coldness’ of care homes, is mentioned by John in his account of the care home 
his mother was in. Care homes are described as marketised, profit-seeking 
institutions, characteristics that do not relate smoothly to the demands people have 
of care arrangements. 
 
John: But what I do find out that an ideal care home should be a place of security. An 
environment uhm, and clean and properly staffed. Also, there is the social 
implications of it. Uhm, particularly regarding my mom because the first thing the 
social worker to mom, who was greatly ill, said (...) ‘you’ve got to sell your house. 
Have you got your own property? You’ve got to sell it’. So in one sense there’s not 
just, there is the financial aspect of it.  
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Very often, a strong focus on the costs of care homes and the difficulties in meeting 
these costs leads to a felt separation on economic grounds. Living in a home (in the 
symbolic, ideological sense) is hence seen as a luxury, and only those who can afford 
it, can get a real ‘home’ (Young 2005a). The issues of the care home as being an 
institutionalised and therefore also marketised space is furthermore emphasised in a 
discussion in which the cold, bureaucratic working styles of care homes are 
emphasised. People working in care homes and the institutions themselves cannot 
act like ‘home’ because they are part of the economic sphere of life. The 
bureaucracy, administration and working arrangements on the other hand are also 
examples and illustrations of the fact that a care home is not home in the ideological 
sense. People employed as carers in institutional settings face a situation in which 
they are working in paradoxical surroundings for, on the one hand, their work space 
is constructed as the antipode to home and, on the other hand, the ideal of their 
work is seen as providing ‘homely’ care. The commonly held understanding of care 
can almost by definition not be offered in a care home. People often refer to the 
hard work carers are performing and that nurses often give everything they have. 
This however, can never meet the requirements and characteristics associated with 
care at home. In the discussion carers are then often understood as (inevitably) 
withdrawing from the people they are in charge of and are seen as only fulfilling 
some tasks:  
 
Caroline: (…) And for that I have nurses sitting there? (...) I mean, I’m one myself, but 
there is a reason why I’m not active in care anymore. There is a reason. Because I can 
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indeed deal with difficult cases, cases of death etc., but with those things not really. 
Because, when I stand there alone and work myself to death (...) really many rather 
sit together for a coffee, and then even tell me, I don’t integrate myself into the team, 
because I don’t want to drink coffee with them. 
 
Failing to respond to individual needs or, more generally, failing to acknowledge 
individuality, seems to be one of the recurring criticisms of care workers in homes. As 
the examples below show, however, it is often not the care workers who are 
accused; they are rather seen as being part of a system that is the problem.  
 
Paul: and they can also not deal with that there, obviously. (...) I mean, if they once 
get to know them and if they had the time, then they could  
Ingrid: to respond to individual needs 
Paul: to individual, uh, demands, or rather, individual readiness for action of those, 
who work there. Whereas I don’t want to, uh, accuse them of something 
Ida: Yes, take make an effort anyways 
 
Ida is again referring to the problem of food being served and taken away again, 
without taking the time to feed the person if that is necessary. She, however, says 
that the nurses or care workers would do it but that the institutional arrangements 
are the actual reason for the maltreatment of elderly people in care homes. Similarly, 
administrative work of care workers is often mentioned as the main obstacle to them 
being ‘real carers’: 
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Ida: the assistants (...) they come, they clear it off then again. And whether he has 
eaten, the patient, or not, that doesn’t matter, right. Sometimes a nurse takes the 
time and feeds, but, I mean, they are also very busy, also with writing work, right. 
One is constantly sitting at the computer, and... 
 
Also social services, care services or other forms of mobile intervention can meet the 
demands only insufficiently. Because care in the own home is constructed the way it 
is, and because of its definition as being more than completing particular tasks, 
formal arrangements must be experienced as disappointing. Zechner and Sointu 
(2008) describe how formal services in people’s own homes are used as ‘medicine 
against loneliness’ but it also seems inevitable that these are not equipped or 
prepared to fulfil this anticipated role. Similarly in care homes carers cannot offer 
what is essentially necessary to fulfil a particular ideal of care. Lack of staff and 
restricted availability of funding are reasons commonly mentioned that carers in 
homes can only do the physically necessary tasks. They cannot, however, ‘really 
care’. Being at home implicitly means a blurring of the boundaries between medical 
or nursing tasks and personal attention. To get some notion of ‘real’ care in nursing 
homes care workers would need to give additional concern and work with the ideal 
of selflessness. In the following extract the discussion revolves again around this 
problem, the impossibility of the right attention in care homes, and potential ways to 
bridge the separation between home and care home.  
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Adam: Yeah, and there’s also something else with the care home. I, I was there now, 
and I’ve also been told, in *town+ there’s also an old people’s home next to the 
hospital (...) A former hospital, (...). Yes, and they’re sitting there, if there are no 
additional, volunteering supporters, they sit in their rooms, and whine, (...) don’t mind 
whether or not they have eaten anything the whole day 
Walter: Yes 
Adam: This is also no care, is it? Clearly, the one person, or the two women, or men, 
who are doing the care there, they also can’t care for 41 or 50 old people, uh. 
Walter: That’s right 
Adam: that’s (...) problem. And that’s again, as you’re saying, that’s what’s missing. 
Walter: it’s a question of money (...). If nobody cares, then you’ll have the poor old 
lady (...) sitting with her spinach and can’t move the spoon (...) 
Adam: that’s it.  
Walter: and what’s missing, you always say, (…) idealism, of course, that’s just an 
employee there. You mustn’t forget that.  
 
All those examples show an aversion against institutionalisation and 
professionalisation as those processes are by definition in contrast to real, loving 
care (this theme will be explored further in chapter 8). The home as the realm of 
domesticity, idealism, selflessness, love and intimacy is opposing the sphere of 
professionalisation, marketisation and bureaucratisation. With Twigg (1997b:228) 
therefore home can be defined as ‘a secure haven against the hostile world of work’. 
Bowlby et al. (2009) use the concept of ontological security (see also Giddens 1991; 
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Shilling 1997) in this context to describe care’s potential to give security and stability 
over the life course. The construction of home as a family refuge, and in it embedded 
safety, comfort and individuality, provides the means for an imagined steadiness of 
one’s own identity, outlook and purpose in life. The home in public discourse is a 
manifestation of unchanging relationships and ongoing personalised, independent 
living. 
5.5 Dichotomies  
Since the care home is the quintessential antipode to loving care a clear dichotomy is 
created between the home and the institution. In this section I will focus on the 
implications of this dichotomy in all its variations. At the end of the last section I have 
mentioned the aversion against institutionalisation in context with an aversion 
against markets and the public sphere. In this section I want to explore this thought 
further. To what extent is the home constructed as a ‘haven’ against this public 
sphere? What does that imply for an understanding of care?  
 
Public/private  
Criticism of the public/private dichotomy has a long history in feminist thinking and 
politics (Scott and Keates 2004; Landes 1998). In the context of care Martin-
Matthews (2007:246) situates ‘home at the nexus of the private and the public 
spheres’ and Blunt and Dowling (2006) convincingly argue that dualistic thinking 
about home which creates clear dichotomies and relations (emotions-rationality; 
tradition-modernity; private-public; feminine-masculine; local-global) is wrong as 
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both categories of this dichotomy can always happen simultaneously. Home only 
exists through the contrast and the confrontation with the outside:  
Home is not separated from public, political worlds but is constituted through 
them: the domestic is created through the extra-domestic and vice versa’ (Blunt 
and Dowling 2006:27). 
 
I agree with their criticism of dichotomies and the discourses show that the creation 
of the dichotomies is of enormous importance for the construction of care. Because 
people use categories in their thinking, their experience is shaped by these ideas. 
Since the home is a strongly gendered space it seems necessary to briefly focus on 
the gender implications of places. The construction of home as the traditionally 
private space obviously entails an implicit reference to traditional gender 
constructions. Young (2005b) for example focuses in her discussion of home on 
preservation, ‘a typically feminine activity’. She argues that preservation, in contrast 
to the sphere of markets, politics and industry, is traditionally women’s work and as 
such de-valued and unrecognised. However, it is an inevitable part of human 
existence and the home can be seen as a manifestation of this. In the public 
discourse the link between women and the realm of the home becomes obvious. 
Hardly any person specifically mentions women as those who should do domestic 
work and stay in the private sphere; the construction of home care, however, shows 
clear gender connotations. In the following quote Claire refers to care that has been 
lost in modern society. In both child care and care for elderly people it is the 
women’s involvement in the labour market that prevents real care in the own home.  
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Claire: the women go with the first bus to [city] to the [supermarket], at 5 in the 
morning, come home with the last bus, the old person has to be put away to the day 
care centre, or into a care home, the children have to be put away to nursery, and 
then? 
 
In chapter 6 I will discuss the nostalgic connotations of these ideas further but here I 
want to point out that through the ideological construction of care at home women 
in particular face a vulnerability to exploitation. Home also ceases to exist as a 
private space through care. Care, it can be said, makes home public. As mentioned 
above, formal services fit only unsatisfactorily into the idea of the private home. 
Twigg (1997b) describes this process as being based on spatial oppositions between 
public and private in the home-space itself, and that, in the process of tasks 
performed by care services the private space, the home, is blurred and partly loses 
its poignant characteristics. This blurring of public and private spaces through caring 
does not only cause problems for the power situation between carer and cared-for; it 
can also change the meaning and the experience of home in general. Similarly, 
Phillips and Bernard argue in this context that ‘a blurring of the boundaries between 
these dichotomous spaces (…) has increasingly occurred, challenging in its wake our 
conceptualizations of care’ (2008:87). 
 
The power to live a self-determined life in the context of a care home is restricted 
and can manifests itself in resistance to the care staff, as Kontos describes: 
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‘The tenants adopt strategies which allow them to retain control over many 
aspects of their lives and maintain the fabric of home at standards they 
recognize as being appropriate for themselves’ (1998:180). 
 
It is important to link these ‘acts of gaining control’, or resistance against the care 
home staff to the broader discourse on the ideological construction of care homes. In 
defining home as a place in which power is held by those living in it, the care home is 
inevitably bound to fail.  
 
Nathan: And as one says, that really puts it on the door front, that says ‘my home is 
my castle and you’re not coming in’ 
 
‘Home’ in opposition to the outside world  
I have mentioned before the potential gain of ontological security that can arise from 
the home, which, as Milligan (2003:461-2) concurs, must be seen as ‘a familiar and 
‘safe space’ from the threats of the outside world’. It is interesting and a sign of the 
ambivalence associated with people’s imaginations and constructions of spaces, that 
the traditional, bourgeois, middle-class ideal of home must then also be seen as an 
antipode to the capitalist world of work, employment and markets. Young 
(2005a:156) in this context states however that  
‘Consumerism encourages people to focus on the private spheres of their homes; 
to this extent home is a counterpart of the capitalist marketplace and a detriment 
to the solidarity of community and assertive public participation’. 
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The home as a manifestation of care can then be seen as the moral context in which 
a life in opposition to market forces can be lived. It is in care in the home that 
solidarity, selflessness, family and community are seen to manifest themselves.  
 
Mallett (2004:71) argues that the public sphere ‘is associated with work and political 
engagements and non-kin relationships’ and that the home, on the other hand, is 
perceived as haven against an imposing, threatening and dangerous outside world. 
While Mallett (2004) points out that these associations are often not reflections of 
reality it is important to understand that as an image and as a nostalgic feeling they 
bear important consequences. Young raises therefore the question whether ‘an end 
to such exploitation requires rejecting entirely the project of supporting identity and 
subjectivity embodied in the patriarchal ideology of home’ (2005b:130). In other 
words, does the positive affirmation of the construction of home inevitably lead to 
gender inequalities and exploitation? Young (2005b:151) argues that feminist 
thinking and politics should adopt a dialectical approach in relation to home: 
‘Feminists should criticize the nostalgic use of home that offers permanent respite 
from politics and conflict, and which continues to require of women that they 
make men and children comfortable. But at the same time, feminist politics calls 
for conceptualizing the positive values of home and criticizing a global society that 
is unable or unwilling to extend those values to everyone’ 
 
A more procedural approach is needed in order to understand the home-making 
practices for both men and women (Blunt and Dowling 2006) and which role care 
plays in this context. While everyday practices are undoubtedly important the 
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ideological construction of homes still presents a rather static image. The 
ambivalences present in some accounts of the public discourse need to be taken 
seriously and need to be understood as attempts to link everyday practices with 
public moral expectations. Home’s implicit connotations of relations with others can 
be seen as ‘part of rather than separate from society’ (Blunt and Dowling 2006:14).  
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the geographies of care by analysing the importance 
people attach to certain places in the imaginations and experiences of care and 
caring. People continually express to wanting to be cared for at home and a link 
between idealised loving, affectionate care and the home is established. Institutional 
care arrangements, on the other hand, are the quintessential places which lack 
intimacy and thus care and care homes are constructed as complete opposites to 
what is associated with care. The analysis of the discourse on migrant carers has 
shown that home can create family relations, even with non-kin members. I have 
also argued that the construction of a dichotomy of home and the institution 
represents ambivalences which are inherent to care. The care home is seen as a 
manifestation of other-dependent, individualised living whereas the own home 
represents family ideals and values. What home means to people is affected by 
everyone’s own historical experiences and Blunt and Dowling (2006:245) summarise 
the constitution of home as something that is made: 
‘home is a process of creating and understanding forms of dwelling and belonging. 
Home is lived as well as imagined. What home means and how it is materially 
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manifest are continually created and re-created through everyday home-making 
practices, which are themselves tied to spatial imaginaries of home’  
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated, however, that certain ideas and ideals attached 
to a notion of home have important and pertinent consequences for the construction 
of care. Practices of home-making are important, but need to be seen in the context 
of the discursive construction of home. With this chapter another step could be 
made in exploring the meaning of care and its moral underpinnings. By looking at the 
construction of the space in and through which care is provided the point could be 
strengthened that family ideals, as described in chapter 4, are also a representation 
of a desire of safety and intimacy in a world which is experienced as overwhelming 
and market-driven. It could be shown that the home in the context of care is 
constructed as a refuge from economic demands ‘outside’. The home can therefore 
be seen as the physical and spatial expression of what care means to people, an ideal 
of ‘being there for each other’. The very values can be seen as being in opposition to 
the dominant, hegemonic market ideology. Success, competition and self-interest 
are counter posed by a particular imagined world. This world, I argue, manifests itself 
in the notion of home. Similarly Young (2005b) describes the potential of the private 
space as an anti-capitalist refuge in which people can resist the enforced political and 
economic structures of the public sphere. She (Young 2005b:149) argues that this 
resistance ‘requires a space beyond the full reach of those structures, where 
different, more humane social relations can be lived and imagined’. In another text 
Young focuses on the significance of ‘a material meaning of home as a necessary 
support for and enactment of personal identity’ (Young 2005a:155). Personal or 
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often group identity can therefore be enacted when the physical circumstances allow 
it. The home she sees as the material space that represents individuals, groups and 
their identities. This point is extremely important for an understanding of the 
complex connotations the positive and emotive affirmation of home has for many 
people. In the public discourse the focus on home both as a symbol and as a physical 
space goes much beyond an uncritical favouring of traditional family structures and 
ways of living (which are present nevertheless). In fact, home also bears a potential 
disconnection from societal marketisation and economisation. The ideological 
symbol of the home opposes market domination and the materialistic aspects 
provide an imagined shelter. Whether these values can provide a ‘leverage for 
radical social critique’ (Young 2005b:146) needs to be seen.  
 
However, in the current economic, political and social circumstances home care can 
only be lived and experienced within the dominant, hegemonic social structures. In 
other words, the emancipative potential of home, as described above, is met by the 
penetrating socio-economic conditions. Parks (2002:28) for example points out that 
‘the high rate of at-home care by black family members may be a labor of love – and 
may be wrapped up within an ethic of family and community’ but that it has serious 
consequences for those being disadvantaged and marginalised in the first place. 
Generally, the unifying values of home inevitably create an ‘other’ that is excluded 
from this ‘better world’. At present a positive reference to the home without an 
affirmation of traditional excluding and exploitative conditions seems to be unlikely if 
not impossible. Under the conditions of neoliberal capitalist economy, the 
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construction of home, as discussed in this chapter, reinforces divisions and 
stratifications and reproduces social inequalities in terms of gender, class, ethnicity, 
disability and age. In particular for women the ambivalence of both home and care at 
home needs to be kept in mind and any policy intervention needs to start with a 
recognition of this ambivalent associations with home.  
 
Because home represents a particular ideal of real care in association with values 
such as family, community, independence and intimacy, policy thinking and policy 
making needs to be conscious of the implications care at home has. The discursive 
construction is powerful and shaping people’s ideas, imaginations and experiences 
about care. At the same time the ‘ideology of home’ is also, as Robertson (1995) 
argues a response to recent claims of ‘homelessness’, and ‘rootlessness’. Home 
represents an image which is both nostalgic (as it might represent traditional family 
ideals) and progressive (in opposition to a neoliberal world). The next step will be a 
further exploration of these feelings of the nostalgic imaginations of the ideal of care. 
An extension of both family relations and the ideal of home can be seen in the notion 
of ‘community’.  
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6 Longing for Community 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapter 4 I concluded the analysis of relationships in care discourses by arguing 
that ‘family’ does not necessarily refer to who is providing care but how care is 
provided. Similarly the discussion of geographies of care has shown the importance 
of the home as an idealised space in which real care is possible. In this chapter I will 
take up these themes of imaginations and ideas by looking at the discursive feature 
of the notion of community and more precisely an expression of a societal yearning 
for community. As in the case of home, community is to some extent a physical 
entity, often a particular living arrangement within a specific area, such as a 
neighbourhood; community, however, also refers to a conception and agglomeration 
of particular values, feelings, emotions and associations. Community entails  
‘all forms of relationship which are characterized by a high degree of personal 
intimacy, emotional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion, and continuity 
in time. Community is founded on man [sic!] conceived in his wholeness rather 
than in one or another of the roles, taken separately, that he may hold in a 
social order’ (Nisbet 1966:47).  
 
In this chapter I will discuss the narratives, emotions and values that constitute 
community and their significance for the construction of care. I will start with 
identifying the discursive patterns, narratives and images that emphasise the 
significance of community within the discourse (6.2). The feeling and subjective 
experience of a decline of community is closely linked to the cultural, social and 
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ideological meanings of care and its discursive construction. In the discourses around 
care and carers community is always something that is gone; it is an ideal that a 
society should strive towards but can never, due to its idealised conception, reach.35 
Following the trajectory of this thesis it can be asked, whether this concept can be 
seen as a counter-force to processes of ‘modern’ life, such as individualisation, de-
traditionalisation, marketisation and economisation? Community, similarly to family 
or home, is the realm that provides safety in a world of market-determined lifestyles. 
Robertson (1992) therefore speaks of an extension of the ideology of home, which is 
not restricted to the physical space of the house, but also includes neighbourhood 
and community. Community often reflects a particular design of society. Using 
Tönnies’s (1955) highly influential distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
an ideological separation of the modern from the non-modern world can be 
identified. Robertson (1992) argues that it is globalisation that is the prime source for 
a particular nostalgia for community living. Bauman (2001) emphasises that modern 
living together has become a political process of negotiations until a consensus is 
reached. This can be contrasted to a more traditional situation (Gemeinschaft) in 
which people are there for each other, they know their role in the community and 
their responsibility towards each other. 
 
Care for elderly people in and by the community is often discursively linked to issues 
of child care, urbanisation and depersonalisation of life, work and relationships. In 
section 6.3 I will use related discursive themes (such as child care, neighbourhood) to 
                                                 
35
 At the same time it could be argued that community is also unimaginable since a complete and 
detailed sketch of the imagined community would destroy the image. Benedict Anderson (1991) 
writes about nations as imagined communities which cannot be described in detail.  
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demonstrate the broader ideological meaning of community for the very discourse. 
Community is idealised as the realm where relational living is possible and can be 
performed. This idealisation inevitably leads to a longing for community, which I will 
discuss in section 6.4. Which role does a nostalgic focus on temporal distance (the 
past) or geographical distance (other countries) have for the meaning of care? Care 
as an expression of living together and being there for each other is constructed as in 
need of a conceptual and physical realm. Are community and neighbourhood thus 
images of another life? A life that is desirable and a life in which being there for each 
other, i.e. caring for each other, is possible? The element of nostalgia also means 
that community represents another way of living, which is, due to economic, social 
and cultural arrangements, not reachable or achievable. In section 6.5 I will explore 
to what extent the notion of community can be seen as resistance to marketisation, 
individualisation and an economisation of life. Because of the absence of the ideal 
community present care arrangements can always only be a second best solution. In 
this sense one can understand the challenges and difficulties related to the idea of 
‘care in the community’. Care is closely linked to what is meant to be community but 
can never be performed by the ‘real’ community that is available. Community is a 
moral ideal, outside the market and based on an idea of general altruism (Firth 
2007:72).  
 
This chapter tries to focus specifically on the how of care. How is the ideal caring 
environment (physically, morally and culturally) imagined? And what does this 
imagination mean for the construction of care and people’s wishes to be involved in 
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care? If the ideal of community is seen as the quintessential opposite to an 
individualised life model, is care as a moral practice contradicting the market-
oriented society? Does therefore the imagination of community provide the 
possibility to construct certain aspects of the nostalgia with an emancipatory and 
progressive moral framework?  
6.2 Narratives of community  
First I will identify the specific narratives in which community appears in the 
discourse on care. Having stated above that community represents and reflects more 
than a physical entity (a particular neighbourhood) and also more than an imagined 
group (the people living close to each other or people who have something in 
common with each other) I here want to discuss the ideological connotations of the 
idea and the ideal of community. I will analyse the particular discursive constructions 
of community trying to identify the specific contexts community is discussed in. I will 
then analyse three exemplary discursive connotations of community, the community 
as an extended family, the dichotomy rural/urban and a discursive construct, which I 
call ‘natural community’.  
 
Community and community values need to be seen as an idea that reaches beyond a 
geographical or cultural entity. A community is constructed as a realm in which 
compassion, support and mutual affection dominate living. Ivan Lewis, then minister 
for care services in the UK, makes this link explicit in a commentary published in The 
Observer:   
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‘there are few more important challenges than the way society treats older people. 
(…) [C]ommunity networks, led by the voluntary sector and faith groups, should be 
supported to deploy volunteers and ‘good neighbours’ to tackle loneliness and 
social isolation. It is not the state’s job to provide befrienders, but it is the duty of 
any community that has a right to the description ‘civilised’. (…) [W]e want older 
people to be valued as active citizens, mentoring and acting as role models to young 
people and, likewise, young people to be supported to befriend and ‘adopt’ older 
people’ (The Observer, 24/06/07, my emphasis) 
 
In this quote several values and virtues can be found. The neighbourhood is 
constructed as the realm in which community happens; faith groups and (obviously 
unpaid) volunteers are, apart from family members, the main actors in securing 
community. The last sentence also emphasises the importance of a notion of inter-
generational coming together. The idea of civilisation will come up in other contexts 
as well. A close and well working community is seen in this example as an essential 
asset of a civilised society.  
 
Extended family 
In chapter 4 I have demonstrated that care is imagined to have a close link to the 
family and family values. Here the link to community will be established, for 
community is constructed as an extended family arrangement. Tönnies (1955) in his 
famous distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft clearly links the family to 
a notion of Gemeinschaft, i.e. values associated with the idea of community:  
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‘Family life is the general basis of life in the Gemeinschaft. The village 
community and the town themselves can be considered as large families’ 
(Tönnies 1955:267).   
 
It appears that not only is community seen as an extended broader family 
construction; community is also seen as constituted by family units. This already 
points to a rather organic, naturalist construction of the ideal of community. Nathan 
in the following extract reflects on what he calls family and neatly describes the link 
between family and community, as he understands it: 
 
Nathan: but there’s lots of issues as who is family? (...) I mean from a church point of 
view we seek to bring a safe place in the community for the community. Which 
means that we try to help each other, (...) and seek to be an extended family, really. 
 
At another point in the discussion, referring to a concept of ideal care and which kind 
of care people want for themselves, Nathan highlights the close connection between 
family and community ideals. The basic, commonly repeated assumption is that both 
seem to have been lost at present day (I will discuss this idea of nostalgia below). 
Also present in this statement is a very common process of contrasting the ideal, 
homely care with bureaucratic, official and institutional practices and procedures. 
Dench et al. (2006:4) in their discussion of changes of a particular London 
neighbourhood highlight the link between ‘impersonal welfare provisions’ and the 
loss of traditional ‘kinship support’. An interference, for instance through political, 
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economic or legal regulations, penetrates the notion of both home and community 
as caring places.   
  
Nathan: And, the reality is, that whereas though I wasn’t around 70 years ago, the 
family units tended to care and (...) the people on the street would actually care 
either. In fact, my first [job], was in an environment where families were close knit 
and if someone was ill (...) the local individual’s family and of the neighbours would 
actually pop in, they would do the cooking, they would bring meals, they would clean. 
The nursing staff would pop in, the district nurses. And everything seemed a lot less 
complicated. As before the European parliament and everything changed, bring in 
health and safety, uh, and cost factors (…). But a lot of it used to be handled by, by 
family and I think, to a certain extent, I don’t have a big family, but what I would like 
is that kind of personal care. 
 
Community here is the extension of family values beyond the family. A notion of 
‘being there for each other’, within a particular neighbourhood and setting. Political 
or legal regulations, here ‘the European parliament’ and the ‘health and safety’ 
regulations, are said to interfere with a more natural emergence of community. It is a 
main feature of these narratives that an image of community is created. In the 
section on nostalgia below I will discuss the meaning of this post-hoc romanticisation 
of certain times. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2001:129-30) argue that  
‘The truth is, however, that the pre-industrial family was mainly a union born of 
necessity and compulsion. (…) And the strong social cohesion, praised in later 
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times as an example of love of one’s neighbour, stemmed mainly from an 
awareness of mutual dependence’.  
 
For the ideological and moral meaning of community, however, the idealisation of 
past community as extended family is very significant. It is not the most important 
aspect whether or not the ideal that is created post-hoc actually fits reality; rather, 
the ideal of community derives its significance out of a discursive consensus that 
other times (or other places) managed to be more caring than today.  
 
Urban/rural 
Another feature of what constitutes community is a reference to the countryside. 
The (village) neighbourhood, which is the quintessential realm in which ideal 
community can strive, is often contrasted to anonymous city life. This distinction is 
also present in Tönnies’s (1955) discussion of the association of Gemeinschaft with 
rural villages and Gesellschaft with the emerging cities. The discursive associations 
are reproduced in the sense that the rural, as the ideal place of community is 
associated with neighbourhood, care and families, as exemplified in the following 
discussion: 
 
Walter: And, I must say, caring at home, if possible somehow, that the person is 
allowed to live by himself, where he, is visited, once in the morning, and then in the 
evening the son comes by, or someone else. That is definitely, the, the very best 
possible, yeah, (…) 
Vanessa: I believe that this can actually work very well here in the countryside (…) 
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Barbara: True. Very true. (…) 
Vanessa: There is still neighbourhood, there are still  
Barbara: Also, yes, yeah 
Walter: Yes. 
Vanessa: Families that do mind (...) and take care.  (...) In the city this is of course 
extremely different  
Adam: that’s different. 
Barbara: That’s true 
Vanessa: There this is less the case.  
Barbara: This is also a big difference. Uh, the rural area, and the urban. 
 
Here again I want to draw attention to the construction of a dichotomy between the 
rural and the urban where the latter is associated with, as Raymond Williams 
(1973:291) put it 
‘capitalism or bureaucracy or centralised power, while ‘the country’ (…) has at 
times meant everything from independence to deprivation, and from the powers 
of an active imagination to a form of release from consciousness’.36 
 
From the extract above it can be seen that the construction of community mainly 
works through certain associations. Vanessa mentions neighbourhood and family as 
aspects that do ‘work’ in the rural areas but which, almost by definition, do not 
happen in the city. This association could be related to an understanding of the rural 
                                                 
36
 Williams (1973) also mentions an idealisation of old urban working class communities similarly to 
rural areas. These communities are also partly present in the discourses under review and the 
discursive construction works in a very similar way to the idea of rural neighbourhoods. 
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community as the natural, in contrast to the man-made city, in which negotiation, 
politics and economic participation dominate. Lefebvre (2000:190) speaks of the 
city’s independence of natural cycles and argues that the concept of urban society is 
based on an imagined evolution or historical development stating that ‘*u+rban 
society rises from the ashes of rural society and the traditional city’ (2000:189). The 
contrast between country and city, as Williams (1973:289) argues, ‘is one of the 
major forms in which we become conscious of a central part of our experience and of 
the crisis of our society’. If care and community are associated with the rural, the 
ideal, namely care in the community, is always seen as an ideal of the past. I will 
discuss the significance of this historical dimension below in the section on nostalgia.  
 
The ‘natural’ community  
Community as an extension of family values and the rural neighbourhood as the ideal 
realm of community are specific discursive manifestations of narratives related to 
feelings, wishes and hopes about what constitutes community. Another narrative 
used in the context of community is, as I have mentioned above, a strong link to an 
intergenerational idea of a ‘natural’ community in which all come together. I have 
pointed to the notion of the ‘natural’ already a few times (especially in the discussion 
on relationships). It is important to understand that people continuously refer to a 
notion of naturalness which touches on biological categories (e.g. kin relations are 
mentioned) but which goes beyond the biological. People ‘naturally coming together’ 
and caring for each other is put in contrast to other notions of negotiations, 
contracts and regulations. The narrative of natural communities goes beyond the 
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nuclear family and bridges generations and other separations constructed through 
modern life arrangements. It expresses a feeling of being together regardless of 
social identities and attributes. The following discussion between Mary and Marion 
demonstrates the discursive realisation of this notion and its links to (naturally) 
grown communities: 
 
Mary: I actually don’t think that it works so much in one direction. I think in, at least 
in Austria, it’s pretty much split, that it is either very much outsourced to the family, 
also in rural areas for example, or in the city for example, that it works very much via 
institutional care. And I think if there are any compromises, then only bad ones. 
That’s my opinion. And I think that basically, until now, there are no possibilities to 
somehow, to combine it more with each other. To have good care, in living 
arrangements, in which (...) old people are integrated, with professional supervision, 
just like all, or most of the people would wish for. I think there is no middle course at 
the moment.  
Marion: Whereas in my village, yeah, I also rather grew up in the country, there are, a 
house was built, where now the old people live (...) from there. They weren’t really 
uprooted, they are still in the same village, they just have a new apartment now, they 
live together in this house, these are 10 people, and the families got together, and 
they are always looked after, and yes, they have like a timetable, who has time and 
when, and then they come and help. Yeah, they have really there, 10 families, have 
found each other, that was then built , uh, by the council, and, I believe, that is not so 
bad (...), but, they can at least live alone like that. 
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What is significant in this extract is the construction of clear distinctions by Mary 
between institutional arrangements and family care, and the impossibility or at least 
difficulty of combining these aspects. Marion then challenges this dichotomy 
referring to her experiences in the village she comes from. Interestingly, the example 
she describes shows significant aspects associated with ideals of family, home and 
natural community. When she argues that the elderly people are not uprooted this 
association with naturalness become obvious. The idea that all help each other and 
all are there for each other is the core of the construction of community in particular 
and the construction of caring in general. In another discussion group Helma is 
emphasising the relevance of natural growth for communities. Shared 
accommodation, as in this example, can therefore become under certain 
circumstances communities.   
 
Monica: I mean generally a shared accommodation (...) that’s, let’s say, if it works 
like that 
Helma: if that has grown like that 
Monica: that’s great.  
 
The discursive construct of ‘natural’ community also entails an emphasis on the 
natural development of communities and neighbourhoods. Communities are spaces 
that have grown, in which people relate to each other as social beings (de Certeau et 
al. 1998:13) through common histories, ways of life and memories. But as de Certeau 
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et al. (1998:142) also emphasise, these notions are felt to not have a place in modern 
life anymore.  
 
The relevance of community as a particular safe, secure and comfortable 
neighbourhood is also discussed in the following extract, in which John explicitly 
refers to the ‘close-knit communities’ that are gone now. Particularly through 
Nathan’s reply it also becomes clear what security in the context of communities and 
neighbourhoods means for people. It describes an assurance that people care for 
each other and are there for each other.   
 
John: There was an instance I know in our [community], where they been living in 
[area], and Mum lived on her own, she had no central heating, it was just a normal 
coal fire, and the actual neighbours, bless them, were actually going in and giving her 
at least one meal a day and they, they, that’s the old-fashioned way of how it used to 
be, (...) on a larger scale before. I mean they used to say you can leave your back door 
unlocked and people would just walk in, but now you can’t do that, and I suppose, (...) 
from the 1960s, when they started to build these high rise flats and started to flatten 
the slums and everything, then suddenly, the close knit community was just sort of 
scattered. And so in a sense, that we’ve lost a lot of that, of that close knit 
community, uh, but here there is a strong sense of community within the warden-
aided places. But out from that, I would say, uh, there isn’t that 
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Nathan: The warden aided places are great here because they give security, and, and 
the give security not only in the sense of the thinking but there is a knock on the door 
every morning, there’s conversation, there’s community.  
 
Interestingly, here a rather positive description of old age living outside the own 
house can be found. ‘Warden-aided’ accommodation is discussed in the context of 
care and it is clear that the positive attributes associated with this form of living 
closely resemble the values and characteristics of home. De Certeau et al. (1998) in 
their focus on the everyday life identify the community or neighbourhood as an 
extension of the home, of the private space. They argue that community is therefore 
also a secure, safe and restful space, a space in which people seek refuge and care.  
 
The significance of the collective enterprise, which I describe as the discursive notion 
of the ‘natural’ community, is furthermore constructed as an ideal for broader 
society. As already pointed out above in Ivan Lewis’s commentary, the decent society 
is discussed as a tight unit that has to and wants to look after its elderly people, 
identified as people who share some family-relations with the rest of the community. 
In other words, the decent society is built on an understanding of care for ‘our 
elderly’. To give just one example from the Daily Mail referring to the treatment of 
elderly people in the community: 
 
‘How can we say we are civilized when we treat our elderly no better than prisoners?’ 
(Daily Mail, 23/01/07, my emphasis) 
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The use of personal pronouns, as shown in the example above, is instrumental in 
creating an imagined community between all involved in this discourse. It 
emphasises the significance of familial bonds and bonds beyond the family in the 
context of care. By establishing a shared familial responsibility for those in need of 
care, a community is created which is based on specific ideals, traditionally and 
organically linked to the context of families. Care for the elderly is constructed as 
accountability of the decent people in a community who have a responsibility for 
‘our elderly people’. The following commentary in The Times exemplifies the 
significance of dedication and selflessness for the existence of a decent community 
and society: 
 
‘Society owes an enormous debt of gratitude to the hundreds of thousands of 
relatives and friends who, out of love and the kindness of their hearts, assist the 
elderly to lead comfortable and fulfilled lives. (The Times, 15/06/07).  
6.3 The ideological meaning of community 
In the section above I have shown the main narratives in the discourse of care in 
which community plays a role. In this section I now want to explore the ideological 
significance of the construction of community. Which role does the use of the idea of 
community play in the discourse on care? What is the ideological and moral meaning 
for the broader discursive arrangements? By identifying various contexts in which 
community is appearing I want to show how the illusion of an ideal world is sketched. 
These discursive patterns come up in discussions on community values and are more 
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or less strongly related to the moral conception of what community might be. This 
will furthermore highlight the fact that community reflects an emotion and an idea 
and, as Bauman (2001:1) argues, it bears an important significance of social life and 
society:  
‘‘Community’ feels good because of the meanings the word ‘community’ 
conveys – all of them promising pleasures, and more often than not the kinds of 
pleasures we would like to experience but seem to miss.’  
 
This already points to the fact that what community means to people is, to a large 
extent, missing; it is rather an imagination of what should be and what people would 
like to be a situation in which caring is really possible. I agree with Nisbet when he 
states that ‘*c+ommunity forms the ideal sketch of the life that is desirable’ and 
community relations ‘come to form the image of the good society’ (Nisbet 1966:47). 
And this, I would argue is an extremely important aspect of the meaning of 
community in the discourse on care. It sketches an ideal, an ideal society and an ideal 
way of living and caring for elderly people represents one part of this better way of 
living. 
 
In the discourse there are recurring associations. Community and the impossibility of 
ideal care are almost always related to other problematic developments in society. 
So, even though the discursive patterns, i.e. the other themes discussed in relation to 
an absence of community, often differ, there is a feeling of discomfort with the 
developments of society. In the following I want to cite an extract from a discussion 
group at length which demonstrates the many associations between unhappiness 
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with the situation of care for the elderly and general societal developments. This 
discussion starts with Claire telling an experience at her work place (a care home), 
which relates to the theme of intergenerational ‘natural’ community, mentioned 
above. Alfred mentions the role animals can play and later associates this way of 
living with rural communities. Claire interestingly blames the development of local 
economies for the change in societal structures and developments: 
 
Claire: recently I had a really lovely experience with a two years old child. (…) One of 
the residents is visited by her grandchild, with the great-grandchild. And she is 
looking for granny, and I say, they all sit outside today, I said, and you can of course 
have a chair and you can take your daughter with you outside, I say, nothing can 
happen. And yes, they were sitting outside for two and a half hours, which had never 
been possible, and the mentioned lady, who screams after five minutes, please, 
nurse, in the bed, please, please, please, she’s sat there, and watched the child 
placidly, but how, only from the facial expression, from the gestures, how satisfied, 
how happy she appeared. (...) 
Alfred: yes, but that’s the same with animals, they  
Claire: Yes, yeah, we do have dogs and cats every once in a while, we have, yeah 
Britta: that does also work the other way. You can’t learn more from anybody than 
from the elderly people, they have just experienced so much already, and they can, 
communicate so much (...) and give you something, that is so valuable.  
Claire: Yes 
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Britta: but, I do think, there are really great projects. Where care homes and nurseries 
are next to each other. (...) and I think that it, in times like these, it is difficult to leave 
it to the family alone (...) 
Alfred: Yes, and I think, that it rather works in rural communities, where people know 
each other, where the, the groups are, so to say, small, and where people indeed, one 
generation after the other, grow up. And do know each other, not like in the city, in 
the city area, where people are more or less anonymous there 
Claire: yeah, it is in the country, through the economic structures, I can only tell for 
us, Alfred, everything’s changed a lot, because look, we used to have the industries in 
town, (...) You had factories, you had everything, like, even if the woman went to 
work, she was in the town, yeah. You still had the corner shop, so you could quickly 
send the granny to go shopping. With a list and money in her hand, you sent her 
shopping and the children were still in town, now, with centralisation, people go, (...) 
the women drive to Vienna to [supermarket chain] at 5 in the morning with the first 
bus, come home with the last bus, the old person must be put away, to a day centre 
or a home, the children must be put away to the kindergarten. (...) Whatever you 
want to call it, but, they don’t have a shop, where I live now, they don’t have a pub, a 
centre of communication, because there I also could send a child, that didn’t go to 
school yet, to go shopping. When I had said, be careful, you have to stay on the 
pavement there. Or the old granny has just taken the child. That was still possible. 
But today, to send someone into the centre, that’s already dangerous. 
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Alfred: Yes, yes, it also used to be (...) that you didn’t need to stay on the pavement 
(...) because, when I was I child, we also played on the streets, also on the main 
street.  
 
In another discussion Fred raises a different issue of economic and political 
interference with communal living. As an example he mentions the closing down of 
post offices in local neighbourhoods in Britain: 
 
Fred: one of the worst things (…) they’ve done, to me, (…) is closing down the post 
offices. (...) Because a post office is a personal contact with someone. And once you 
close them down, there’s an awful lot of people out there, who can’t cope.  
 
Institutions and places like local post offices, local groceries and other shops or pubs 
and cafes are seen as fundamentally essential for the cohesion of and within 
communities. The closing of these places is itself leading to a decline of community; 
it also is a sign, however, of this very decline. The absence or the decline of 
community is an expression of unhappiness with societal developments on a broader 
scale. In the chapters above I have already noted the ambivalence people show in 
the sense that, on the one hand, societal changes are seen as necessary and 
inevitable, and, on the other hand, there is a feeling of decline and yearning for an 
alternative situation. Positive counter-examples for community can be experienced 
in places where modern society (and the world of work and politics) does not 
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interfere with people’s way of living (e.g. the bridging of generations in the care 
home, as mentioned by Claire in the extract above).  
 
Another often recurring pattern is the discursive relation between elder care and the 
way children are raised and treated, which also demonstrates discontent with the 
way people relate to each other (i.e. the way communities work). The reference to 
changes in the economic situation, in the discussion above, also re-constructs and 
reproduces the dichotomy of capitalist production and ideal community. Similarly, 
Caroline in the following extract from another discussion group refers to the 
economic situation and compares the demands in Austria with the advantages of 
‘having less’ in a particular African country she knows:  
 
Caroline: Because it’s simply like that, the richer we are, and the better we have it, 
the less we can care for the elderly. Because in *African country+, the family doesn’t 
have money, they live in tiny houses, (...). I just have to say that the expectations are 
just different, because the people also don’t want huge houses, down there. You just 
have the time, firstly, they also don’t have to clean their small houses the whole day, 
they’re done in an hour, they simply have a very different way of life. (...) Because the 
more you want, the bigger everything has to be, the more work it is, and the less time 
you have for your family. (...) 
Gita: it’s also that you not only don’t have time for care, but also not for the children, 
I mean, (...) 
Max: yes, but then you also must say that 100 years ago it was like that here as well 
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Caroline: it also has to do with what we are used to (...) 
Max: Yeah, it’s not that long ago that it was like that here as well 
Caroline: Yes 
Max: the extended family (...) 
Brenda: yeah, in the country, in the country definitely. In the city that’s a long time 
gone, but in the country there were extended families.(...) 
I: Would it be better, such an extended family? 
Brenda: In my opinion yes. (...) 
Caroline: I personally experience it as better, so, when I’m down in *African country+, I 
love the family relations down there.  
 
Again, the distinction between country and city is emphasised but, more importantly, 
an uneasy feeling with the current living situation is expressed. This criticism, 
however, is not directed at oneself; rather it again expresses an aversion against the 
economic and social developments of society. The discussion continues with the 
argument that a move back to those times which are nostalgically remembered is not 
really possible. Again, ambivalence about economic and social developments is 
expressed. Dench et al. (2006) in their study of the developments of the London East 
End emphasise the significance of community, neighbourhood ties and family 
relations for the experience and feeling of safety and security. Community and 
community relations balance the demands of modern capitalist society: 
‘Family ties gave people the support and security which made life tolerable, and 
provided a model for organizing relationships with close neighbours. Being a 
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member of a family gave you kin and quasi-kin locally, and made the world a 
safe place’ (Dench et al. 2006:103). 
 
Obviously, the element of nostalgia in this account (as in the accounts of people 
discussing community in the context of care) has to be remembered. To some extent 
it is a myth that close family ties gave security and safety; however, today these ideas 
have an important ideological and moral function in dealing with the demands of 
modern society. In other words, even though these ideas are myths they give people 
the possibility to imagine other options and thus help to reinstate a particular 
everyday morality. As shown in the extracts discussed above, the possibility of 
community, and hence the possibility of this safe place is felt to have been lost, it is 
something from the past, or from another area. In the following section I want to 
discuss the relevance of these discursive expressions of a nostalgic feeling. Which 
role does a longing for community play in the context of arrangements of care for 
elderly people? 
6.4 Nostalgia: longing for community  
Looking at the construction of the moral ideal of community a tendency to situate 
this ideal at another place or at another time becomes obvious. A particular longing 
for community, neighbourhood and consequentially, care, can be identified in many 
discursive materials. In that sense the notion of nostalgia provides some useful 
insights into the mechanisms of these processes. Davis (1979) convincingly shows 
that nostalgia is not only a psychological, personal expression (which is often 
described as similar to homesickness) but needs to be understood as a social 
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emotion as well, a widely shared attitude in society. Davis (1979) situates nostalgia as 
a yearning for the continuity of identities in a time when people experience 
subjective discontinuities. Below I will discuss Beck’s notion of individualisation and 
the pressures of economic and social expectations. Here it should be held that the 
yearning Davies describes must be seen in contrast to people’s materialist life 
situations. The present life conditions are ‘felt to be, and often reasoned to be as 
well, more bleak, grim, wretched, ugly, derivational, unfulfilling, frightening, and so 
forth’ (Davis 1979:15). 
 
While Bauman (2001) thinks about community primarily in a historical context as 
something that always had been in the past or will be in the future, there is also a 
locational perspective involved. This section follows Alleyne’s (2002) description 
about the construction of communities as always being displaced in time (past) and 
space (other countries). The link between other countries and the past can clearly be 
identified in the discourses on care, following Alleyne’s (2002:611) observation that 
people feel that ‘we’ have individuals while others have community (which we once 
had).  
 
Another important aspect for an understanding of nostalgia and a longing for the 
past (or some imagined distant place) is the creation of myths. Coontz (1992) 
demonstrates how in US discourses the image of the family has been idealised and a 
(white, middle class) myth around this idealised family has been created. Coontz 
(1992:9) argues that the imagined ideal family of the past is ‘an ahistorical amalgam 
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of structures, values, and behaviors that never co-existed in the same time and 
place’. This resonates as being very important for the construction of community and 
community values in the discourse on care as well. Community, how it is 
constructed, is not a historical (or, as I will argue, local) phenomenon, but a 
combination of feelings, ideals, wishes and emotions. However, for Coontz (1992) 
the existence of nostalgia is also related to a feeling of being unsatisfied with the 
economic demands and pressures. He argues that  
‘*m+ost individuals still attempt to carve out space for personal commitments, 
family ties, and even social obligations, but they must do so in opposition to 
both job culture and consumer culture’ (Coontz 1992:178-9). 
 
In thinking about the meaning and the consequences of a nostalgia for community 
Coontz’s (1992:6) argument that myths ‘bring *people+ together and reinforce social 
solidarity’ might, however, also give some indication of a positive, progressive use of 
the very longing. If times of social solidarity are longed for, community could 
potentially represent a more progressive way of life in society. As mentioned above, 
community is constructed as an ideal for the better society, or, as in the newspaper 
commentary below, the civilised society: 
 
‘One of the yardsticks of a civilised society is the way that it looks after its elderly. A 
decent country would ensure that its old and infirm received the best possible care, 
not least as a mark of respect that should be afforded to the elders of the 
community. Judged by this standard, Britain is becoming progressively less civilised. 
For British citizens, the experience of ageing is increasingly beset by hardship and 
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neglect, both at the level of individual families and the institutions of the state. In 
other European countries or in Asian societies where family life is still very 
important, people venerate their elders and assume it is their duty to look after them 
when they can no longer look after themselves. In Britain, by contrast, expectations 
have changed along with a profoundly altered way of life. People are too busy and 
too self-centred to assume such responsibilities. In particular, many women who 
once would have assumed it was their duty to look after aged parents are now 
themselves in paid employment. In addition, family breakdown is increasingly 
snapping the vital bonds of attachment between generations. (…) As the Health 
Service staggers under its own financial crisis, elderly or chronically sick people are 
being discharged from hospital into ‘community care’, only to find that the 
community doesn’t care at all and that neither nursing nor other essential services 
are available. (…) It is only in rethinking the welfare state from first principles, and 
moving from underfunded dependency to personal and family responsibility, that our 
elderly and long-term sick will ever receive the care they need’ (Daily Mail, 11/01/07, 
my emphasis).  
 
The ideas of the civilized society and the decent country are clearly linked to a 
particular arrangement and provision of care for elderly people. A historical 
perspective is applied, that tries to show that the change of lifestyles in the UK has 
led to a situation in which community does not care anymore for its elderly 
members. At the same time other countries and cultures are constructed as being 
the havens for elderly people. These (inevitably rather abstract) places are described 
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in opposition to modern Britain as being based on a culture that not only deals 
differently with elderly people but shows a different public morality in general. And 
finally, the provision of care is linked to a broader discussion of social conditions. 
Self-centredness, economic involvement and family breakdown are linked to an 
image of the busy, self-absorbed and selfish modern society. Even though this 
particular commentary needs to be understood as delivering its own (rather 
traditional and conservative) agenda, the idea of linking the situation of care for the 
elderly to a moral category and categorisation of the conditions of a society and 
culture is representative for the general discourse. The notion that community is 
something from the past or from other cultures and does not fit in with the present 
societal arrangements is very strong in the discourses, whether this is seen positively 
or (as in most cases) negatively. Nostalgia in the context of this thesis can be 
described as longing for a community which, people imagine, existed in the past, or 
exists at other places.  
 
Time 
The first perspective of nostalgia is a yearning for past times. The ideal community or 
neighbourhood has been lost over the decades as reflected in Nathan’s comment (I 
quoted a lengthier extract of his statement above): 
 
Nathan: And, the reality is, that whereas though I wasn’t around 70 years ago, the 
family units tended to care and the people on the street would actually care either.  
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Again, Dench et al.’s (2006) study of the development of the London East End gives 
interesting insights into the construction of the idea of a loss of community. They 
argue that in particular in economically difficult times there ‘was commitment to 
local community – involving concern for the needs of others – which served you best 
in the end’ (Dench et al. 2006:47). With the economic, capitalist development the 
‘need’ for community as direct economic support got lost. Dench et al. (2006:106) 
however argue that this has also produced losers, namely those being dependent on 
local communities. As I have argued before, it is important to not take these 
accounts as a literal reflection of reality. What is interesting is the construction of the 
ideal community by sketching a certain image of the past and linking changes to 
economic and social developments. The notion of ‘civilisation’ is particularly 
interesting in this context as it often refers to an idea of progress and progression of 
societies and countries. In the discourse on care, however, civilisation is often linked 
to an ideal of real care, situated in the past, whereas current socio-economic 
developments have pushed society away from civilisation.  
 
People in need of care were definitely dependent on families, local social networks 
and neighbourhoods to get support for living their lives. The notion of a longing for 
community is therefore often related to times of the past in which people could rely 
on their existing communal networks. The extract above highlights the perspective of 
nostalgia. Nathan says that even though he wasn’t around 70 years ago, he just 
knows that there was care and that there was community. I want to highlight this 
statement as an expression of what I have called everyday morality, the sentiment 
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that people just know what is (and was) a better societal arrangement. Specific 
personal experiences are merged with ideas, emotions and ideologies into a social 
‘experience’ that community is something from the past.  
 
Space  
The other source for nostalgia is situating the ideal community in other countries 
and/or other cultures. In the following extract Caroline refers again to the situation 
in an African country she knows well: 
 
Caroline: Down there it is still, firstly, unemployment is different there, secondly, 
there’s a different living situation there. It is very normal down there for example that 
you do have a yard, where, however, 5 entrances come together, from different 
houses. The houses are of course considerably smaller than here (...) and in one lives 
the aunt, in the next one granny, there the sister lives and there the brother lives, so 
the whole family lives there. (...) And all of them on this yard together. It also means 
that, as far as children are concerned, it doesn’t matter at all, whether it’s about an 
old person or children, the care, the social willingness to be there for each other, is 
very different. Because they have the opportunity, though. 
 
The link between economic development and work demands and the possibility of 
living together and for each other (i.e. community) becomes obvious in Caroline’s 
comments. Additionally this way of living is also often described as better and more 
fulfilling, which can also be seen in Helma’s arguments below. But it is always 
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emphasised that this (better) way of living, this communal lifestyle, is nowadays 
impossible in people’s own societies. Bauman (2001) in this context points out that 
community is always safe to be desired as, ultimately, it is something imagined that 
is not available in a globalising world.  
 
Helma: I really was in (...) countries, in Nepal and Tibet, (...) there are for (...) 
hundreds of kilometres, there’s one (...) doctor and there the people live in huts, and 
still they all came smilingly and beaming with joy towards me.  
Monica: yes, but there the family relations are very different, in these cultures, I think.  
Uta: Yes (...) Here there also used to be the extended family, the village, or 
Helma: Yes, that’s again a human factor, a human situation. Why has it happened 
like that? Why is the, the disintegration of family, why has that developed like that? 
 
Another striking feature of this discursive pattern is that this situating of the ideal 
community in other countries, the ideal that has long been gone in people’s own 
society, can also be found with reference to different ‘cultural’ groups in ‘Western’ 
societies. Larry in the following extract mentions different ethnic groups as having 
different constructions of community: 
 
Larry: It varies, across the board, through different (…) levels of society, and also, 
different ethnic groups as well. (...)  If you look at the Indian community you’ll 
probably find (…) generations, all living in the same house. 
Pamela: oh yes. 
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Larry: but there, there they have this ethos, ethos of care, going all (…) the way 
through I think. Same for the Chinese as well, 
 
The impossibility of community  
Later in this discussion Will comes back to the idea of communities in other countries 
and other ethnic groups, telling his own positive experience of family and community 
abroad. Pamela however links the loss of community in the mainstream society to 
economic and educational advancements, arguing for a historical perspective in 
which community will also change within other ethnic groups as an inevitable 
consequence of progress and development. 
 
Will: Oh, oh, yes indeed. yeah, I agree, but I mean, it, it’s this sense of family, that the 
Indian community, and many of the European  communities, I’ve now just been to 
*European country+(…) but, you know, the hotel we stayed at, there were 3 
generations of that family, running that hotel and there was this, just sense of family, 
we joined that family for the, you know, and there’s that sense of family, ok, because 
(...) they’ve probably lived all their lives, in that little, little town, (…) 
Pamela: I actually think that as the generations go on and as people get more and 
more educational opportunities (...) even within the Indian community, this strong 
sense of family will,  
Will: Yes 
Larry: it will, it will change 
Pamela: it will change, (...) that’s right because nothing stays the same 
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Morgan: we don’t go back to the sense of family that there used to be 
 
In both of the two groups quoted above there is an idea that some change has 
happened and that this change has been inevitable. So it can be said that nostalgia 
for a particular idea of community includes a realisation that this form of community 
is impossible (see also Anderson 1991) at the moment and to some extent 
unachievable under current conditions. I have already mentioned the emphases on 
education and economic development which have led to faster, more individualised 
life conditions. Bauman (2001:46) rightly argues that  
‘nothing endures long enough to be fully taken in, to become familiar and to 
turn into the cosy, secure and comfortable envelope the community-hungry and 
home-thirsty selves have sought and hoped for’. 
 
Many discussions revolved around an idea of change of culture in which people want 
to and have to move around and in which people do not want to be a burden on 
those who have to react to economic necessities. Fred for example argues that 
 
as there has been so much more mobility (…) you can’t expect your family to look 
after you (…) because how can somebody come back from the other end of the 
country every weekend? 
 
Fay agrees with this idea that family cannot be the main provider of care anymore. 
She, however, argues that there will always be and should always be  
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a community looking after you, and I think that’s the way.  
 
The discussion then focuses on a notion of community that is detached from a 
shared history or family ties; it is a notion that emphasises personal responsibility 
within a neighbourhood as a replacement for traditional social ties. Personal 
responsibility, instead of trusting that the state will help, is seen as being lacking:  
 
Otto: What’s lacking in this society is responsibility 
Silvia: yeah, I agree (…) 
Olive: people don’t take responsibility, you know (…) 
Fay:  I know what you’re saying, and to an extent I agree but when it comes to care 
for the elderly, I don’t think it will be that simple 
 
Fay summarises this idea of community as the modern expression of being there for 
each other:  
 
Fay: it’s just that society is so different now, but I think that is, the community, we 
can only deliver the services we need, through the community, and paid for by the 
state. 
 
Nostalgia and longing for community therefore must be seen as an ambivalent 
discursive construction, as a longing for ideals of being there for each other and the 
construction of various ways of how to achieve this. Many of those alternatives 
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relate to ideals of the past or other cultures; some, however, present a more forward 
looking alternative to traditional responsibilities. Because community is not only 
constructed as an ideal but also as an impossible ideal it provides the safety and 
comfort against an imposed social reality. People acknowledge that they cannot live 
up to the ideal (which might be characterised for example by living a more ‘caring’ 
life) because the ideal is impossible. To some extent, the possibility of personal 
agency to take over responsibility for the other is challenged by a discursive 
construction of the impossibility of community. Through the construction of a 
longing for community people take away their own agency in the societal 
arrangements.  
6.5. The ambivalence of community  
I have so far pointed out that people’s ideas about community can be characterised 
by some ambivalent feelings. I have identified specific narratives and discursive 
patterns in which community is constructed as a warm realm in which people are 
there for each other. I have then described how a nostalgic association creates 
community as an impossible ideal due to social and economic developments. This 
ambivalence also reproduces the construction of dichotomies which can be found in 
much of the discourse on care (see also the discussion in other chapters). In this 
section I will try to disentangle some of these ambivalences about community. First, I 
describe a discursive feature in which community is seen as a positive ideal, but not 
necessarily as a reproduction of traditional patterns. Rather, community is 
constructed as a counterforce to neoliberal societal arrangements. After that I 
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present some accounts in which people construct community as a negative 
experience and societal developments are put in contrast to an old-fashioned idea of 
community. This will enable some general considerations about the possibilities of a 
progressive and emancipatory understanding of community and its potential 
consequences for care for elderly people.  
 
Community as a counterforce  
Tönnies’s definition of Gesellschaft as ‘formed and fundamentally conditioned by 
rational will’ in contrast to natural communities, which he calls Gemeinschaft ‘in 
which natural will predominates’ (Tönnies 1955:17) already shows a dichotomy 
between rational constructions of societal arrangements and naturally grown forms 
of community. Modern bureaucratic capitalism, the ‘most distinct form of 
Gesellschaft’ (Tönnies 1955:28), and globalisation have increased this ideological 
distinction even further. Castells (1997:60) for example identifies a clear reaction of 
people against this development and states that  
‘people resist the process of individualization and social atomization, and tend 
to cluster in community organizations that, over time, generate a feeling of 
belonging’.  
 
This resonates with Thompson’s (1991) story of the struggles in traditional working 
class communities against the capitalistic developments. He describes these 
communities as ‘defending their own modes of work and leisure, and forming their 
own rituals, their own satisfactions and view of life’ (Thompson 1991:85). Local 
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communities are a potential answer to the dangers, fears and pressures of 
capitalistic developments, but they are in most cases  
‘defensive reactions against the impositions of global disorder and 
uncontrollable, fast-paced change. They do build havens, but not heavens’ 
(Castells 1997:64).  
 
Similarly Bauman (2001:1-2) describes community’s strength in creating safety in a 
dangerous world by making it possible that ‘we are never strangers to each other’. 
Political, economic and social developments are an expression of a culture that has 
alienated people from each other and their community units. An ethic of 
individualisation as a ‘duty to oneself’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001:38) replaces 
former reliance on family and community. The main problem, Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim (2001:xxiv) argue, manifests itself in a society with ‘growing inequalities 
without collective ties’. 
 
The legal, organisational and financial arrangement of care for elderly people is one 
such sign of alienation from each other as it can always only be a second best 
solution. In an ideal world, it has been argued in some discussion groups, we would 
not have an issue of care for the elderly, as people would be there for each other 
anyways. Community is then almost constructed as a counterforce to the current 
economic and social arrangements. Whereas Barrera (2008) positions the church and 
theological ethics as a moral counterweight to individualisation and the market, 
Dench et al. (2006:232) propose a rediscovery of ‘small groups as a source of civic 
virtues’:  
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‘The culture of individual rights has obscured the value of family ties and local 
community for many people. The most practical way to resist that culture may 
lie in strengthening family. It is significant that one of our strongest findings is of 
the value of family and community ties in keeping ordinary people in control of 
their lives’ (Dench et al. 2006:232).  
 
The construction of the treatment of elderly people in general, and care in particular, 
as opposed to the selfish, rationalistic, economic world of employment, labour and 
busy living are again positioned as the ideal for a decent society. A ‘community’ in 
this society is then a concept or a way of living that is ultimately founded on values of 
emotion, dedication and friendship. A reader-comment on abuse of the elderly in the 
online version of The Guardian suggests that mistreatment does not have a place in 
the communities sketched earlier: 
 
‘I wonder if this abuse of the elderly takes place in small tight-knit communities? 
Perhaps part of the problem is that we are all now “individuals” who are less 
restrained by societal norms than by laws’ (The Guardian Unlimited, 23/02/07) 
 
Political competition is also constructed as belonging to a sphere of rationalist, 
materialist decision-making. This is again contrasted with an ideal of care and 
community that opposes the world of work, markets, politics and impersonal 
relating. Rather, the ideal of care should be understood as an example for better 
living. In Britta’s comment below she argues for a communal way of living as an old 
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person’s answer to, or an exit from, the hardships of work, loneliness, and care 
needs:  
 
Britta: So, I think that there has to be an intermediate stage, where it is pitched to 
people that they have to go away from this alone at home. And that they become 
interested in moving together with like-minded people. Because I think that the need 
for care then only comes later. Rather than if you are alone at home and you fall, and 
nobody finds you for a very long time, and then, the complications are also 
immediately much worse, than if you live in a community, where someone finds you 
immediately, or supports you, where everyone helps each other.   
 
Disadvantages of community  
However, individualisation and being anonymous also offers potential advantages to 
some. Thus, some participants in the discussion groups expressed their own desire to 
not be part of the community all the time. Similarly to Bauman’s (2004:62) claim that 
‘*f+or most of us (…) ‘community’ is a Janus-faced, utterly ambiguous phenomenon, 
loved or hated, loved and hated, attractive or repelling, attractive and repelling’, in 
the public discourse the disadvantages of community were mentioned. Claire for 
example, herself a nurse in a care home, emphasises her own needs of respite which 
would be challenged if she was employed in a care home in her own community: 
 
I: And does the distance also play a role, from the people one cares for? 
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Claire: Indeed, so for myself, I did question that for myself, because I might have had 
the possibility to work in [her home town], we do also have 2 care homes. (...). And I 
had worked for 15 years in the village, and, I thought, no, I am glad that I’m away 
from home. Because indeed, it, it is like that in [work place], I am at work for 11 hours 
there, think I do that for myself, alright, but when I leave, I leave the luggage inside. 
(...) And when I now go to the farmers’ market in *work place+, and meet some 
colleague or so, ok, but I can’t meet any relatives, who can complain. (...) In *home 
town+ that would have been very different. At every corner, this doesn’t work, and 
that doesn’t work. I’ve seen that, I’ve worked there for one month on trial, only to see 
for myself, whether I want to work in elderly care at all. And even in this one month I 
have experienced it, the aunt comes, this person comes, everyone, and I think, no, 
that’s not what I want. There, I’m anonymous. There I do the care work, there I’m 
known by nurse Claire, that’s it. When I come out, I can go cycling, can call *a 
relative+, can go to Vienna, it doesn’t matter. 
 
Claire points to some aspects of community, which she experiences as negative and 
challenging to herself as a person. I argue that this relation that is based on her 
position as a care worker emphasises and reproduces the dichotomy between 
community as the realm of personal relations and where all are ‘naturally’ there for 
each other and the bureaucratic, individualised realm of work and employment. 
Community as a progressive, modern counterforce against economisation is seen to 
provide security and cohesion within a risk society (Beck 2009); it should, however, 
not fall into reactionary communitarianism:  
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‘The basic mistake of communitarianism is to react to individualization. It is 
‘reactionary’ in its attempt to recuperate the old values of family, 
neighbourhood, religion and social identity, which are just not pictures of reality 
anymore’ (Beck in Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 208) 
 
Bauman (1993:151) also describes this form of community  
‘which represents community as a unit held together by the awareness of unity, 
by a fraternal sentiment which makes it family-like without making it a family, 
as a territory of unqualified cooperation and mutual help, 
 
Bauman (1993) warns for an ideology as nostalgia which is itself resulting from a 
tendency of neighbourhoods and families losing their authority. In summary the 
discourse on care shows elements of a counter-discourse to traditional, reactionary 
ideas of community, recognising the positive and progressive elements of an ideal of 
community. It remains doubtful, however, whether this counter-discourse is strong 
enough to provide answers to the ambivalences which are hegemonic in the societal 
construction of care and the community.  
6.6 Conclusion 
‘Between the symmetrical errors of archaistic nostalgia and frenetic 
overmodernization, room remains for microinventions, for the practice of 
reasoned differences, to resist with a sweet obstinance the contagion of 
conformism, to reinforce the network of exchanges and relations’ (de Certeau 
et al. 1998:213).  
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In this chapter I have focused on the idea of community in the discourse on care. 
Community does not mean one specific theme or topic of discussions, articles and 
speeches; rather, community represents a combination of interrelated thoughts, 
emotions, wishes and ideals. Building up on the preceding chapters, community can 
be understood as an ideological extension of family, and the neighbourhood in which 
community happens as an extension of the home. Both the traditional family and the 
traditional community are felt to be under threat by economic developments (e.g. 
globalisation, see Robertson 1995:30) or are felt as having taken place in other times 
or at other places. This chapter has also shown the significance of parallel discursive 
narratives, such as childcare, neighbourhoods and lifestyles. Taking these different 
but interlinked aspects of the discourse on care together, a picture of the ideal of 
community can be shown which enables security and safety in an ever faster 
developing environment. Or, as Bauman (2004:61) put it:  
‘To insecure people, perplexed, confused and frightened by the instability and 
contingency of the world they inhabit, ‘community’ appears to be a tempting 
alternative. It is a sweet dream, a vision of heaven: of tranquillity, bodily safety 
and spiritual peace’.  
 
Community is constructed as a counterforce to economic, political and social 
developments which people perceive as hostile, individualising and pressurising. 
Robertson (1995:30) even argues that because of its counter-movements 
‘globalization has involved the reconstruction, in a sense the production, of ‘home’, 
‘community’ and ‘locality’’. However, ideal care, as taking part in the community and 
being carried out by community is not really possible if community itself is not 
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available. Another question raised in this chapter was whether a conception of 
‘community’ is exclusively a tradition based, anti-modernist notion. I have tried to 
argue that community also needs to be seen as a counter-discourse within an 
individualised, economised and marketised world and I have also pointed towards 
the positive aspects of a de-traditionalised form of care and responsibility for care. 
Trying to combine these aspects I mentioned a tendency in some discussions to see 
community as a modern answer to the demands of care for elderly people. With 
reference to the discussion of the theoretical framework (see chapter 2) Bauman’s 
claim for general responsibility for the other can be incorporated into an ethics of 
care and therefore extend this ethics beyond the primary family structures. If family 
care is not possible (or not wanted) community could step in and take over 
responsibility. Maria neatly describes the need for a new construction of care 
arrangements which focuses on responsibility but not on traditional family- and 
community ties: 
 
In the days when we lived in small communities care could be shared among all 
members of the community and/or extended family. (…) But in today’s crowded yet 
fragmented society we need a different kind of care. (…) Society as a whole does have 
a responsibility – people work all their lives for the economy of the country and 
deserve recognition and respect when they reach ‘old age’. This means a system of 
support and care regardless of income and need, just as we [support] and care for 
children. 
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How these new forms of care arrangements are designed and what the new form of 
community looks like, is, inevitably, not classified in clear terms. It involves, however, 
the attempt to reconcile the freedoms gained from economic and social 
independence with responsibility for each other. Community thus tries to break out 
of the traditional dichotomy of security vs. freedom and community vs. individuality 
(Bauman 2001). The following discussion is a perfect example for people struggling to 
find terms, images and concepts for the care arrangements they would favour:  
 
Larry: It (…) works the other way, my late parents lived in *city+ and they had fabulous 
neighbours and we were in [other city] and we used to commute up and down the 
motorway, but we knew that we could always also ring Andy and Jude, if we (...) have 
got a problem, so it is a two-way traffic. And of course with this changing society 
where (...) parents are going to the country from the kids, and they’re moving around, 
you’ve the  
Will: Well of course, the family unit is, uh, is totally changing 
Larry: is changing yeah 
Will: and although I’ve said, that really we shouldn’t be responsible for our parents, 
the breakdown of the family unit in the UK, (…) and that is what is causing a lot of the 
(...) problems. Because, for instance, I know families in [town], who, for instance, old 
mining communities, who are still there, 3, 4 generations. (...)The sense of family 
there, is so much stronger than, than where I live, because they, they’ve not moved 
more than maybe 5 miles away.  
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Morgan: it’s not a breakdown of the family though, is it? Where are your children, 
you know? 
 
Morgan’s rhetorical question where are your children? summarises the ambivalences 
that can be found in the discourse on how care can be arranged and how communal 
living could be possible. It has been a main aim of this chapter to take these 
ambivalences in people’s ideas, opinions, emotions and experiences seriously. The 
discussion above continued with a focus on the requirements of mobility of modern 
society and the labour market and the expectations of and from people who want to 
succeed in this economic system. These discursive patterns could be found more 
often and it appears that, even though there is recognition of community being in 
contrast to marketisation and individualisation of modern life, it is not seen as 
something that can be brought back. Rather, the changing family structures, 
increased mobility and education, the roles of women in society and other social, 
cultural and economic developments are often seen as starting points for a new 
definition of community. The example Larry gives of the neighbours who looked after 
his parents, is an illustration of an extension of community beyond naturally grown 
ties. Beck (1998) describes this experience of longing for community but not wanting 
to go ‘back’ as a collective fate, arguing ‘no one wants to go backwards. The sacrifice 
of a bit of hard-won freedom is something that everyone, man or woman, expects 
only of others’ (1998:34). Mirroring the discussion above in which community was 
described as an ambivalent concept which also includes negative experiences and 
pressures, Bauman (1993, see also Smart 1999) in his discussion of ethics, describes 
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the role of community as having changed from an individual’s security to an 
individual’s burden. He furthermore argues however that a re-constitution of 
community, as a community which constitutes morality and ‘which reinforces moral 
commitments and inclinations’ (Smart 1999:168), could lead to a new moral 
framework. Community is fundamentally based on commitment towards each other 
(Bauman 2001) and a duty to help each other.  
 
Finally, I argue that it would be useful to disentangle two interlinked aspects of the 
discursive meaning of community described above. Firstly, community is constructed 
as a unity of people who have something in common, people who share something 
(e.g. religion, nationality, ethnicity). Care is here seen as a duty between people who 
share some ties, similarly to the ideal of the (extended) family. Secondly, however, 
community can be and is also understood as being born and sustained simply and 
exclusively out of the dedication of its members (Bauman 1993). Whereas the first 
notion of community is based on the sameness of its members, and therefore linked 
to a necessary absence or exclusion of the other (Bauman 2001) the latter version is 
based on a recognition of, as Bauman (2001:150) puts it, ‘sharing and mutual care’. 
This more egalitarian form of community can be described as ‘a community of 
concern and responsibility for the equal right to be human and the equal ability to 
act on that right’ (Bauman 2001:150). When community is imagined as the ideal 
realm and context for care for the elderly it is important to emphasise the possibility 
of this more progressive form as the future for long-term care responsibilities.   
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In combination with the chapters 4 and 5 this section has provided an answer to the 
question of what care means to people and how care is ideally imagined. It has also 
identified aspects of how responsibilities to be there for each other are formed and 
what community responsibility can mean in this context. The argument of nostalgic 
expression and the impossibility of community enable at least a partial answer to the 
questions of the relation between the neoliberal societal framework and the ideal of 
care. The socio-economic characteristics of society define how care can be delivered 
(‘real’ community care is seen as impossible) and care is seen as outside the design of 
the current societal arrangements. In a sense individual freedom and participation in 
the market driven society is in tension with what care means to people. But does 
that mean an impossibility to reconcile independence and care? How are those who 
need care constructed in the conception of care as an idealised desire of being there 
for each other? In the next chapter I will explore the social reality of depending on 
someone further.  
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7 Depending on people 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss the theme of ‘independence’ as a category in the discourse on 
care for elderly people. Independence appears widely in the public discourse. In the 
focus group discussions, however, it needs to be understood as a secondary theme 
which means that as a theme it emerged from the discussions without being 
deliberately introduced by the facilitator (Krzyżanowski 2008). All of the discussions 
have shown some references to the ideal of independence and the main aim of life as 
living independently.  
 
Originally mainly an economic classification (in relation to work enabling or preventing 
independence) Fraser and Gordon (1994) describe the rise of dependency as a 
moral/psychological and therefore political category meaning that those being 
dependent on others are constructed as being morally inferior to the idealised 
independent person. The wish for being independent in the discourse of care is mainly 
concerned with those being cared for; however, these people, in particular the elderly, 
are themselves totally absent from the discourse in the public realm, in the sense that 
they do not feature in articles or other contributions as individual actors. This absence 
can be seen as a result of the particular social construction of care, for those in need of 
care are defined as being passive and dependent on others and they are not seen as 
actors in their own right.  
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In a study analysing people’s perceptions of and opinions on issues of dependency and 
independence Dean and Rogers (2004; see also Ellis and Rogers 2004), drawing on 
interview data, report that dependency is generally seen as a negative state which 
people should try to avoid. Dean and Rogers (2004) furthermore argue that their 
interviewees continuously distinguished between deserving and undeserving 
dependency. People related these attributes to the specific life circumstances and 
individual behaviour. Dependency is thus a negative state which is only seen as 
acceptable for some members of society (e.g. people with certain disabilities) and not 
for others. Personal responsibility for making specific choices is seen as the main factor 
to avoid dependency. Confirming Fraser and Gordon’s (1994) focus on the moral 
nature of independence Dean and Rogers (2004:72) add ‘material sufficiency, referring 
either solely to financial independence (...), or identifying practical and physical aspects 
of independence alongside the emotional and psychological aspects’. In other words, 
material independence merges with moral constructions of self-reliance and self-
sufficiency to form a moral ideal of personhood. Dean and Rogers (2004) also found 
some (ambiguous) awareness of interdependence in their interviewees’ accounts and 
‘*p+aradoxically, (...) even those who denied their own interdependency demonstrated 
an acute awareness of the necessity that others should depend on them’ (Dean and 
Rogers 2004:74). This last aspect of an acknowledgement of others’ dependence on 
oneself in combination with a denial or a rejection of one’s own dependence is an 
important feature of the discourses analysed below. The ideal of giving is contrasted to 
the ‘horror’ of taking and being the one others depend on is constructed as a 
favourable state. In political discourses (for the UK see Harris 2002) this ideal of 
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independence in combination with a duty to give and to ‘help’ dependents has 
featured prominently over the last decades. The idea of caring as a citizen obligation 
(see also Doheny 2004) constructs a clear divide between those being independent 
actors and those being dependent on someone’s care.  
 
I therefore aim to demonstrate the construction of both the aversion against 
dependency and the ideal of independence (section 7.2). I will then (7.3) focus on 
possible challenges to the very notion of dependency. I will ask whether a rejection of 
dependency as a social construction is useful and desirable. For this endeavour I will 
discuss two major perspectives which both focus on dependency and independence as 
moral and structural categories. First, authors of the Disabled People Movement (e.g. 
Shakespeare 2000; Oliver 1990) focus on the societal construction of dependency and 
argue for emancipation and support of people with disabilities in order to avoid 
unnecessary dependency. The position of writers of the feminist ethics of care (e.g. 
Noddings 2003; Groenhout 2004), on the other hand, emphasise the shortcomings of a 
model of independent beings and argue for a recognition of the inevitability of 
interdependence of social actors in society. Do these perspectives offer a fruitful 
challenge to the fear of dependency? To what extent do public discourses show 
references to these positions? Does a focus on people’s interdependence reproduce 
the idealisation of mutuality and reciprocity and thus fall short in threatening the 
ultimately negative idea of being dependent on others. The main aim is to depict the 
ideological fear of dependency and to suggest embracing dependence as a foundation 
of personhood (Dean 2004). In section 7.4 I will explore the relations between a 
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rejection of dependency and people’s ideas about wider social structures. To what 
extent is the focus on independence recognised as an expression of neoliberal society? 
An acknowledgement of dependencies might enable an approach that social life is 
fundamentally defined by interrelated, often but not always mutual, dependencies, a 
conception which fundamentally challenges economic and social ideals.  
7.2 The ideal of independence  
Independence can be seen as a dominant paradigm of current welfare state 
arrangements (Mittelstadt 2001; Fraser and Gordon 1994) and social, political and 
economic life in general. Independence as one of the key themes of a good social life is 
very strongly integrated in people’s conceptions of their own existence and the societal 
structures, or as Oldman (2003:45) puts it: ‘It is almost impossible to contest the 
concept of independent living, as it is hard to challenge motherhood and apple pie’. 
Other authors, such as Glendinning (2008) emphasise the relevance of the ideas of 
individual choice and self-reliance in more and more fields of social life and social 
policy.  
 
Independence and dependency as ideals and principles have a long history in 
philosophy (Held 1990), economics, policy making but also in everyday public and 
social discourses. Fraser and Gordon (1994) convincingly show that the term and the 
concept of dependency have substantially changed over time, fitting the ideological 
and political demands of the respective systems. Especially during the enlightenment 
the values of independence and rationality have led to an idealisation of the 
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autonomous male, white, middle-aged, able-bodied subject as the quintessential social 
actor (McNay 1994; Watson et al. 2004; Shakespeare 2000). Work and employment, 
which used to be a sign of depending on somebody else, are now seen as an escape 
from dependency (Fraser and Gordon 1994). General societal structures and life 
circumstances define the ideal citizen as an independent, self-reliant actor. Any 
divergence from that is seen to be inferior to the ideal. However, there have always 
been groups of people (women, slaves, the young) at whose expense this 
independence has been created. Additionally, there have always been groups of 
people who could not embody the ideal of independence due to their position in 
society or their conditions of life. One question arising is whether anyone can actually 
live ‘independently’, i.e. being totally autonomous from everyone else? In fact we are 
always dependent on others; dependency is inherent in any social being, and it is, as 
Kittay (2002) argues, an integral part of human existence and human nature (see 
Groenhout 2003, 2004). Shakespeare (2000) draws attention to the fact that there are 
no two distinct natural categories of dependency and independence; rather reasons 
for dependency are inherent in human life: ‘Everyone is impaired, and all people have 
areas of vulnerability’ (Shakespeare 2000:9). Fine and Glendinning (2005) point out 
that there are different aspects of inevitable dependency, such as economic, physical, 
emotional and political dependency and Groenhout (2004:10) portrays individuals 
under the basic premise of an acknowledgement of necessary dependency as ‘physical 
beings who live lives that are inescapably structured in terms of dependence on other 
humans and on the environment in which they live.’  
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However, it also needs to be held that some dependencies in public life are valued 
differently to others. Some dependencies are stigmatised and disregarded whereas 
others are seen as normal and ‘natural’ (see Fraser and Gordon 1994). The dependency 
of children, for example, represents an uncontroversial situation whereas dependency 
in the context of middle aged people with disabilities is seen from a different 
perspective. A distinction of various dependencies is then often related to moral blame 
for some dependencies rather than others (Dalley 1996; Murray 1990; Dean and 
Rogers 2004). In this chapter I discuss the discursive construction of dependency and 
independence in relation to elderly people. A dichotomy is created in which older 
people are portrayed as passive, totally dependent non-actors who are in need of care 
and whose life is determined by others. This essentialisation of someone’s dependency 
is then linked to the idea that this is not a decent, desirable life. At the same time a 
fear of becoming a burden on others is present, which will be described as a fear of 
dependency.  
 
Construction of care as a dichotomy of dependency  
Care is constructed in a dichotomy of dependent and independent actors. Conceptually 
there is one person being active in the process, being the independent actor, and there 
is another person being dependent on the former. Care is then seen as the often dirty, 
unpleasant and intimate reaction to dependency. Eva Kittay starts her important and 
highly influential book Love’s Labor with the sentence: ‘Dependence requires care’ 
(Kittay 1999:1). Lloyd (2004:247) describes care as taking ‘into account the needs and 
rights of those too young or too old to be the active ‘independent’ adult citizen’. Both 
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accounts represent the general understanding of care as being based on a dichotomy 
of dependency and independence.  
 
Bobbio in his description of what it means to be old argues that old age marks an end, 
a final stage, and that it is ‘mainly depicted as decadence and degeneration: the 
downward curve of an individual’ (2001:24). In the discourses this feeling of old age as 
an end is very prominent. Old age is very easily equated with dependency (Plath 2008) 
and old people are seen as passive victims who need to be looked after, in other 
words, they are constructed as ‘the other’ in relation to the healthy independent actor. 
In the following extract Helma talks about the act of caring itself, describing how an old 
person can help the process of caring. This is a good example of the idea of ‘othering’ 
(Oakley 2007:108) old people. 
 
Helma: Because I really believe (…) and I also know old people, who are like that, uh, 
adorable, quiet, grateful, not that they are now dismissive (…) but, dignified grateful, 
yes, that you like to have them with you, and that you like to be there for them (…) 
Now, there are those, and then it would be, the whole caring would be much easier, 
because they, yeah, they simply would also be there  
 
With Hughes et al. (2005) one can argue that disabled people, and this is very similar 
for old people, are continuously infantilised, disempowered and degraded in public, 
social, cultural and political discourse (see also Sennett 2003). Shakespeare identifies a 
construction of a ‘polarity between dependent, vulnerable, innocent, asexual children 
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and competent, powerful, sexual, adult citizens’ (2000:15) resulting from this process 
of infantilisation. Hockey and James (2003) in this context point out that certain 
periods during the life course are seen as metaphors for stages of 
dependence/independence (for a similar argument see Dean and Rogers 2004). In that 
sense elderly people are recurrently associated with children, as the following 
discussion exemplifies: 
 
Barbara: And on the other hand, somebody has given me this recommendation and I 
have also seen that, that you can indeed also scold the ill person a bit, and also the 
person in need of care (…) and not having to always do everything for them, and having 
to give in. Because they forget it, that you have told them off, this they forget again 
anyways, but somewhere, something remains with them, that it isn’t entirely fine, what 
they’re doing (…) So you can really once, of course not all the time, but you can really 
once also have a strict word with them. Because (…) it goes better after that. 
Vanessa: and they, I think, like small children, test the boundaries 
Barbara: That’s it, yes, that’s it, yeah. (...) 
Walter: yes, that’s it. It is like, that you can really say, they become small children 
again. (...) 
Adam: and children test the boundaries, how far they can go, but the old people do it as 
well. 
Barbara: or, you also have to tell them then, uh, that’s not possible now, and now like 
this, and, and, but rigorously, otherwise (...) nothing works, right. (...) And you’re doing 
it for their good, don’t you. You want to mean well, you do mean well.  
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As in the extract above, the infantilisation of elderly people is often linked to an 
expression of reassurance that this is done in their best interest. Agency is therefore 
systematically taken away both in practice and in the conception of the situation. 
Similarly, Larry in the following discussion on elderly people, who are cooking for 
themselves in care homes, emphasises the necessity to act in this empathic way, in the 
sense that actions of restriction are performed in people’s own interest:  
 
Larry: and I believe, if the person’s got dementia, or something (...)  they can have a 
kitchen, but (...)  it’s got a master switch that turns the whole kitchen off, if necessary, 
let them boil the kettle, anything beyond that, (...) they are not allowed to (...) [to] 
control, not in, in the nicest way possible, in their self-interest.  
 
Another aspect of the public discourse on care deals with the fact that some people 
express an extreme anxiety of dependency, of being helpless and in need for care. 
Euthanasia is frequently discussed in this context, a theme I will take up below in the 
discussion on ‘being a burden’. The idea and the image of being in need for care cannot 
be combined with a dignified life. 
 
Alfred: So, I have in that sense thought about it, (...) that I say, right, I don’t want to get 
that old. If it doesn’t go anymore, then away, away, away. And there, I think, I’m 
agreeing with my mother. She also ran until the last moment. And then, when it got 
critical, she gave up. Then she died within 2 days. (...) So, of care, she was horrified, that 
she will be in need of care, that she would be dependent on other people. And I do 
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understand that very well. I don’t want that either. Then, I rather want to go before 
that. (…) So, care, no, then I’d really like to go. 
Britta: I mean there certainly is something worse than dying, and that’s suffering. 
Alfred: It is worse, if you are in need of care. Yes. It’s worse, for example, if, if physically 
you can’t, but mentally you’re fully aware, yeah.  
 
Plath (2008:1355-6) points out that the construction of elderly people as dependent 
and marginalised is not due to a natural process of ageing but that it rather must be 
seen as ‘a socially structured state, maintained by dominant ageist values in society’. 
There is also a creation of a clear separation of the time when someone is healthy and 
independent and the time when someone needs care. It is imagined that care begins 
when agency ends. What characterises a reasonable life is therefore defined by those 
who are not in this situation. Secondly, there often is an emphasis on the dependent 
person as being completely passive, as not understanding what’s going on in life as also 
exemplified by Paul’s statement below: 
 
Paul: She was in [care home] for seven years, and she has hardly recognised her 
daughter then. And is, so to say, kept alive by law (…) That really wasn’t a life in the 
sense, how we imagine it, or, how we, or what we understand by it.  
 
There is a strong connotation of ‘othering’ those who are very dependent on others as 
they do not have a life in the way we understand it. 
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Home vs. institution  
As discussed in chapter 5, independence is also a main feature of the aversion against 
institutional living, in particular living in care homes. Theodora mentions that  
 
those people who cannot buy into a super private home have basically an institutional 
lifestyle forced upon them. They lose their home, their pets, their belongings.  
 
An ‘institutional lifestyle’, as mentioned by Theodora, is the antipode to independent 
living. Similarly Maria argues that in a care home  
 
they lose pets, personal belongings, familiar rooms/furniture/neighbours, they lose 
space and privacy, and unless they can buy into a good quality care home they basically 
live in a hostel. There is no individuality or stimulus, just a sense of being bundled into 
‘god’s waiting room’ 
 
For this chapter the aspect of the ‘institutional lifestyle’ is particularly important. It 
describes a way of living that is characterised by dependency on others. Someone 
living in an institution must follow rules and laws set up by others. The institution is 
constructed as a place where one has to follow strict rules which do not allow making 
one’s own decisions and the whole way of life is determined and regulated by others: 
 
Ingrid: In the home there are also these strict rules. So, whatever, to eat supper at half 
past four already, one also has to get used to that indeed.(...)  for example if someone 
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wants to stay up longer, he doesn’t have a chance there, or watch TV longer, that’s all 
not possible in a home  
 
By that the institution becomes the quintessential ‘dependent living’ arrangement. In 
the discursive construction all the negative attributes about dependency are combined 
to manifest themselves in the idea of an institution. Through that institutionalisation is 
created as a stigma (Phillips 2007) for those living in it. Living in a care home is a clear 
and obvious sign of not being independent. At home, on the other hand, this stigma is 
not apparent as, regardless of the actual situation, independence is potentially possible 
there. The idea of a loss refers back to the concept of homelessness described in 
chapter 6. This loss is combined with a deficit of subjectivity, or individuality. The care 
home is the ideological manifestation of this loss. The unfamiliar setting produces even 
more dependencies and thus works in a disempowering way (see Phillips 2007). Losing 
one’s subjectivity is sometimes described as quasi-death, or social death (Froggatt 
2001) and this association is furthermore strengthened by a clear relation between 
moving away into an institutional setting, a shortfall of identity and the end of life: 
 
Nathan: there was a space in a nursing home and he was taken in there and he gave 
up. 
 
This again reproduces a pathological view of old age but also creates a clear logical 
relationship between old age, life in institutions, dependency and death.  
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At first sight a possible contradiction could emerge. People’s strong preference for 
independence and independent living correlates with a strong emphasis on care at 
home, the family and communal living (as discussed in the chapters above). It is in and 
through social, political and cultural discourses that meaning is given to these 
concepts. Living in the community, preferably in one’s own home, is by definition to 
not live in an institutional setting. Dependency is therefore always less distinct at home 
in comparison to the institution. Thus, it is not only ambivalence in feelings and 
emotions between wanting to be independent and staying in the save haven of family 
and community; the construction of dependency as a concept is closely related to 
institutions and therefore fosters this affectionate construction of independence, 
exemplified by Fay’s wish for arrangements for her mother, that 
 
allow [...] her to stay in her community that she wants to be in, you know, with her own 
independence. 
 
This refers to a relationship between community and independence in which 
community is something which is consciously chosen, in opposition to an institution 
which excludes any possibility of personal action. Independence might be an 
expression of this active, reflexive choice of social relations and social networks that 
some authors associate with the specific demands of the current economic and social 
situation (e.g. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001:35). Living at home, within the 
community and the family, is a choice that enables independence and is at the same 
time an expression of independence. Vera for example emphasises the conscious 
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decision of the whole family against a care home and for care within the family, 
highlighting the importance of this choice for the family and its cohesion and vice 
versa: 
 
Vera: for example, we do have a care institution close to us. (...) That’s, not far away 
from us. And we have decided to not take up this option. Firstly, because this institution 
is horrible, but regardless of that, because we have simply said, ok, we stay together, 
so, the family sticks together, simply (...) It was our decision.  
 
Within the community the (own) home is then seen as the place in which individuality 
and independence can remain. Carol for example links the preference of being at home 
to people’s character, in that those who are independent characters want to stay at 
home. This resonates with the discussion above, when it was argued that independent 
characters reject the idea of ‘institutional living’.  
 
Carol: I think, uhm, if a person is of an independent nature, they will probably prefer to 
be in their home, in their own home as long as possible.  
 
Oldman (2003:50) argues that underlying the concept of independent living, as it is 
promoted by the British government for example, is ‘the notion that living at home is 
better than life in an institution’. This straightforward relationship between 
independence and the home is of course not only a political strategy but is produced 
and reproduced in everyday discourses. In chapter 5 I have also discussed the 
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significance of the physical entity of the home, the house people live in. Fraser and 
Gordon (1994) point to the fact that in earlier times, independence meant to own a 
property and to therefore be able to live without the need to perform paid labour. The 
question, however, remains, whether the concept of independence and independent 
living is also related to the idea of owning a property, and consequentially, living in 
one’s own property. Dalley (1996) highlights the importance of economic 
independence (which is often linked to the possession of a property) for any concept of 
independence. Economic independence gives other principles meaning. Morgan in the 
following statement also points to the fact that people’s independence is related to 
having their own house, and that therefore moving into another form of 
accommodation is synonymous with giving up one’s independence: 
 
Morgan: I think also that, the point you’ve made about the grey pound and I think 
economically, despite the credit crunch and everything we hear, the older generation 
are better off than they were previously and obviously more people own their own 
homes, and or more independent, in that way. (...) So there’s an awful lot to give up.  
 
Kontos argues that it is one particular feature of home that it ‘unlike many other 
accommodation options available to frail older people, does not compromise their 
independence’ (1998:168). Home can therefore be seen as by definition enabling and 
guaranteeing independence for those living in it. There is no definite meaning of the 
concept of independence; rather it symbolises ideas, emotions and imaginations which 
seem to be very important for people, particularly in the UK discourse. People living in 
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their own homes, being visited by carers, or even living with a live-in carer (such as the 
case of the migrant carers in Austria) are not necessarily ‘more independent’ than 
people in institutional arrangements. It is the connotation of home however, that 
secures this experience of independence for people.  
 
The institution signals the quintessential dependent living arrangement. In the 
discursive construction all the negative attributes about dependency are combined to 
manifest themselves in the idea of an institution. At home, on the other hand, this 
stigma is not apparent as, regardless of the actual situation, independence is 
potentially possible there.  
 
‘Although she is much better cared for *in a nursing home+ than formerly and she 
admits that she enjoys the food, the whole situation is an affront to her independence. 
It’s hard to believe she will ever actively enjoy institutional living’ (The Guardian, 
24/03/07). 
 
Change in relationships  
Another important aspect defined by constructions of independence and dependency 
is the relationship between carer and cared for. Relationships between people are 
fundamentally based on dependency relations. However, dependency bearing 
enormously negative connotations, the discourse shows many attempts to define care 
differently, in order to sustain a relationship between independent individuals. The 
family for example is a combination of mutual reciprocity and one-sided support, being 
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based on emotions, feelings and social structures (see Fitzpatrick 2008:155). However, 
as Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2001:85) argue, transformations in the family have also 
changed its constitution to what they call a post-familial family. Underlying these 
conceptions is, however, a recognition that care is very often not an outcome from 
rights held as individuals, ‘but from what is due us by virtue of our connection with 
those with whom we have had and are likely to have relations of care and dependency’ 
(Kittay 1999:66). Many relationships are characterised by both contractual and 
emotional arrangements. In chapter 8 I will explore the tension between these two 
aspects further.  
 
In chapter 4 I have discussed how care can lead to a redefinition of particular 
relationships in which a person feels that an official recognition as carer (in order to 
claim benefits for carers) would change and challenge this relationship. An 
arrangement in which people are paid for their care work challenges the notion of a 
loving family conception. In a different way dependency relations can be challenged by 
a reversal of roles. Typical for that are parent-child relations in which the parent now 
becomes dependent on the care given by the child: 
 
Eloise: I would have, somehow, made sure earlier that it has to be a home somehow, 
yes. Because, I think, it was uncomfortable for both sides. Because the mother felt of 
course, to be mothered, by the own daughter *laughs+, that’s somehow, funny.  
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I now briefly want to turn to those people responding to dependency, those who Kittay 
(1999) calls ‘dependency workers’. One of the main differences between most forms of 
conventional work and dependency work lies in its relationship to the person in need 
of care. Whereas in a Marxist account one works to sell labour, often with no interest 
in the work as such, in care the interest in the wellbeing of the other is the main 
characteristic of the work (Kittay 1999). The relationship itself is therefore one being 
based on mutual interest and dependence. This clearly excludes the possibility of the 
dependency worker as the imagined free, male individual. Eleanor’s statement shows 
the distinction between the ‘normal’ independent worker and the dependency worker:  
 
Eleanor: Perhaps one should be looking at, how people are going to be encouraged to 
want to live the sort of life, where they are caring for other people, because society now 
is very much geared to, you are successful if you’re making a lot of money, and you live 
in a mansion you’re your children are going to boarding schools and to the continent; 
(...). In fact most of these places [care homes] run on part-time workers, and that of 
course saves them certain expenses, national health wise, doesn’t it? Stamps and 
things. So, probably that’s one of the biggest things that needs to be looked at, how to 
make people, attract them to this kind of work, and to giving.  
 
Hughes et al. (2005:267) argue that those who do the care work ‘place themselves in a 
domain of peripheral value outside the masculinist boundaries that define proper 
productivity and, therefore, have no claim upon the values of success, dignity or 
respect.’ Working as a dependency worker therefore places oneself in opposition to 
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the model of the independent agent (see also chapter 8 in this context). Hughes et al. 
(2005) also question the Disabled People Movement’s focus on the employment 
relationship as this means that ethics remains in its masculine, bourgeois meaning, 
which clearly contradicts an ethics of care. Performing work under these conditions 
clearly takes away one’s one independence and possibility for control over one’s life 
situation. Kittay (1999:183) states the importance of dependency workers for the 
existence of independent citizens and workers: 
‘The purchase price of independence is a wife, a mother, a nursemaid, a nanny – 
a dependency worker. Whether the care of dependents is turned over to a 
woman with whom one shares an intimate life or to a stranger, unless someone 
attends to the dependencies that touch our lives, and inevitably touch the lives 
of all, we cannot act the part of a free and equal subject featured in the 
conception of society as an association of equals.’  
 
Carers (especially family members or migrant carers) are dependent on the cared for 
and the relationship of care. Therefore the independence of people staying in their 
own house often is at the expense of other people’s dependency. The emphasis on 
loving, dedicated and selfless care often creates a relationship that contradicts other 
ideals of independence and autonomy.  
 
Becoming a burden  
Related to the very negative construction of dependency is an aversion against 
becoming dependent on others. In the discourses this is often related to an expression 
of not wanting to be a burden on others. The theme of burden reflects a topic that is 
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very characteristic for the discourse on care (Shakespeare 2000) and closely linked to 
being dependent on others. This has also been a theme of much of the care related 
literature in its aim to point to the work that is been done in an often unacknowledged 
and undervalued context (Shakespeare 2000). Similarly, social policy making, which 
focuses strongly on the needs and the situation of carers, leads to an emphasis on an 
idea of burden, as Hughes et al. (2005:261) argue: ‘Social policy constructs male and 
female recipients of care as a burden and a drain on scarce resources.’ This emphasis 
on the burden in academic, political and public discourse, however, obviously 
reproduces the negative connotations of dependency and the very negativity appears 
as an objective problem, since somebody needs to carry that burden. In the discourses 
this is often realised in an expression that people value caring, and even express their 
willingness to care for their relatives, friends or neighbours; they, however, do not 
want to be cared for by anyone close to them. This interesting situation in which 
people want to make the decision to care and to be there for others (representing the 
heroic, sacrificial, selfless virtue of giving), but in which they do not want to be in need 
of care (the horror of taking) clearly shows how dependency is thought of and 
constructed as a fundamentally passive, negative stage of existence, as Sennett 
(2003:63-4) argues: ‘Care of oneself can mean additionally not becoming a burden 
upon others, so that the needy adult incurs shame, the self-sufficient person earns 
respect’. The worry about being the reason that others (usually people close to 
oneself) have to carry out an undervalued and unrecognised work is obviously part of 
the fear; secondly, however, conceptions of oneself and the strong aversion against 
becoming dependent and therefore helpless are reproduced. Imagining oneself 
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through the narrative of care in a situation of helplessness and dependency is a very 
negative idea for many people. Being in need for extensive care is described as 
something different than the life as we know it. Care is seen as a pitiful stage in life, a 
situation people would like to avoid by all means. The following extracts give an 
impression of people’s wishes for their own old age: 
 
Pamela: I would never ask my children, to look after me.  
Will: No, and I’ve made that clear 
Pamela: I know that very clearly, and that’s very clear because I just don’t think it’s fair, 
I’d like to be near them, so that I could see them occasionally... 
 
Nathan: My prayer is that I keep healthy, till the day I die (...). And I never need looking 
after.  
 
People often express anxiety to having to live a different life to what is seen as a 
‘normal’ life. People express their unwillingness to live a life of being a burden and 
effectively of being dependent on others. This leads to a wish to die healthily without 
needing any care, but also includes a discourse in which euthanasia is repeatedly 
thought and talked about. An example from Germany states in this context that every 
third German would rather commit suicide than being in need of care (Die Welt 2007). 
Ingrid for example declares that she would consider ending her life in response to a 
discussion on the possibilities of being in a care home: 
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Ingrid: If I’m able to, to do it, to understand my situation, and I can’t see a way out, 
then I would make use of my right, to determine the point of my death. 
 
This discourse is of course not reproduced by everyone in the same way. Depending on 
moral and spiritual attitudes, the option of euthanasia is discussed either as a positive 
option, as a choice against dependency and being a burden, or as something to be 
frightened off, as the example below demonstrates. However, in either case there is a 
clear link between being independent and having some worth for society. Even in cases 
when people fear that society disregards its elderly members they reproduce an 
association between age, care, dependency, and value of life. 
 
Nathan: And it will be, ‘you’re too expensive to keep, (...) let’s put you out of (...)’. And 
euthanasia, she thinks, euthanasia might well be an answer, that a government of the 
future decides, is legitimate, because… 
Peter: a lot of elderly people who aren’t welcome thinking it’s the only way. Because a 
lot of them do say ‘I wish, I wish I could go. I wish that the lord would take me now.’ (...) 
 
Free decision making is one of the most significant aspects of these discursive themes. 
Often people argue that people ought to make choices before they become dependent 
on others, to ensure that nobody has to carry the burden without his/her acceptance. 
Not making decisions for the future is then seen as a weak attitude of not really taking 
responsibility for one’s own independence for the future: 
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Monica: And then she says: Yeah, yeah, and if I’m once a case for care, then I don’t 
notice it anymore anyways. *laughs+. And with that it’s difficult to fight against, and to 
argue against 
Helma: Yes. They’re always like that *...+ Self-responsibility, shifted off. Yes, yes.  
 
In the following newspaper extract from The Observer, this decision making process is 
very much emphasised. Own choices and decisions are presented in opposition to an 
image of old age, in which elderly people are dependent, passive and vulnerable to 
abuse, neglect and infantilisation. This example reproduces the idea that old age is 
closely related to being completely dependent on the good will of some abstract other; 
that, through planning, choosing and conscious decisions, however, one could escape 
from this trap of dependence: 
 
It wasn’t just the sociable nature of the enterprise that appealed *of moving into a 
home together]. It was the thought that we were going to be one bunch of oldies in 
charge of our destiny. We will choose everything from menu to morphine and thumb 
our nose at the cruel convention that the elderly are to be treated like children. We will 
show the curious visitors that you can be in your sunset years and still be interested in 
the news or in seeing a good play; we’ll exchange views on the Booker shortlist and 
Gordon Brown’s long-term future. No one will take our savings, jeer at our incontinence 
or nod-nod, wink-wink at our sexual frolicking. (The Observer, 09/09/07)  
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Dependency is constructed as an other way of existence which is undesirable, feared 
and rejected. The creation of a dichotomy of dependency and independence means 
that being dependent is seen as completely defining someone’s identity and people 
are seen as either dependent or independent and these stages are complete opposites.  
7.3 Challenging dependency 
Do the discourses on care show any questioning of the dichotomy presented above? 
Are there any variations and nuances in the way people think about, talk about and 
construct elderly people? Is it possible to identify any challenge to the creation of the 
dichotomy of independence and dependency? In this section I will present two 
positions appearing in the public discourses which are also resembled in the academic 
and political sphere. Firstly, I focus on the idea of empowerment and support of elderly 
people in order to avoid passivity and dependency. The second position focuses on 
mutuality and reciprocity as normal parts of human interactions and interrelations.  
 
Empowerment and support  
The first perspective challenging the equation of elderly people with passivity and 
dependency emphasises practices of support and help, rather than care, in order to 
enable independent actors (Smith 2005; Ryburn et al. 2009). The discussion so far has 
followed the traditional conception of care as a response on behalf of those who have 
the capacity to respond to the needs of others (Groenhout 1998:177). An important 
argument brought forward by the Disabled People Movement (DPM), however, is the 
focus on replacing a notion of care with the terms help or assistance (Shakespeare 
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2000), seeing care not only as an answer to but also as a cause for dependency (see 
also Hughes et al. 2005). There often seems to be an understanding of people cared for 
as passive recipients, and not active, ‘independently’ acting people. Following the 
classic liberal rights model of promoting independence for everyone (Ellis and Rogers 
2004), the concepts of help and assistance bear a meaning of an emancipatory concept 
of independence and self-determination (Hughes et al. 2005), whereas care bears the 
tendency to objectify and construct dependent people (Shakespeare 2000). Drawing 
on the social model of disability the main aim is to reject notions of pity and 
victimisation (Smith 2005) and instead focus on emancipating and empowering people. 
Do people express a notion of help as enabling and securing independence over a 
notion of care which produces independence, as the argument, in a simplified version, 
goes? John in the following quote discusses a photo of a young man fitting new light 
bulbs and an elderly men standing beside him:  
 
John: Yeah, and the greatest thing that a carer can do in that situation is actually (...) 
not lord it over them (...). So actually they’re not invading his privacy. He’s still taking 
part, and inviting him, even to hold something, (...) ‘can you hold that for me’, (...) just 
not  exclude them from the activity but make them feel as though they are part of it, 
and in fact, that they’re the boss.  
 
One problem arising with the concept of empowerment is the agency of the assistant 
involved in the process. Oliver and Barnes (1998) therefore argue that being 
empowered by someone else is an inherent contradiction and ultimately represents 
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disempowerment (see also Smith 2005). Additionally, whereas the importance of a 
rejection of an objectifying notion of care cannot be underestimated it is also 
important to analyse the consequences of this distinction for what care means to 
people. Watson et al. (2004:339) therefore raise the question whether the term 
assistance does actually ‘capture the combination of emotional and practical care and 
the ultimately gendered nature of care and care work’? The focus on commodified 
relationships (Ungerson 1999) in which strangers provide intimate services bears the 
danger that ‘the contract to care for had been fulfilled, but with a loss of the sentiment 
of caring about’ (Ungerson 1999:591). Sennett (2003) also asks whether caring without 
compassion might actually be a more fruitful endeavour. He (2003:142), however, 
concludes that  
‘*i+mpersonal caregiving is a very pessimistic view of the human condition; it 
supposes people are likely to do others injury by caring for and about them 
personally, so that the human elements of judgement and response to need 
should be eliminated.’  
 
Another problem arising might be in some ways that the focus on help instead of care 
can reproduce the dichotomy between independent and dependent recipients of 
assistance even further. In other words, does the focus on help potentially construct 
those who really need care as different to those who simply need help and assistance? 
It could be argued that a mutual relationship between people is sometimes simply not 
possible or even desirable (see also Fine and Glendinning 2005). Another discursive 
feature that reproduces the aversion against dependency and the praise of 
independence I call ‘elderly but fit’. Elderly people are presented and talked about very 
  
263 
fondly, in relation to an emphasis of their fitness, be it mental or physical. Eloise for 
example, talking about respect for elderly people in general emphasises how great old 
people are who still are active and intelligent: 
 
Eloise: and age itself, now, that’s not really a merit. 
Britta: uhum, uhum. 
Eloise: But, I mean, it is, it’s great if, everyone, I know many old people, who I also like, 
yeah, where I think, that’s great, how they are still interested in things, and how 
smartly they can talk, but age itself, that’s not it. 
 
Similarly, in the following extract people who deal with elderly people on the basis of 
voluntary work emphasise how some elderly people are very active, funny and witty. 
Highlighting that someone who is in their late nineties is active and still going on 
holidays, the discussants present an ideal of an elderly individual which is the opposite 
of a dependent, passive person.  
 
Peter: This is very important because there is some prejudice against elderly people and 
invalided people but, uh, people tend to walk past and they are probably fully aware 
insight their brain. Fully, with a 20 year old brain (...), 30, 40 year old, instead of a 70 
year old person. (...)  
Patricia: Our favourite lady at the moment is 98 
Nathan: She said she wants to go to Australia 
Patricia: next year 
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Nathan: For a holiday 
Patricia: Yeah. 
Nathan: At 99 
John: It’s amazing 
Patricia: And she came in the other week and she said ‘Patricia, I’m a bit worried’, I say 
‘Why (…), what’s the matter?’ She says: ‘I’m beginning to feel my age’ *laughing+. And I: 
‘I’d worry about it when you start acting your age’ *laughing+. ‘cause she doesn’t act 
her age [...] 
Nathan: at all 
 
It is important to understand that it is this emphasis of older people’s abilities, actions 
and cognitive skills, which reproduces the dependency-independence dichotomy. Due 
to the emphasis that elderly people are still fit and healthy, the negative associations 
of dependency are perpetuated. In these accounts elderly people are presented as 
independent, self-reliant actors, and brought in opposition to those who really are in 
need of care and support. Similarly Will in the following statement, talking about his 
neighbour, emphasises the engagement with the ‘modern world’ as a praiseworthy 
character trait. He also admits that this characteristic of his neighbour makes the 
contact with him a pleasure. Again, an othering of dependent elderly people is clearly 
happening here: 
 
Will: my neighbour, (...) he lost his wife 2 years ago, (...), he’s now 91, but at the age of 
90 he bought himself a brand new (…) car, he bought himself a computer *some laugh+. 
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He’s got a mind like, and, and I, I visit him obviously, at least once a week, and it’s 
always a pleasure, it’s never a, a chore, because his conversation, you know, he’s, ok, 
he’s got his aches and pains, but he’s, he maintains a 3 bedroom detached house, no 
cleaner, no, he cooks for himself and everything, you know (...). He’s 91, and he’s, but 
he’s got, the essential thing is he’s got his brain, he’s got his brain 
Pamela: And he’s got a mental attitude.  
Will: Yes, yes.  
 
This aspect points to a public norm in which the ‘‘normal’ healthy body is a moral 
obligation’ (Oakley 2007:117). The very positive representation of elderly people as 
being fit, healthy, smart, funny and active until old age reinforces the moral 
responsibility to stay independent. And it also assumes that people are in the position 
to make certain choices during their lifetime to avoid dependency. Lloyd (2004:251) 
expresses this important aspect and emphasises its connection to an ideal of 
independence, arguing that this focus ignores significant characteristics of the general 
human condition: 
‘In contemporary western societies, independence has become the ideal quality 
of the adult human being and the sine qua non of public policies. (...) The 
concept of ‘active ageing’, so prevalent in contemporary policy discourses, 
stresses the importance of older people being able to function in ways that best 
approximate to the ideal of the independent autonomous adult – and for as long 
as possible. In contrast, a focus on the whole lifecourse enables us to see more 
clearly our essentially social nature and the ways in which vulnerability and 
dependency are experienced by all human beings at different times.’  
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The emphasis on independence and self-determination has led to a focus on 
empowerment of people and participation in public life. As much as these aspects are 
important in many cases, they also bear the danger of focusing on traditional 
connotations of what independence means. Harris (2002:277-278) rightly argues that  
‘Whilst these strategies are important as a way of countering a view of older 
people as a passive burden, they inadvertently reinforce a concept of citizenship 
which defines people’s status according to their contribution to the economy, as 
well as reinforcing a sharp distinction between the young-old/old-old and the 
grey pound/grey drain’. 
 
I agree with Phillips when she argues that ‘*k+eeping older people ‘independent’ has 
been translated into a message of keeping them fit and active whereas it should mean 
giving people more choice and control over their lives’ (2007:135). I would add, 
however, that the way, in which the concepts of choice and control are used in public 
and political discourses and policy making, they are also idealised aspects of an 
imagination of independence (see Glendinning 2008). Glendinning (2008) also shows 
that the concepts of choice and control often create and support a market-situation in 
the care sector. A successful deconstruction of independence needs to also focus on 
issues such as choice. Individual autonomy needs to be re-imagined within a context of 
constant interdependencies.  
 
Choice is also seen as an expression of not being in need of care. In other words, some 
people are seen to need help and some people are seen to need care. This situation is 
described by Will in the following extract. Here the dichotomy between care and help, 
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a dichotomy that reproduces the binary of dependency and independence, is 
distinguishing between oneself and the others. Whereas Will sees himself and his 
fellow participants as those who can plan their old age actively in an independent and 
self-reliant way, he describes others as those who can’t help themselves. They are 
described as passive recipients with no own agency involved.  
 
Will: I mean, fortunately (...) we will be able to do that, and I thank God, I have been 
given that choice, because I’ve had a good life and it’s given me (...). The people we are 
really, really talking about, are those that, can’t help themselves. And, (...) have lost out 
on, on life, for whatever reason, some have not bothered (...) and you say, well, they 
don’t deserve it, but you still gotta look after them, whatever.  
 
Mutuality and Reciprocity 
This section refers to a discursive theme in which people underline reciprocity and 
mutuality of relationships. In contrast to the representation of elderly people as 
passive and dependent, here the opposite is emphasised. Being a helpful citizen is seen 
as the counterexample to the elderly, dependent person: 
 
Lisa: I think it’s very difficult to preserve a person’s, dignity, and sense of worth, when 
they, become, less, yeah, a bit helpless. (...) And I think (...) they need to be aware that 
they are treated with respect for them, and for their dignity and their pride in as gentle 
way as possible. And an understanding way. And I also think it’s important, to help 
them keep their sense of purpose, in life. When so much, gradually goes from them.(...) 
  
268 
That they need to feel wanted  
Carol: And a helpful citizen.  
 
It is also the idea of not being a full member of society that makes feeling dependent 
such a negative experience. Society, especially in its meritocratic conception, is 
constructed in a way that favours individual contribution to the whole. Being passive, 
receiving and dependent is an unwanted, inferior status to take on. In the discourses 
people continuously talk about the worth of elderly people in terms of their 
contribution to society and their value for others. In the following extract the 
importance for one’s feeling of self-worth as a consequence of fulfilling tasks is 
emphasised: 
 
Barbara: here in *town+ there is this elderly home, it was there, and even then, I don’t 
know, 200 years ago, or longer (…) people had to do simple tasks (…) 
Vanessa: yes, that just keeps fit 
Barbara: Yeah, and this was actually very smart, intelligent from this, this founder, and 
who has ordered that they are asked to do simple tasks (...) that you are not feeling 
useless. Because that’s a very heavy burden 
Vanessa: uhum, uhum 
Barbara: a psychological burden, I think 
Adam: That was of course also the advantage, when the family lived from the great-
grandfather to the great-grandson, in one union, usually in a farmers house, right, that 
then the old people could at the same time look after the children.  
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What can be noticed here is a recognition that some people need help or care but that 
they also give something back to society. Feeling useless and not contributing anything 
is seen as a very heavy burden. In that sense elderly people’s contribution to others (in 
relationships) and to society as a whole is highlighted. In these accounts people are not 
reduced to being passive and dependent but mutual interdependence is identified. But 
it is not only in people’s self-interest to fulfil certain tasks and to contribute something. 
Also society is seen to be benefitting if elderly people’s contributions are 
acknowledged. Later in the discussion, Vanessa, raising the point that respect for older 
people and the acknowledgement of people’s worth for society needs to be increased, 
argues that the elderly should be much more integrated again. In a discursive theme 
that links back to the creation of nostalgia (see chapter 6) the intergenerational 
exchange between grandparents, parents and children is emphasised.  
 
Several analysts (Groenhout 2004; Fine and Glendinning 2005; Noddings 2003) argue 
to replace both dependency and care with the concept of interdependence, describing 
a process of ‘reciprocity between partners, exchanges between dependent actors over 
time, and the networking of these relations of dependence’ (Fine and Glendinning, 
2005:612). The ethics of care approach positions interdependence and a sense of self 
in reference to others against the (masculine) ideals of independence and 
individualism. The feminine is thought of as being related to receptivity, relatedness, 
responsiveness (Noddings 2003). The moral relations between people are 
characterised by the absence of generalisable, independent actors but happen as social 
relations between concrete others (Kittay 1999; Smith 2005). 
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However, even though interdependence seems more promising for an understanding 
of social relations and ‘human relationships and the interdependency they entail are a 
good in and of themselves’ (Dean 2004:193), there is still a questionable tendency to 
emphasise aspects of mutuality, reciprocity and, potentially, deservingness. Kittay 
(1999) therefore describes the concept of interdependence as a fiction arguing that 
there are some dependencies which are not socially constructed and through which 
actors cannot engage in mutual reciprocity. Kittay elsewhere (2007:56) argues that 
‘*c+are relationships have many characteristics that suggest paternalism’ as they are 
usually based between unequals. The answer, however, might rather be a ‘theory of 
equality that embraces dependency’ (Kittay 1999:xii) in contrast to a focus on people’s 
mutual contributions. With her I argue that an approach which embraces dependency 
can manage an integration of care and autonomy in the sense of relational autonomy 
(Ellis 2004). Ruddick (2002:219) agrees, arguing that ‘[c]ommon feminist ideals of 
interdependence and mutuality are inadequate counters to domination in dependency 
relations’. Another option is favoured by Silva and Smart (1999) in arguing for a life-
course perspective as people encounter various stages of dependency and care 
throughout their life. Interdependence is happening not in mutual reciprocity but over 
the period of one’s (and the other’s) life. 
 
Within a care relationship everyone always gives something to the other. This, 
however, should not be confused with a focus on mutuality as a normative aspect. In 
other words, a theory of equality that embraces dependency does not deny that 
people also ‘give’ something. It rather shifts the attention away from mutuality as a 
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necessary prerequisite for relationships. Reciprocity needs to be rethought and 
challenged in order to avoid a shift of vulnerability and dependency into the private 
domain (see also Ellis 2004). Dean (2004) argues for a social inclusion approach that 
allows the recognition of one’s dependency on others. I have mentioned earlier that 
many people in the focus groups expressed a willingness to care for others but rejected 
the image of being cared for by relatives themselves. This observation fits in with 
Dean’s (2004:195) study in which they found that  
‘The paradox we observed in our research was that those who most vociferously 
denied their interdependency were those who most strongly asserted the 
importance of their own dependability for others’. 
 
Once again, being the independent actor on which others can rely upon is seen as 
superior to being dependent on others. If, however, dependency is seen as a neutral 
and normal aspect of human existence (Kittay 2007), without a focus on reciprocity or 
mutuality, a politics of dependency might enable a new way of thinking about social 
relations and the course of life. At the same time, however, dependencies do exist and 
create real difficulties for people. An important point is made by Groenhout (2003) 
when she warns about the danger of romanticising vulnerability and dependency. 
Finally, I want to emphasise the importance of keeping a notion of justice and equality 
in a construction of a new politics of dependency. A re-conceptualisation of 
dependency must not disregard these values. Kittay (1999) and Feder and Kittay (2002) 
make it very clear that care and dependency do not inevitably lead to subordination. 
Rather, they see the challenge in how a society can ‘deal justly with the demands of 
dependencies that constitute inevitable facts of human existence, so that we avoid 
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domination and subordination with respect to care and dependency’ (Feder and Kittay 
2002:3). Tronto (1993) tries to combine the concepts of an ethics of care with strong 
ideas of justice and equality and Nussbaum (2002a:198) convincingly argues for an 
inclusion of ‘ideas of equality and dignity’ into a care ethics: 
‘we will understand that issues of justice require us to think well both about care 
and love and also about human needs for a wide range of other human 
capabilities (...). The resulting theory may still be critical of some familiar liberal 
theories; and yet it will also draw in important ways on what is best in the liberal 
tradition, on its ideas of equality and dignity, its conceptions of the need for 
freedom and self-respect’. 
  
Kittay (2002), in a reply to Nussbaum and other critics, acknowledges the importance 
of a combination of the values of justice and care and argues that people have the 
potential to fulfil the demands for both. Additionally dependency needs to be taken 
out of the realm of family (Sennett 2003; Fineman 2002) in which it is traditionally 
hidden. The attempt of combining a sense of justice and a morality of care might 
enable a conception of dependency which is not an ‘evil state of existence’ (Groenhout 
2003) but which allows for some ‘consciously accepted dependency’ (Kruse 2005). In 
the discussion so far I have addressed the discursive construction of independence and 
dependency and I have presented the need for an ethical position which embraces 
dependency. At the same time I have argued that empowerment, justice and equality 
are extremely important aspects of a progressive ethics of care. However, issues of 
justice, freedom and mutuality need to be understood as currently being linked to a 
market logic and market driven understanding of liberalism. An ethics of care which, in 
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Fraser’s (2003a, 2003b, 2005) sense gives rise to recognition, redistribution and 
political participation also needs to understand the meaning of categories such as 
freedom and autonomy in the context of specific societal arrangements. In the next 
section I will explore further the meaning of these categories in relation to care within 
the social reality people live in.  
7.4 Self-reliance and Independence as a burden of modern times  
Despite the general agreement and tendency to favour independence and self-reliance 
by all means these concepts also bear problematic connotations. Some ambivalence 
can be found in the discourses in the sense that independence and self-reliance are 
also seen critically as concepts that put burdens on people, in particular on elderly 
people. The following two extracts from discussions offer an insight into why 
independence can be experienced as a burden and why institutional living can under 
certain conditions be a relief:  
 
Ingrid: She was very happy that she didn’t have to pick up things she let fall anymore, 
and it was reduced to that, that she didn’t have to care anymore, that she got 
something to eat 
 
Caroline: like you said! You have at some point, I also think, if you’ve done that for your 
whole life, you’re fed up to some extent with cooking (...) Doing the laundry and these 
things, everything that’s then done for you (...) But you’re still your own, you have your 
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own room, you have your privacy (...) You’re your own master, you come and go, as you 
like. 
 
In particular the second extract shows the ambivalence that can be found in the 
discourse on institutions. On the one hand the institution takes away the burden of 
having to live independently and self-reliantly, on the other hand, however, there is a 
notion of remaining your own master, in other words, to not becoming a dependent in 
the institution. Phillips (2007:109) shows that people can ‘face ‘forced independence’ 
through stereotyped and romanticized notions of home’ (Phillips 2007:109). But not 
only the focus on the home, but also the general construction of the preference of 
independence, might cause substantial difficulties for people. Dalley (1996) argues that 
it is the construction of the capitalist society that constructs ‘those who cannot work 
(for wages) through physical or mental impairment, or those who have passed beyond 
the age limit imposed by society on the end of working life’ (1996:98) as dependents. 
Whereas I agree with her argument that the social construction of dependency needs 
to be challenged I think it is equally important to recognise that for some people the 
category of independence is not useful in describing their current and future life 
situations. Mittelstadt (2001) for example demonstrates how economic self-sufficiency 
has replaced dependency in the post-war welfare discourse in the USA and has 
therefore created a feeling of obligation of being independent in all areas of life.  
 
Plath (2008:1364) criticises that the dominant understanding of independence ‘places 
the emphasis on older people doing things alone and making decisions alone’ and 
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argues for an understanding that also includes alternative aspects such as access to 
community. She also argues that the traditional focus on ‘doing things alone’, ‘making 
one’s own decisions’, ‘physical and mental capacity’, ‘having resources’, ‘social 
standing and self-esteem’ (Plath 2008) all can bear negative consequences. This 
formation and Caroline’s quoted statement above clearly relate the dominant 
conception of independence to the demands of society’s capitalist construction. 
Oldman (2003) also bases the difficulties of independence on a societal level and 
criticises the state’s complicity in the process of construction. The focus on 
independence is closely linked to capitalist development and a main feature of what is 
described as a protestant work ethics (see Weber 2001; Fraser and Gordon 1994). 
Bauman (2001) for example has shown that those who are seen as very successful and 
productive in modern society are also characterised by independence and self-reliance. 
This link between (economic) success and independence also leads to a moral rejection 
of dependency created by the discourses shaped by the successful and powerful 
(Bauman 2001:50). Care in this conception is clearly a break of the possibility of two 
independent, mobile, flexible and therefore successful actors (see Phillips 2007).  
 
It seems that the dichotomy between dependency and independence also reproduces 
the notions of success in the market versus a life based on relations. It furthermore 
seems to assume that care, which includes the acceptance of the existence of 
dependencies, is in opposition to a successful, market based life (Zelizer 2005). This 
distinction is then often essentialised and directly related to personal attributes such 
as gender (see Mann 2002) or age: 
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Walter: the old ones not anymore, the youth that’s the, the youth is the important 
thing. The youth is the future. 
Adam: yes. 
Barbara: Yes, the youth. 
Walter: the youth is the one, that brings the money. 
Barbara: Yes, everything’s calculated like that. 
Walter: The youth is the one, that works, and the old guy, whatever, he uses, well he, 
yeah, we also have to provide for him. 
 
In this extract the dichotomy is reproduced but also a link to the world of work and 
capitalism is established. I will explore this aspect further in chapter 8 and want to 
emphasise the importance of the contradiction between dependency and capitalist 
‘usefulness’ which people mention. Eloise in the following example seems to also 
reproduce the dichotomy mentioned above. She, however, positively refers to a 
character trait which makes an acceptance of dependency possible. In talking about 
her mother’s approval of the situation in the care home she refers to her upbringing 
and the fact that economic success and productivity were not the main determents of 
life:  
 
Eloise: the period before that (...) even though she was in a care home, my mother has 
always been (...) a satisfied type, yes. So, war and these things (...) and then you just 
didn’t have that much, and generally she also didn’t have such, huge demands, and she 
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was also always very grateful, yes. And this has actually then, in the care home, also 
worked really well. 
 
In the beginning of this chapter I discussed a quote from a focus group emphasising 
gratefulness and I argued that the ‘ideal’ elderly person is described as passive and 
accepting. With the last section I wanted to demonstrate that being dependent is not 
only seen as a passive existence but also as a rejection of particular values and 
demands of the capitalist society. Care in that sense is understood as an image of a 
counter-force to neoliberal requirements of self-reliance, independence and constant 
activity.  
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the persistence of values of independence and self-
reliance and its consequences for those involved in caring relations. Independence has 
always been a male ideal of self-definition. In particular in ‘advanced liberal 
democracies acknowledgement of the reality of dependency is denied th[r]ough the 
promotion of an ideal of individual autonomy’ (Fine and Glendinning 2005:613). Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim (2001) describe the demands to have and to design ‘a life of one’s 
own’ as fundamental to post-industrial societies. Rights and duties and the conception 
of a good life are intrinsically related to a notion of independence. Lloyd (2004:236) 
convincingly argues that for those who are more dependent on others than the 
imagined average individual this conception causes important problems in their strive 
for justice and participation:  
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‘We do not have a language that represents adequately the nature of social 
justice and rights for those who are dependent on others for support and care. 
In contemporary British social and political life, these concepts are inextricably 
linked with independence, autonomy and citizenship’. 
 
Societal structure and life circumstances define the ideal citizen/human being as an 
independent, self-reliant actor. Any divergence from that is seen to be inferior to the 
ideal. Secondly, care is constructed in a dichotomy of dependent/independent actors. 
Ideologically there is one person being active in the process, being the independent 
actor, and there is another person being dependent on the former, i.e. this is the 
dependent, passive ‘actor’. Care (in particular in its later stages) is then often seen as 
dirty, unpleasant and really intimate contact. Not being able to do these things oneself 
is scary and the very manifestation of dependency. When we talk and think about 
caring, we do refer to these categories. Therefore, in particular in the context of care it 
seems that people imagine a state of being left to others’ goodwill. Interestingly, this is 
much more seen to be happening at institutions than at home. In the home, there is 
some assumption that a self-reliant life is possible, even though people are in need of 
care. However, the chapter has also discussed that dependencies do exist and create 
real difficulties for people.  
 
Recognition of the human nature of dependencies would potentially challenge both 
the stigma attached to the need for care and the power relations in a care relationship. 
However, I argue that a focus on mutual dependencies, i.e. interdependence and its 
manifestation in the discursive themes, is again focusing on mutuality, deservingness 
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and self-relying actors. It does not necessarily involve a new understanding of human 
life and relationships. Kittay (1999) describes the concept of interdependence as a 
fiction arguing that there are some dependencies which are not socially constructed 
and through which actors cannot engage in mutual reciprocity. She rather argues for a 
theory of equality that embraces dependency (Kittay 1999:xii).  
 
I have furthermore discussed a paradox and ambivalence emerging from the discourse 
on care for elderly people, namely: people want to care and be there for each other, 
and value (in emotive terms) caring and being there for each other. People however do 
not want to be cared for and do not want to be dependent on others. This links to an 
understanding of care as a heroic action, emphasising the virtue of giving, whereas 
being cared for is passive, and linked to the horror of taking as a passive recipient. 
Sennett (2003) identifies giving as a better virtue in earning others’ respect than being 
an independent, self-sufficient actor. As dependency is seen primarily as a problem 
and as something negative the definition of dependencies becomes very important in 
the public discourse. As dependencies are furthermore often related to services 
arranged through the welfare state, dependency and deservingness are very often 
defined in medical terms (Dalley 1996). One topic example would be the arrangements 
of the Austrian Pflegegeld (see chapter 3), paid to each person in need of care 
according to his/her care needs, which are defined through a doctor’s assessment. 
Through this medical definition a process of pathologising of dependency instead of 
accepting it as normal part of human existence (Kittay 2002) can be noticed. If, 
however, dependency is seen as a natural aspect of being human, and ideas of justice 
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and equality start with this premise, a reinterpretation of care and old age could be 
reached. This would enable a different ideological version of the important values of 
independence as a form of ‘socially inclusive independence’ (Plath 2008) which does 
see dependencies and relations as social ties. Groenhout’s (2004) image of a ‘dance of 
intimacy’ in which both caring for and a recognition and promotion of independence 
and separateness of others are possible and interchangeably appearing seems a good 
approximation of this idea. However, one must not forget that for some people the 
engagement in relations is mainly based on being dependent. But not leading the 
dance does not inevitably reduce the possibility of enjoyment of the social relations 
underlying it.  
 
This chapter contributes to an understanding of what care means in society and how 
the actors in care relationships are constructed. The analysis of the construction of the 
dichotomy of independent and dependent people allowed a further answer to the 
question of what constitutes a good life. Care in society also means an 
acknowledgement of dependencies and it means the requirement to deal with 
ambivalent emotions. In the last section of this paper I have emphasised that people 
also link the necessity of independence to the demands of a market-driven society. 
This helps to answer the question of how care is positioned within the current societal 
arrangements. To some extent care (and with it the acknowledgement of 
dependencies) is constructed in opposition to neoliberal conceptions. People’s fear of 
dependency is also seen as an expression of a rejection of economic demands. In the 
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last chapter I will continue investigating this creation of an opposition of care on the 
one hand and the world of markets on the other hand.  
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8 Opposite worlds of care and 
markets?  
‘Can work be done for pay, and still be loving?’ (Nelson and England 2002:1).  
8.1 Introduction  
So far I have described the themes emerging from the discourse on care, how care is 
constructed in society, how care relationships are understood, which role 
geographies play in the context of care and how care is imagined in past, present and 
future. In this chapter I want to focus on a theme which has been running through all 
of these accounts. In all the accounts above I have pointed out that dichotomies are 
constructed. I have so far shown that care is ideologically and morally positioned in 
opposition to work, employment, politics, bureaucracy and markets. This is based on 
a strong aversion against institutionalisation, marketisation and professionalisation 
of care. In this chapter I will elaborate more on these themes emerging from the 
discourses on care. I will combine these themes by presenting what ideal care means 
and in particular by sketching the opposite, the creation of a form of care which is 
undesirable and rejected. This also requires a rethinking of carers’ identities. I have 
pointed out already (see for example chapter 4) that care is not primarily understood 
as the fulfilment of a set of divided tasks; rather it is a complex relationship between 
the person in need of care, the carer and the environment (such as the community or 
society). The carer is referred to not as someone providing certain services, but 
rather as being the carer. The focus thus is on the identity of a caring person rather 
than on the fulfilment of tasks, the delivery of services or the provision of a certain 
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form of labour. What does the combination of a rejection of a marketisation of care 
and the emphasis on the identity of carers mean for an everyday morality of people 
in the context of care?  
  
This research has presented several care discourses so far. Hochschild (2003a) 
distinguishes between four main models of care discourses: the traditional model (in 
which women stay at home and provide care), the postmodern model (based on 
individualisation and the rejection of traditional bonds and the burden of care), the 
cold modern model (focusing on practical and efficient institutionalisation of all care) 
and finally the warm modern model (in which institutions provide some care and 
men and women join in equally). While I agree that these models present useful 
parameters for discussion, in practice they appear interlinked and interrelated to 
each other. What is important, however, is that they all draw on an ideological and 
moral split between work, rationality and markets on the one hand and care, family 
and intimacy on the other hand. In this chapter I will particularly draw on Viviana 
Zelizer’s (2005) concept of ‘two hostile worlds’, referring to the ideological creation 
of a dichotomy of intimacy and financial exchange. In the chapters above there have 
been elements of this idea. The construction of care traditionally follows many 
dichotomies, such as virtues versus skills (Macdonald and Merrill 2002), private and 
public, lifeworld and system, unpaid informal care versus paid, formal work and love 
and work. Care as being based on the idea of family values was discussed in 
opposition to paid work (chapter 4), the notion of community and the nostalgia for a 
better society in which care is arranged informally, showed important signs of a 
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rejection of neoliberal market logic and pressures (chapter 6). The home was 
constructed as the quintessential realm of anti-institution sentiments, as the refuge 
from markets and politics (chapter 5), and the fear of dependency was contrasted to 
the ideal of independence (chapter 7). All levels of care discourses show some split 
between the two worlds of intimacy and marketisation.  
 
In public discourses over the last decades care has become a prominent issue. 
Politically and socially carers have been praised, and the foundations of care have 
been reproduced. Referring to the discrepancy between moral appraisal and 
economic, social and cultural support, Hochschild (2003a:2) argues that 
‘*i+deologically, “care” went to heaven. Practically, it’s gone to hell’. Ungerson (1999) 
points out that the academic discussion around care has presented it in opposition to 
work and argues for a breakdown of the boundaries of care and work. She thinks 
that ‘marketisation, privatisation and consumerism have been locked into a 
symbiotic relationship’ (Ungerson 1999:585) and have somehow created an 
dichotomy between paid and unpaid care(work). Voluntary commitment and 
informal care are praised and valued highly, not only for the importance of the work 
output for individuals and society but also for their characteristics as morally 
significant work. James Crabtree (2009) and the magazine Prospect in this context 
even argued for a compulsory citizens service for young people which should, beside 
other aspects, strengthen people’s moral attitude. The idea of a ‘compulsory 
voluntary service’ seems paradoxical due to the moral construction of care (and 
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other ‘voluntary’ dedications) but it represents a strong desire of labelling 
commitment and care as ideals for society.  
 
Zadoroznyi (2009) describes the importance of established cultural codes and 
typifications which function as recipes for how to think and behave in relation to 
care. Similarly Glucksmann and Lyon (2006) emphasise that there are different levels 
of appropriateness between the state, the market and the family that are 
constructed when it comes to the provision of care. In this chapter I will analyse the 
process and the consequences of the construction of these moral assumptions in 
order to answer the question whether a commodification of care is possible and/or 
desirable. This will specifically allow me to answer the questions of how an ideal life 
is sketched within (or in contrast to) the current societal arrangements. I will thus 
first (8.2) present several themes of discursively constructed aversions in the context 
of care: aversion against institutionalisation, aversion against professionalisation, 
aversion against instrumentality, and aversion against bureaucracy and politics. This 
will set the scene to understand the moral condemnation of a commodification and 
professionalisation of care and the deep routed negative sentiments. Section 8.3 
follows to combine these themes to present the creation of a dichotomy of ‘two 
hostile worlds’ (Zelizer 2005) of care and economics. The section will present two 
main realisations of this dichotomy, the public – private split and the separation 
between work and care. With this focus the moral meaning of care in opposition to 
work will be established and the situation carers (paid and unpaid) face will be 
described. This is followed (section 8.4) by a discussion of the consequences for 
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those involved as carers. The question asked is to what extent the split between 
work and care creates a carer identity. How are the demands on a carer identity 
constructed? To what extent can care be split into separate tasks? And what 
characterises a ‘carer identity’? Which role do professional carers play and which 
moral assumptions and difficulties do they face? Finally, I will conclude the section 
with a return to the main questions:  Does a discursive construction of care in 
opposition to markets make professionalisation and/or commodification of care 
impossible and/or desirable or is a combination of intimacy and markets morally 
thinkable? What possibilities are there for social and political intervention in order to 
improve the situation for those being in need of care and for those wanting or having 
to care? 
8.2 The ideal of informal care 
The nature of care and its relation to intimacy, empathy, love and affect have been 
discussed already. However, these values are specifically emphasised in informal 
settings. How is care interpreted and constructed if it is delivered in professional, 
formal contexts? Does a commodification of care change the nature of what care 
means to people? Kendrick and Robinson (2002) emphasise care’s (and nursing’s) 
nature as ‘acts of loving’ and Laabs (2008) points to the religiously based roots of 
nursing, arguing that morality should bind strangers together ‘as moral friends’. 
Professions involving care, such as nursing, are therefore in the centre of the 
question of a possible commodification of intimacy. Ungerson (2005:189) highlights 
that as care relationships involve physical touch it bears the potential to promote 
  
287 
specific forms of intimacy between strangers. In the context of a commodification of 
care one can thus speak of a ‘marketization of intimacy’ (Ungerson 1997:363).  
 
In this section I will analyse the discursive themes which all lead to an aversion 
against a professionalisation and commodification of care. These discursive themes 
create a dualism of care and work which will be discussed in the following section in 
more detail. However, new developments in the context of care have challenged the 
boundaries of paid and unpaid work (see Ungerson 1997). An understanding of care 
as being clearly divided between, on the one hand, informal, family based care at 
home and, on the other hand, commodified, professional care in institutions is 
misleading and does not reflect the reality of hybrids of love and instrumentality 
(Ungerson 2000) and contract and affect (Glucksmann and Lyon 2006). Examples of 
intermediary arrangements are non profit services which are not necessarily 
governed by market principles (Held 2002a) or voluntary schemes which focus on the 
‘altruistic and idealistic motives of volunteers’ (Glucksmann and Lyon 2006:6.2). 
Beside Held (2002a), Timonen and Doyle (2007) emphasise the differences between 
care in public, private and non-profit sectors. Interestingly, in the Austrian case study 
it appeared that people were strongly favouring social insurance solutions if 
necessary over for-profit, market arrangements which are seen as not caring by 
definition: 
 
Ida: it would have to be a social insurance, which then isn’t in it for some private 
profits.  
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I will pick up this idea again in section 8.3 discussing ‘fractal distinctions’ in the 
context of care discourses. At this point it is important to note, however, that 
commodification and professionalisation obviously do not refer to one particular 
arrangement; rather these concepts describe a range of possibilities and 
developments. I will discuss whether commodification and/or professionalisation of 
care are in some contexts desired and valued. Are there different forms of 
commodification which are seen as good and others as bad? However, albeit 
different nuances can be noticed the discourses are largely defined by specific ideas 
of broad categories: Commodification and professionalisation on the one hand, 
intimacy and care on the other hand. A main aim of this chapter is also to shed light 
to the nuances without losing the focus on the importance of the grand categories.  
 
Additionally, a paradoxical narrative concerns the role of the state. Many 
contributions in both newspapers and focus group sessions declared that the state 
(and society) should look after its citizens. At the same time, however, some element 
of self-reliance was advertised by the participants, usually in the sense that rich 
people should not spend all their money and later expect society to care for them. 
But if people have been working hard then society should provide for them later on. 
In relation to non profit arrangements, care is still constructed in an informal, loving 
way. How does the work change in different contexts and in diverse socio-economic 
modes and locations (Lyon and Glucksmann 2008; Glucksmann and Lyon 2006)? 
Glucksmann’s (2005) total social organisation of labour approach shows that there is 
an interconnectedness across boundaries between paid and unpaid work, market 
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and non-market, formal and informal sectors (2005:28). I will start the analysis with 
the theme of institutionalisation, taking up Zadoroznyi’s (2009) claim that care tasks 
bear different meanings in different spatial contexts such as home or institutions.  
 
Aversion against institutionalisation  
As described in chapter 5 the home is constructed as the realm of care and in 
opposition to institutionalisation. Here I will briefly discuss the consequences of the 
idea of institutionalisation for the meaning of the care work carried out in, for 
example, care homes. Guberman et al. (1992:613) describe research arguing that 
institutions are seen  
‘as being cold, rigid, normalizing places where feelings of love and self-sacrifice 
are totally absent. [People] were convinced that the care receiver could never 
get the same care there as in their family’. 
 
The fact that care in institutions is provided by paid employees contradicts care’s 
foundation on love, devotion and affect: 
 
Walter: There’s missing, as it is said, (...) idealism, of course this is only an employee 
there. You must not forget that! 
 
However, carers in institutions were also often portrayed as being restricted in their 
devotion by the very fact that they work in institutions: 
Paul: the individual willingness and effort of those, who work there. Whereas I don’t 
want to say anything bad about them 
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Ingrid: Yes, they try anyhow.  
Paul: that they are not 
Ingrid: as far as possible.  
Paul: that they don’t want to, but that they are not in a position for it. 
 
Professional carers are not seen as ‘worse’ people than those caring at home, nor are 
they criticised for delivering care in institutional settings; rather the institution is by 
definition (and additionally due to economic pressures) a realm in which intimate, 
loving care is not possible. In the next quote Bea exemplifies the frustrations arising 
from the contradiction between the awareness of what care means and entails and 
how the institution is arranged and organised:  
 
Bea: The other thing is that, when you’re talking about carers, I know it’s years ago, 
mid 90s, 1991 it was, (...) there’d be 2 carers for 22, 23 people. (...) They’d all got to 
be bathed or washed, put to bed, and given their nightly pills and  they were lonely, 
it’s simply because, however kind you felt, you had to share. (...) You know, it’d say, 
share and talk to them, of course, they were full of what they wanted to say to you. 
And you could only stop and listen for a few minutes to that person. 
 
In chapter 5 I have argued that the own ‘home’ is constructed in opposition to the 
outside world. I have stated that the traditional, bourgeois, middle-class ideal of 
home must also be seen as an antipode to the capitalist world of work, employment 
and markets. The home as a manifestation of care can then be seen as the moral 
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context in which a life in opposition to market forces can be lived. It is in care and in 
particular care in the private home where solidarity, selflessness, family and 
community are seen to manifest themselves. This points to the contradiction 
described above since the own home is the quintessential realm of love, intimacy 
and care and the institution must necessarily fall short of that ideology. As the 
institution is seen as quintessentially uncaring space people working and living in it 
are confronted with a discourse defining their own situation in these terms. This 
aversion against institutionalisation has obviously also consequences for paid carers 
in people’s own homes. Martin-Matthews (2007) refers to an inherent contradiction 
in that people need to make sense of the ‘stranger’ in private places, the bridging of 
the boundaries between the workplace of the carer and the home of the care 
receiver (2007:233). 
 
Aversion against professionalisation  
Institutionalisation and professional care arrangements in people’s own houses are 
both seen as representing a market-driven alternative to informal care. 
Professionalisation is thus not discussed in relation to quality of care but to a large 
extent as the opposite of informal care. In the following extract the question arose 
whether carers are seen as heroes and whether they should be paid for it. Betty’s 
argument that payment decreases the value of care raises important questions for 
those professionally involved in care work:  
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Betty: Most carers are happy to do the job and not getting 
Nathan: Yeah. Most, most carers don’t think of themselves of being heroes. (...) 
Betty: You can’t put a price on it 
Nathan: No.  
Betty: If you, if you’re caring and you want to care for someone, putting a price on it 
begins the devaluing.  
 
The question of caring as a gift has been discussed above (e.g. chapter 4). Payment is 
here seen as changing the care relationship and care itself. Real care is not 
something that can be provided in exchange for money. The following extract from a 
different group takes up the theme of professional carers and refers to a 
contradiction between payment, professionalisation and dedication, here referred to 
as vocation. Interestingly, Pamela emphasises that vocation is not everything but 
that professional training is equally important. Her reference to Africa, though, 
already suggests that carers are seen as being a particular type of person:  
 
Larry: how much of it is vocational, as opposed to, or, you gotta give, you gotta have 
a living wage (...). But, as was nursing in years gone by (...) it was, to a certain extent 
it was a vocational profession.  
Pamela: Yes 
Larry: Someone wanted to go and look after. Humanly help people that were ill.  
Pamela: And the best carers do have a vocation but it’s the (…) you can see it very 
clearly in the carers in my mum’s home, that the best carers are the people who have 
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come from Africa, basically, who are trained nurses in their own country (...) who 
have (…) much higher levels of training. 
 
There is an inherent tension between the categories of training associated with 
quality of care and vocation, or having a caring identity. This tension lies at the roots 
of professional care and its differentiation from informal family based forms of care. 
The difficulty of combining the two categories of care is also discussed in the 
following quote from Mary again: 
 
Mary: I think in, at least in Austria, it’s pretty much split, that it is either very much 
outsourced to the family, also in rural areas for example, or, in the city for example, 
that it works very much via institutional care. And I think, if there are any 
compromises, then only bad ones. 
 
So the question is arising whether different forms of care work can be commodified 
and other forms cannot. To what extent is professionalisation a hindrance to loving 
care, and, on the other hand, loving care a contradiction to commodified care? Are 
both ideal categories mutually exclusive? Lewis (2007) doubts whether all care can 
be commodified arguing that care is not only a task but an emotion and that unpaid 
care by friends and relatives can never be fully substituted by commodified versions 
of care. Lynch (2007) in her distinction between three forms of care labour highlights 
that due to the historical arrangement of care, love labour, which describes the most 
intimate form of care, is not commodifiable as it is ‘emotionally agaped work’ with 
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the principle goal of the well-being of the other.37 Love labour is distinct from other 
forms of care work, based on strong mutuality and refers to ‘the world of primary, 
intimate relations where there is strong attachment, interdependence, depth of 
engagement and intensity’ (Lynch 2007:555). In that sense, Lynch argues, certain 
tasks are commodifiable but love labour is not: 
‘The emotional work involved in loving another person is not readily transferred 
to a paid other by arrangement; neither can it be exchanged. To attempt to pay 
someone to do a love labour task (…) is to undermine the premise of care and 
mutuality that is at the heart of intimacy and friendship’ (Lynch 2007:565).  
 
Lynch furthermore argues that  
‘What makes commodification of care work problematic is the attempt to 
commodify the non-commodifiable dimensions of it. Mutuality, commitment 
and feelings for others (...) cannot be provided for hire as they are voluntary in 
nature. The love that produces a sense of support, solidarity and well being in 
others is generally based on intentions and feelings for others that cannot be 
commodified as it is not possible to secure the quality of a relationship on a paid 
basis’ (2007:565-6).  
 
Lynch very strongly distinguishes between love and the rational aspects of work. 
Important to her account is, however, that people need to be able to make a choice 
to commit oneself for the sake of the relationship and not for payment. Mary in the 
next quote challenges the dichotomy between professional work and emotional 
                                                 
37
 Beside ‘love labour’ the other forms of care Lynch (2007) describes in her work are ‘general care 
labour’ and ‘solidarity work’.  
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involvement (I have discussed parts of this conversation in another context above). 
In her argument she emphasises that emotional involvement is also always part of 
the professional job. In the way she discusses her mother’s experience, however, 
there is still a strong reference to the differences between loving family care, and 
professional care work:  
 
Mary: So firstly, I hope and I think that there’s a difference of quality, because at the 
end of the day there’s a lot of medical professional knowledge behind it. (...) And 
secondly, I think, it is not true (...) that you have some distance from it, because I see 
it with my mother. She’s working in care and, maybe she should be able to do it, but 
often it is very difficult to switch off, and also to really keep the distance. And she, so I 
experience that with her, she’s taking a lot of it into her daily life, that’s a big topic in 
conversations. (...) So it moves her massively, and it also gets to her. So, it is not true 
that you can simply switch off. And I do think that, that she’s doing professional work, 
and high-quality work.  
 
Two aspects are really important in this account. Firstly, quality of care becomes an 
issue and professional carers are linked to providing better quality due to education. 
This education, however, is identified as medical professional knowledge, and not 
necessarily ability to care. Secondly, in order to identify her mother as a ‘carer’ Mary 
emphasises the fact that she is also emotionally involved in the process of caring. 
Being touched by it is constructed as a clear sign of real care and in order to establish 
the professional (here her mother) as a carer these characteristics are highlighted. So 
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is there a possibility of professional care in combination with personal intimate care? 
Lynch’s (2007) account above suggests that a disentanglement of different parts of 
care is important to enable a commodification of some parts. I would argue, 
however, that care is seen as more complex and elements associated with 
professional and institutional care can also be found in informal arrangements and 
vice versa. It rather seems to be a certain attitude towards care that is rejected.  
 
Aversion against instrumentality  
Institutions are constructed as quintessential realm of instrumental care 
arrangements. Personal, emotional involvement is, by definition, not located in these 
spaces. Similarly, professional care is constructed as lacking the moral attitude 
necessary for ideal care. Care is defined as being not instrumental. Held (2002a) for 
example argues that people recognise the intrinsic and not merely instrumental 
value of the activity, as a market value is not appropriate in this context: 
‘Women may resist the view that their paid caring work is simply a commodity, 
and they may resist even more thinking of the unpaid work they do at home, 
caring for children out of affection and developing bonds of trust and family, 
merely in terms of the market value to which it would be equivalent if paid for’ 
(Held 2002a:21).  
 
In other words, the nature of caring work as affection, love and emotional labour 
(Hochschild 2003b) prevents it from being seen as commodifiable. Caring in this 
definition is not done out of instrumental reasons but out of concern for the specific 
other, an idea that strongly reflects an ethics of care (see chapter 2). 
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Commodification of care would thus mean a commodification of feelings (Hochschild 
2003a) which is seen as contradicting the idea of care itself. John’s comment points 
to the intrinsic versus the emotional rewards of caring: 
 
John: People get so much out of it, not financially but emotionally, in terms of 
feelings. Away from official recognition. 
 
The dichotomy between care and work leads to a situation in which self-sacrifice of 
carers is described as a decision against an own career. While work and employment 
are often identified with the (masculine) realm of ‘hard’ values such as reason and 
justice, care relates to conceptions of the (feminine) realm of nature and natural 
emotions (Hughes et al. 2005:265, see also Held 1990).38 Held argues that due to a 
naturalisation of a split between the two spheres, this dichotomy appears normal 
and essential. This also reinforces a split between the public realm in which the 
‘human’ is constructed and the household, in which the natural and biological is 
reproduced, a dichotomy which is traditionally identified with gender differences 
(Held 1990, 2002b). Similarly Zadoroznyi (2009) points out that a normative view 
remains that ideal care is naturally emerging out of the family in contrast to a 
decision to offer it as work. Referring to the naturalness of wanting to care within the 
family, Hochschild (2003b:74) shows that social roles within families are ‘partly a way 
of describing what feelings people think are owed and are owing’. If natural bonds 
are emphasised this can be contrasted to a professional relationship, which 
                                                 
38
 Nelson and England (2002:1) beside others argue for a move away from a dualistic view that 
women, love, altruism and the family are radically different to man, rationality, the market and work.  
  
298 
inevitably involves some financial, economic transaction. Reciprocity within the 
family should not be misunderstood as resembling an economic exchange; rather, 
the ‘natural’ relation and affection between people favours an ideal of care given as 
a ‘priceless gift’.39 And the notion of a gift involves an idea contrary to payment and 
financial exchange.  
 
It must be noted here that the bipolar construction does not only result from a 
reference to ‘professional carers, whose commitment may be questionable’, as the 
Daily Mirror describes it (06/04/07), but is generally related to an ideal of care based 
within the realm of dedication, emotion and affection. By constructing care in 
opposition to work with an emphasis on natural values of love, affection and 
dedication and in contrast to materialistic goals and motivations, care for the elderly 
is designed as a model of ideal, selfless and committed behaviour. The good 
behaviour is done out of love and selflessness and can therefore not be included in 
the logic of the market and the payment of labour. As Gita argues, care at home, by 
the family, should simply be funded, without the need for forms, assessments or 
other evaluations and calculations: 
 
Gita: and that’s why I say, that’s of course no question at all, that at home, care at 
home was the best, right. (...) And I don’t understand why care at home is not simply 
financed.  
 
                                                 
39
 I have discussed the notion of ‘nature’ more extensively in chapter 6. 
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Aversion against bureaucracy and politics  
In the focus groups but also in the newspaper discourses people express their 
frustrations with the tensions between the nature of care as a loving, dedicated 
emotion and the requirements of bureaucracy and administration. Care is seen as 
morally opposing aspects of bureaucracy and there is a notion that dealing with 
forms, evaluations and financial aspects should not be required in the context of 
care: 
 
Bea: You don’t want money worries, on top of that 
Denise: No, no 
Lisa: No, but actually, all those forms, that was a problem for her. 
 
Rather, as mentioned above, the provision of family care should be enabled; the 
state should not intervene but rather foster informal, loving care. In the following 
extract the contradiction between care and bureaucracy becomes clear. Walter 
sketches the distinction by referring to humans, not a machine, who should not be 
forced to think about money issues in the light of care for some elderly family 
member: 
 
Walter: yeah it is like that. The human is indeed a human being, and not a machine or 
something like that, isn’t it? (...) Maybe one should be able to say, yes, he needs so 
and so many hours, without thinking about the money. (...) But when I say, ok, if you 
need that, you get it. Whatever it costs. (...) The state has to pay for it. That’s it.  
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The distinction between the human being and a machine again points to the 
associations of real care with nature and against instrumentality, as discussed earlier. 
Similarly, common sense is often brought forward in contrast to bureaucratic 
arrangements and requirements: 
 
Larry: We’re lacking common sense. 
Pamela: Yes, yeah, common sense in the end has to prevail. 
 
Official (party) politics in this context is seen as inherently opposed to ‘real’ care. 
Others criticise the involvement of several agencies to control and check on carers 
and caring facilities for these institutions intervene with the real nature of care. It can 
also be clearly seen that some diverse discursive patterns emerge: on the one hand 
people want politicians and the state to act in providing support and in intervening 
when care provision falls below a certain standard; on the other hand they reject 
making care a political issue (see discussion below). Politics can thus be seen in two 
ways: firstly, people identify it with official representation, negotiations, business 
and economic decision making. Secondly, people see politics as a substitute for ‘the 
state’ or ‘the society’. In this sense people express the wish that ‘politics’ should 
enable and foster care. But the former notion of politics is rejected in the same 
context. As thus, care is constructed as non-political or apolitical, i.e. as an issue that 
should not be the topic of political argumentation, campaigning, and legal regulation. 
Aldridge (1994) in this context points out that constructing issues as apolitical often 
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implies a certain moral relevance that cannot or must not be contested. With 
reference to Brown’s contribution (see above) the Daily Mail states:  
 
‘Some issues should be above party politics. The treatment of carers is one of them. 
They are the cement which holds the nation together, selflessly giving up their lives 
for the sake of those they love. We applaud Gordon Brown for recognising their 
worth’ (Daily Mail, 21/02/07). 
 
Political competition is thus constructed as belonging to a sphere of rationalist, 
materialist decision making. This is again contrasted with an ideal of care and 
community that opposes the world of work, markets, politics and de-personalised 
relating. Using the same newspaper extract in the focus group discussions I have 
prompted people to think about the relationship between politics and caring.  
 
Denise: So, a politician shouldn’t use it as a way of getting support. They shouldn’t be 
promoting good things for people just to get the votes. 
 
This was a very common theme. There seems to be a real distinction between 
political confrontation and competition and the values of care. Below I quote from a 
discussion in more detail as it nicely highlights the ideas and themes that underlie 
the aversion against politics in the world of care. The extract shows the construction 
of two distinct spheres between the world of party politics, its relation to 
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competition, profits and rational behaviour, and the world of care, which is based on 
emotions and feelings, rather than on negotiations and conflict.  
 
Patricia: I think it should be above party politics 
John: I agree with that.  
Patricia: never going to get it, above party politics, unfortunately.  
Nathan: It becomes a weapon, (...) for the parties. But I think it’s true that *carers+ are 
the cement which holds the nation together.  
Patricia: Yeah, yeah.  
Nathan: Because they do, carers, we do save this, this country a lot of money. (...) So, 
in a financial sense, it cements it together but relationally it does too.  
I: And why should it be above party politics? What do you think? 
John: Party politics for me is, it seems that you can get into a quant mire, there can be 
a lot of (...) offmanship, gameplanship and all these thing can come into play, and 
actually, the thing about that, it can cloud the issues, and once you get, sort of, like, 
issues regarding care involved in that cloudiness, they, you not gonna get a clear 
picture, you not gonna get clear vision out of that. And some issues need to be kept 
out the party politics (...) 
Peter: Who, who benefits from the party politics? It’s not the person who needs the 
care. (...) It is the person who engages in politics. Are we going to be caring for people 
or are we gonna talk about it? (...) 
Nathan:  I think, what I would say is that everybody should be carer. (...) Not making 
caring a, a sort of political football. There should be a general sense of humanity, that 
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we look for the best, for each other. And that we work to that end. Rather than it just 
being, I mean it’s something that parties have to talk about. 
John: Yeah 
Nathan: They gonna have to come to conclusions. You can’t, you know, the spending 
of money etc., there’s gonna be disagreements.  But when it just becomes party 
politics, for the sake of a political football then that’s a different *story+.  
 
The paradox of politics I described above can be found in this extract. The 
discussants clearly reject politics as counter to care. What real care is, can be 
described by Nathan’s idea that it reflects a general sense of humanity. When Nathan 
argues that everybody should be a carer it again favours the direct, natural 
engagement of people over political, abstract decision making processes. At the end 
of the extract, however, Nathan acknowledged the need for politics, in the sense that 
they have to come to conclusions. However, the tension between care and politics 
clearly remains.  
8.3 The creation of 2 worlds 
The aspects of aversion and rejection described above create a broader dichotomy in 
which care is created. In this section I will focus on this general construction of a 
dichotomy between the intimate sphere of care and the hostile sphere of markets. I 
use Zelizer’s (2005) model of ‘two hostile worlds’ in which she argues that  
‘Intimate care sentimentalizes easily, for it calls up all the familiar images of 
altruism, community, and unstinting, non-commercial commitment. From there 
it is only a step to a notion of separate spheres of sentiment and rationality, 
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thence to the hostile worlds supposition that contact between personal and 
economic spheres corrupts both of them’ (207).  
 
The dichotomy between real care and doing a job as an employee is not only a 
difference in arrangements (formal and informal) but also in mindset, attitude and 
character:  
 
Fran: But then that varies, some carers do really care, 
Denise: Yes 
Fran: and love their job, and others, you know, are doing their job 
 
However, especially between informal and formal care arrangements the two worlds 
are split and clearly separated. Zadoroznyi’s (2009) definition of two forms of care 
reveals the most important distinctions. It thus becomes clear that underlying both 
informal, family oriented and formal, professional care are moral constructions and 
ideologies: 
‘Most notably, informal care is diffuse (that is, unspecified), based on feelings 
(which might be anything from obligation to love); it is provided by ‘identifiable 
kin and friends’ on the basis of a generally ascribed relationship with the person 
being cared for; and is oriented to a particular person with whom there is a 
relationship and affective ties. In contrast, the logic of (formal) care provided by 
professionals is based on functional specificity, achievement, universalism and 
being affectively neutral’ (Zadoroznyi 2009:271).  
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Dichotomy public – private 
The public – private dichotomy has a long analytical tradition in feminist work on 
care. I have discussed it above in chapter 5 in the context of the construction of 
home. Here it can function as one aspect of the creation of a dichotomy of two 
hostile worlds. The importance of having a private space becomes significant when 
formal care services enter this space. Formal services fit only unsatisfactorily into the 
idea of the private home since ‘they transgress a symbolically important boundary 
between the private space of the home and the ‘public’ space in which institutional 
care typically takes place’ (Zadoroznyi 2009:280). The clear separation between 
public and private spaces is furthermore related to an imagined different nature of 
care provided in different contexts. Below I will discuss the inherent differentiation 
between the private and the public space within both private and public spaces but I 
want to note here that the distinction is to a large extent a moral and ideological 
one. In reality people are often confronted with much more complex arrangements. 
 
In chapter 5 I have also already discussed the relevance of owing private property 
and its potential to exclude others. Another feature of the discourse on institutions 
was the ideological relation between institutional, public spaces and the sphere of 
money and payment. This is important as the ideological and moral dichotomy is 
reproduced and re-established. The relationship between the private spaces and 
private relations is striking, as observed by Gal (2004) who argues that private 
property is a feature of capitalism but that private intimate relations are ‘ideally 
protected from economic calculation’ (2004:261). This paradox can be explained by 
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understanding the ideological and moral creation of hostile worlds and the public 
‘communication in which social organizations are imagined in nested ways’ (Gal 
2004:275).  
 
Care – Work  
The creation of dichotomies and the two worlds of care and work are implicit in the 
construction of the meaning of care. This is already present in the classical distinction 
between caring for and caring about (Ungerson 1999), where the former is 
sometimes associated with both private and public realms and the latter is 
exclusively related to the private sphere. Tim in the following quote describes this 
dichotomy between the person who completes the practical task, such as washing 
and dressing and people who are there for him, who do not leave him alone:  
 
Tim: For this point in time I would just wish, that I wouldn’t be alone, just, (...) that I 
don’t have the feeling, ok, I now sit, whatever, in my wheel chair, stare out of the 
window for hours every day, and nobody comes ever by, or something. Who the 
person is who really cares for my health, if I, if I can’t move at all anymore, so, who 
washes me, or who dresses me, or something, I don’t really mind that much. More 
important would be, that people were there, where I know, alright, I can be sure 
about it, that they, if they have time, drop by, for an hour for a coffee and chat with 
me, even if I can’t respond anymore and nothing, (...), but that there just is somebody 
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there, this would be for me this ideal care, where you just, really don’t have the 
feeling without anybody to be dead already.40  
 
Tim clearly distinguishes between aspects of care work (or ‘caring for’) which can be 
delivered by anyone, also professional carers. The aspects of care which can be 
described as minding or being there for someone, however, he finds more important 
to be provided by people close to him. For many people, however, there is a unity of 
the caring tasks and being there for someone. Especially at home being there for 
someone cannot be split in specific tasks but requires the person of the carer as a 
whole: 
 
Adam: Yes, but at home (...) care and minding, that goes hand in hand, that’s blurred 
then. Especially if you are a family member yourself, who cares for someone older. 
(...) You cannot really separate that then.  
 
The example also points to another issue which distinguishes care from work. In both 
newspaper articles and focus group discussions people medicalise tasks of carers, 
especially if these are done by others. Mary makes a similar distinction to Tim in 
emphasising the different tasks which are required from professional carers: 
 
Mary: Is it about shopping or is it indeed about round-the-clock care, which means 
lifting and moving, and here it is indeed like that, that you need professional help. 
                                                 
40
 In chapter 7 I made a reference to the concept of ‘social death’ which Tim refers to at the end of 
this extract.  
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The following account about the experiences of working in care also shows some 
reference to something other than usual work relations. Denise describes her work 
as mainly making them feel comfortable and happy, and the reward is a relationship 
of gratitude:  
 
Denise: I cared for people in a home, in a nursing home, I was only just an ordinary, 
uh, dog’s body, *some laugh+, care assistant, you know. Drinks, getting to bed, wash 
them (...). For just 10 months, not for very long. But it sort of really opened my eyes. 
And, also I wanted to carry on, because I liked looking after them because they were 
so grateful, didn’t matter what you did, they were so *grateful+, thank you, thank you. 
So grateful, even the smallest things (...) and that was, that was the greatest reward, 
of making them feel comfortable and happy,  
 
In contrast to work, care is discursively related to particular kinds of relationships 
(see chapter 4). Ungerson (2004) demonstrates that different forms of funding have 
a different impact on the nature of care relationships. Uta in the following extract 
responds to Helma’s account about a professional carer but emphasises that 
payment and employment do create specific working relationships which are distinct 
from unpaid caring relationships: 
 
Uta: And I do think that’s a big difference (...) such a carer, who (...) first of all she 
gets paid (...) which means, she is my employee, that’s also how it’ll be seen by many. 
Not everyone will be so nice and lovely like the one in [village] is. (...) 
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Helma: That’s of course true. (...) 
Uta: And what you’re doing, that’s a voluntary social service, which is unpaid, which 
means I arrive there, chat with her and I don’t have an advantage of it, yeah. No use. 
While a carer is paid for. 
 
National policies of cash transfers which enable people to pay for care play a 
significant role in this context. These so called cash for care schemes (Ungerson 
2004; da Roit et al. 2007) in a European perspective show many differences, not least 
in terms of people’s freedom to use the money. If the money can be used to pay 
relatives or friends, however, tensions are created between the ideal of care and the 
financial (and publicly funded) remuneration of this care. Tensions between care as 
being there for somebody and care as a summary of specific services underlie the 
design of both policies and moral attitudes. How are these differences then 
constructed in the discourse? Commitment and love for people are themes that 
distinguish real care from the performance of work, as Adam puts it; some are seen 
as only doing their work, whereas others love the person in need of care: 
 
Adam: And you also need to have a certain vocation, or love for it, because, if you’re, 
whatever, rather becoming a builder, and you should care, he can’t do that of course. 
There are probably also always people in this area who do not 100 percent fit it (...) 
who just do that. You can see it in hospitals, they do their job, but they don’t do 
anything more than that, and they just do it monotonously, like on a conveyor belt.  
Barbara: So it needs a lot of idealism to do a job like that, that’s your statement, isn’t 
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it? 
Adam: Yes 
Barbara: yes, and also love for the older person in need of care  
 
The emphasis of the natural is a reminder of the discussion on the ideal care 
relationship constructed in relation to family values (chapter 4). So is real care then 
possible in institutions if the right people are present? Or is there only work to be 
performed by employees? Nathan in the following discussion emphasises in the 
context of hospitals that people (nurses) would like to care, that the institution 
however prevents them from doing so. In other words the institution is organised as 
a workplace and not as a realm of care:  
 
John: And I’m sure that  if you are in an environment where you do have these 
dedicated staff, who really, really care and (...) dedicated to what they do, then I think 
Nathan: (...) Part of the problem in our care system now is that nurses who went into 
nursing to nurse, are no longer permitted to nurse. That, they find themselves in 
situations where they are managing wards and it’s become very, very management 
structured. It’s become very much (...) time managing (...) So you end, you going to 
A&E, if you’re there for longer than four hours, the hospital gets a fine, so you’re 
pushed out to a ward somewhere, or you get, even worse, put in an ambulance and 
driven around to other hospitals just so that that hospital can actually hit its target 
and (...) not get fined. That isn’t care to me. (...) But nurses like this *points to picture+ 
are wonderful. It is a vocation, like Peter said, (...) it is a vocation but nurses are 
  
311 
pleading in this country to be able to nurse. (...) Rather than meeting targets, rather 
than just being in situations where they are so short staffed. (...) And it’s not the fault 
of the nurses. The desire of the nurses that went in to nurse  is that they do nurse. But 
they find themselves under so much pressure, because of those.  And it is finance 
driven again. (...) You cannot put a budget to care in this country. 
 
At the same time the institutional split of tasks, through which people are seen as 
separating themselves emotionally from the cared for person, is sometimes also seen 
as an advantage. In particular for the professional carer the separation of work and 
life sphere and the division of different aspects of care work are seen by some as 
positive (see also the discussions on dependency workers in chapters 4 and 7):  
 
Britta: I mean at home it starts with, now if the bed sheets are dirty, at home you 
have to wash them yourself. In the hospital I throw it in the basket.  
 
The relationships within professional care are thus complex and ambiguous. 
Performing a role that is based on a ‘contradiction between command and 
obedience on the one hand, and sensitivity to feeling on the other (Ungerson 
1999:586) challenges the imagined ideal of the identity of caring for and caring 
about. Ungerson elsewhere (2005) distinguishes between different emotional 
variations of relationships, labelling them cold, cool, warm and hot relationships 
according to the closeness to family-based idealised care relationships. Ungerson 
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argues that some commodified relationships can even represent hot relationships as 
is the case of migrant carers in people’s homes:  
‘Such relationships are unprofessionalized and unregulated in exactly the same 
way as non-commodified informal care relationships are (...). But both sides in 
these relationships are vulnerable to forms of exploitation and even abuse 
particularly since the relationships are acted out behind closed doors within the 
domestic domain. Given the core vulnerability of frail old age on the one hand, 
and illegal immigration on the other, combined with spatial proximity, very low 
wages, and twenty-four hour availability, it is not surprising that these 
relationships are full of feelings, not all of them healthy or likely to underwrite 
reasonable quality care’ (2005:202).  
 
In other words, these arrangements do not represent work in its discursive 
construction but refer to an idealised notion of relationships. In this quote Ungerson 
also points to the potential vulnerability to exploitation involved in all caring 
arrangements, particular in those that reflect traditional caring relationships. 
Macdonald and Merrill (2002:67-8) argue that altruism, empathy and emotional 
involvement are inherent to the nature of care, but that care workers, however, are 
‘denied recognition of, and compensation for, this investment of self’. They argue 
that because care is constructed as ‘nonwork’ and (female) carers as ‘nonworkers’ 
people miss out on a full partnership between them and others (Macdonald and 
Merrill 2002:75). Finally, two accounts give an indication that a simple hierarchy of 
good and bad care, related to ideas of work and emotions, needs to be challenged. 
Firstly, Theodora gives an indication of a trap into which analysts of care can easily 
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fall. She does produce the classical distinction between (informal) care and work; she 
points however to a situation in which all people involved in caring face 
disadvantages and exploitation: 
 
Theodora: Informal care is done through emotional coercion and dare you ask for 
recompense. Paid labour is like any financial contract; you do a job and expect a living 
wage.  
 
Secondly, Mary argues that both professional and family carers can really be the 
caring person, in a different way, but both can be really there for someone:  
 
Mary: I personally would just say, if the person’s doing well, if the person, has 
everything, then she’s well looked after, or cared for. And I believe that both sides can 
do that well. And, of course, in a different way. 
 
Nelsen and England (2002:5) rightly point out that the focus on the separation of 
‘caring and intimate values from the infection of markets (...) also implies a vision of 
a fallen world of an evil elite “them”, opposed by the forces of a virtuous but 
downtrodden “us”’. There is a process of ‘othering’ happening in relation to nostalgia 
of real care (see chapter 7). I will thus in section 8.4 turn to the creation of the 
identity of carers and the reproduction of the separation of the spheres of work and 
care in the construction of the carer’s identity. Before that, however, I want to 
explore further some aspects discussed in this section. I have argued that the 
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aversion against professionalisation and commodification leads to (and is at the 
same time based on) a differentiation between the two worlds of work and care. I 
have furthermore shown that this distinction is a moral and ideological one, based on 
associations, feelings and ideals. Both worlds, however, can to some extent be found 
in both professional care and informal care.  
 
Fractal distinctions 
The distinction between informal and professional care is not the end of the process 
of construction; rather, the division is reproduced within the sphere of professional 
care. Lyon and Glucksmann (2008:114) for example argue that ‘a simple dualism (...) 
cannot readily distinguish between different kinds of commodity or non-commodity 
relations’. Clearly, the distinction between real care and work does not strictly follow 
the trajectory of the split between paid and unpaid, or formal and informal work. As 
a consequence some people in professional care do work, whereas others really care. 
Claire giving an account of her own work as a care assistant, links the ideal care 
delivered in a care home to natural aptitudes of people (in this case not surprisingly 
women). She presents foreign nurses as the counterexample who are interested in 
the financial, organisational aspects and who treat the employment exclusively as 
means to earn money:  
 
Claire: What does a mother need? She doesn’t have any education. (...) And a bit of 
common sense, and what really needs to go with it is love. You can really hardly find 
that anymore in elderly care. (...) But when I see that we bring over nurses from 
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abroad (...), the first thought is how many hours can I work, can I work 12 or 14 hours 
(...)? How much do I earn? (...) And there I think, where’s the human being in all that? 
Where’s the humanity? What is now in the foreground? And for me care has indeed 
(...) drifted apart. We talk incredibly much, and train incredibly much (...) and 
document, yeah, the documentation. 
 
The two separate spheres I have discussed above are ideological and moral 
constructions. Susan Gal (2004) identifies the emergence of the doctrine of separate 
spheres in the 19th century and since then it is 
‘assumed that the social world is organized around contrasting and incompatible 
moral principles that are conventionally linked to either public or private: 
community vs. individual, rationality vs. sentiment, money vs. love, solidarity vs. 
self-interest’ (Gal 2004:261). 
 
The ideological distinction between public and private is therefore not a spatial one 
but a discursive one. The split is not only between institution and home but is an 
ideological distinction, replicated in itself, called a ‘fractal distinction’ (Gal 2004). Gal 
(2004) gives as example for its self-replication that the private space of the house is 
again split into a public (e.g. living room) and private space (e.g. bedroom). The 
discussion above about the professionalisation of care can be seen in a similar light. 
The ideological and moral split between informal family care and professional and/or 
commodified care is reproduced in the context of professional care itself. Some 
professional carers are seen as ‘real’ carers and others are not. Another example is 
care delivered by non-family carers in the home setting. Twigg (1997b) describes this 
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process as being based on spatial oppositions between public and private in the 
home-space itself, and that, in the process of tasks performed by care services the 
private space, referred to as ‘home’ is blurred and partly loses its poignant 
characteristics. This blurring of public and private space through caring does not only 
cause problems for the power situation between carer and cared for; it can also 
change the meaning and the experience of both home and care. Similarly, Phillips 
and Bernard argue in this context that ‘a blurring of the boundaries between these 
dichotomous spaces (…) has increasingly occurred, challenging in its wake our 
conceptualizations of care’ (2008:87). To summarise, fractal distinctions are based on 
ideological and moral associations and constructions about care. In that sense 
commodification and professionalisation of care on any level have to deal with the 
very moral associations.  
8.4 Identity of carers  
This chapter has so far focused on the ideological construction of two separate 
spheres of informal care on the one hand, and professionalised, commodified care 
work on the other hand. I have also pointed out that those providing care are 
confronted with this moral and ideological construction. The construction of the 
person of the carer is embedded in the two worlds-dichotomy (which spreads into 
the different spheres as discussed in the section above). In chapter 4 I have described 
the ideal caring relationships as being based on an ideology of family values. I have 
argued above that care is not understood as a fulfilment of a number of specified 
tasks and services, but that care (in its idealised version) is based on the presence of 
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‘a carer’ whose availability is sought (Degiuli 2007) referring to a particular identity, 
constructed in the discourse on care. But how is this identity of a carer shaped in 
relation to a discourse emphasising values such as empathy, love and affection? And 
how can professional carers be described and understood in this discursive context? I 
will discuss these questions in two sections. Firstly, I will analyse a continuation of 
the dichotomy presented above, in the split between doing and being, whereas the 
latter signifies the sought after identity of a natural carer and the former reflects the 
tasks performed by a care worker. Secondly, I will raise the question of who is a carer 
and how the real carer is defined.  
 
Doing vs. being  
In describing the nature of care I have argued that care is constructed in a way that 
makes it impossible or undesirable to distinguish between different tasks; rather the 
identity of the carer is one of simply being a carer. In other words, someone is caring 
if he/she is there and is involved. Ungerson (1999:598) for example describes the 
nature of the work of personal assistants (whose occupation is to some extent 
similarly constructed to those of informal carers) as ‘essentially unorganised and 
particular’. The main good given by the carer is time, in particular ‘flexibly available, 
normally for very long periods’ (Ungerson 2005:193). This element of flexibility is a 
core feature as the carer as a person is constructed as someone who is 
‘compassionate, emphatic, merciful and selfless’ (Winch 2006:14). And this 
construction enables a persuasive pressure on people to work beyond contract 
(Ungerson 2000). Ungerson (2000) points out that social care, seen ‘as a set of tasks’, 
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can easily be commodified; the nature of care, however, leads to a situation in which 
even paid workers are constructed as behaving similarly to informal carers in 
introducing feeling ‘in the provision of total care’ (2000:630). I have demonstrated 
this process in the discussion on the employment of migrant carers in Austrian 
families, who are paid for ‘becoming family members’ (see chapter 4). People want 
someone who cares, someone who is there for them. This must be distinguished 
from someone who does care work, who is performing certain tasks. In the latter 
case this can be bought, in the former case, however, this is not an optimal option, as 
the following short extract exemplifies: 
 
Caroline: That caring does not only mean, (...) I do everything (...) but that caring also 
means, I’m simply there for you, and try to keep your dignity as well. (...) And this 
relatives can often do better, I think, than trained nurses.  
 
It is important to understand that this aspect of being there for someone cannot be 
split in separate tasks. Carers in an ideal situation do care and are not following 
certain procedures. In the following account real care is described as being there, 
‘looking after the whole person’: 
 
Nathan: The other thing about care is, (...) we think in terms of care (...) for the 
elderly, as being the individual person. But someone who’s coming in, and looking 
after the individual person, doesn’t actually cut the grass, or cut the hedges. Doesn’t 
actually look after the whole person. So [relative], I would come and at certain times 
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he was looking out of the window and seeing the sun shine and seeing the hedges 
growing around the area. He would say to me: ‘Nathan, I can’t see the people 
walking by, over the hedge. Can you cut my hedge please’? Now, a carer would never 
get a pair of shears (...) and say: part of the care for you, Ben (...), is that you want to 
see your neighbours going by, you want to be able to wave, you want to be able to, 
see, hear the children going by when they go to school, so you want your hedge at a 
certain level. (...) 
Peter: Do carers do something outside of his remit, then (...) 
Nathan: And then, cutting the hedge was never in the carer’s remit. She was asked, 
well, she should have come in and helped him wash, get him tidy, get him clean, get 
him dressed, prepare his breakfast, tidy up where he lived.  
 
As indicated in chapter 6 real care is often constructed as something of the past, in 
which people would not have restricted their caring to certain tasks but they had 
gone the extra mile (Nathan in focus group) in their spare time. The question of this 
section now is whether this represents a particular identity that is necessary in order 
to be a caring person, rather than doing care work. Is there a general perception of 
carers as specific types of individuals (Lloyd 2006)? A perspective drawing on virtue 
ethics in this context would stress the importance of certain characteristics of 
someone in order to be a caring person (Groenhout 1998). The following discussion 
shows how these virtues are also constructed in the context of formally employed 
carers:  
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Morgan: that’s what’s lacking a lot, I mean, I have to say, (...), I’ve worked in various 
hospices, there is just such a culture in there, that nothing was too much trouble. The 
people who work in there, it’s supposed to be a burn-out period but they all went 
beyond that, because they loved it, and they found it rewarding and so they would do 
whatever was asked of them. If you look at nurses, you walk into QMC or City 
Hospital, you not gonna find nurses like that 
Larry: a different kind of person 
Morgan: Absolutely. (...) they’re totally committed to what they were doing, and 
understood what was required of them and were able to give more than was asked, I 
think.  
Pamela: yes, yes 
Will: Oh yes, yes, and I, I have just seen a, (...) hospice, which is not, it’s a day care 
hospice (...). But I mean (...) look at the volunteers, that, it wouldn’t exist, we don’t 
get any money (...) from the government (...) And the volunteers, I mean, are 
absolutely wonderful people, it just [effuses] out of them (...) the care that they have 
Morgan: It’s a privilege to be around them. 
 
Commitment and dedication as values are emphasised (the volunteer personifies 
these virtues) but there is also a strong notion of the character of the caring people, 
both paid and unpaid; they are a different kind of person. Larry continues by focusing 
on the life cycle of caring, arguing that caring is a trait of character which is created 
through the care people receive in their childhood: 
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Larry: But where do you learn that? And I would put it to you, you learn it, when 
you’re small.  
Will: I agree. 
Larry: You cannot evoke it, and bring it onto a person who is, a teenager already and, 
uh, later on in life (...) 
Pamela: And you’re entirely right, but I would add to that, that I think that people 
who give the most are the people who have been given the most. 
 
Being the caring person, however, is often related to invisibility, and the ‘housewife 
syndrome’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001) in the sense that the identity of being a 
caring person is (re)produced time and again (see also Ungerson 1987). Being a 
caring person is then a trait of character and identity, based on ‘empathy, sociality, 
and respect for the different responsibilities involved in different relationships’ 
(Groenhout 1998:175), rather than a requirement of the fulfilment of certain roles. 
The morality of being a carer is necessary to establish a recognised social identity 
(Harris 2002) and carers self-regulate themselves according to the very expected 
identity (Winch 2006).  
 
Who is a carer?   
Caring thus is regarded as being related to the presence and availability of a caring 
person. It is important to understand that this holistic ideal of care also includes the 
imagination of certain people who represent the characteristics of a carer. In many 
discursive accounts the label ‘carer’ is rejected by people, in particular if the care is 
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based on family relations (Lloyd 2006; Henderson and Forbat 2002). The idea of a 
‘carer’ is sometimes linked exclusively to professionals. This fact, as Ungerson (1987) 
has pointed out already, shows that close relatives often do not call themselves 
carers as this is associated with a professional occupation (see also chapter 4). 
Henderson and Forbat (2002:683) describe that the terms care and carer ‘prevent 
the construction of assistance being expressed as a normal component of the 
relationship’ (see also chapter 7). ‘The terms suggest ‘otherness’, which places 
meaning outside of the interpersonal arena’ (2002:683), in particular because the 
notion of a carer is closely related to the world of political meaning and 
administrative, bureaucratic processes, which, as shown above, are seen as opposing 
the ideal of real care. This rejection of the term carer is interesting as it points to a 
feeling that the term has been appropriated by professionals and political actors. 
There is a contradiction between the imagined ideal nature of care and the terms 
and labels used in an administrative context. When Zadoroznyi (2009:280) rightly 
claims that ‘we do not have a ‘recipe’ for a paid ‘caring stranger’’, it must be added, 
that because of the political and public discourse caring has to some extent been 
taken out of the realm of loving, caring relationships. Real care is not associated with 
the idea of a carer in the political context. There is a threat being expressed that care 
becomes another marketised commodity and is extracted from its basis on love, 
devotion and emotions. Will expresses the fear that because of the state of society 
people lose the caring identity and in fact the ability to be caring: 
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Will: [it is] natural (...) to care for our elderly. But in between, we get greedy and 
selfish. And other elements of man comes into play, and we become, we lose, (...). 
And so, this caring element, doesn’t seem to be quite the same as it used to be, so 
maybe adults are not learning the skills that they should be, in, how to care for 
children and, stopping off work, for a few years, I’m not saying whether it’s the 
woman or the man, it could be either (...). And that is a worry that the next 
generation may not have the care skills, (...) they may just not have a clue, how to 
care (...) for their parents. 
 
This description points to the nostalgia discussed above (chapter 6) but here I want 
to emphasise the construction of a caring identity which seems to get lost. In the 
Austrian discourse on migrant carers there also is a strong element of describing the 
caring identity of the Eastern European women, as exemplified in the following 
extract: 
 
Vanessa: Is this somehow a particular kind, these Eastern women?  
Barbara: yes, they are a still different (...) 
Vanessa: Yes, indeed. 
Barbara: they still have (...) That‘s it (...), I find, that these women are still more like 
women. So, they still have a more womenly appearance. (...) Not yet like here, into 
this business world and these emancipated  
Vanessa: yes, that really could be 
  
324 
Barbara: drives, yes, and this businesslike coldness (…) 
Adam: yes, they do have a certain idealism 
 
I specifically want to point out the references to the social and economic 
developments in society. The women are described as having still a caring identity 
and character whereas we have lost this idealism to care. There are obviously gender 
and ethnic stereotypes reproduced in this account. The migrant carer is constructed 
as the personification of the longing for what care ideally should be. The 
employment of migrant carers enables the building up of a relationship which closely 
resembles the idealised care arrangement and represents what is lost in Austrian 
society. The argumentation that Eastern European women are still different and that 
they are still more like women is a result of this nostalgia of an idealised notion of 
care which is thought of as an issue of the past generations (see also chapter 6).  
 
What can clearly be seen in the following extract are the gendered aspects of the 
(informal) carer identity which shows many parallels between the constructed 
identity and the traditional, stereotypical female identity. A distinction is made 
between the care business and the touchy, feely hands on care, the latter 
representing an aspect associated with women: 
 
Larry: it’s the women who do the caring. I’ve seen 
Pamela: yes, it is.  
Larry: it’s not, it’s not a men thing. Yes there are certain men in the care business as 
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such, but when it comes to the touchy, feely hands on (...) And they don’t care 
whether you’re looking after men or women, it’s the female of the species, *laughing+ 
who in reality is the hands on person (...) who will go in and clean up an incontinent 
person or something, 
Pamela: that’s right.(...) 
Larry: and this is a more natural (...) thing, is it not? 
Morgan: Yeah. When I was up in [city], they have a voluntary sector organisation up 
there and that provided voluntary services for people who were dying in their home. 
And some of those were men, and they were telling me stories, particularly when it 
was a chap on his own (...) who was dying, they’ve gone into the homes, sat there, 
hold his hand, until he died, and he’d gone to the funeral, befriended the family and 
all of this. And I thought they were absolutely amazing, (...) and there were quite a 
few of them, so it’s nothing stopping them.  
 
The informal carer can be described as ‘feminised’ even though the difference in 
numbers between men and women doing the care work might not be vastly different 
in this day and age (Ungerson 2000). Hence, the term ‘feminised’ refers to those 
being involved in care regardless of their gender. The construction of a moral ideal 
around the notion of love and in contrast to work must be understood as highly 
feminised, in a sense that it reproduces discursive associations with femininity 
(Gilligan 1982, 1993). Gilligan and other authors of the ethics of care approach have 
shown that society’s notion of morality and ethical values is traditionally based upon 
a gendered differentiation which also led to differences in the values attached to 
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certain modes of morality (see Held 1990; Bubeck 1995). Bubeck (1995) also links the 
constructed opposition of care and work to a vulnerability to exploitation, in 
particular for women. Williams (1989:7) rightly holds that the ‘state’s assumptions of 
female dependency and responsibility for care blinkered it to the fact that the 
welfare state was built upon the unpaid and the low paid care of women’ (see also 
Sainsbury 1996). Fraser who states that ‘affective care is actually women’s labor, 
ideologically mystified and rendered invisible’ (2003b:220) addresses this problem of 
the marginalisation of care and its reduction to self-sacrifice and moral responsibility. 
‘As a result’, she writes, ‘not just women but all low-status groups risk feminization 
and thus ‘depreciation’’ (Fraser 2003a:20). The feminised carer who does the work 
(which is often not regarded as work) is constructed outside a (masculine) citizenship 
which is characterised by income, employment, reasonable decision-making and 
economic reciprocity. Being confronted with this construction of roles and identities, 
those involved in care thus face a vulnerability to exploitation and domination (see 
Kittay 1999) just because he or she is the counterexample against a selfish, 
rationalistic and materialistic society. Carers are vulnerable because they are 
constructed as morally superior in a moral order that favours this moral 
responsibility but defines it as a priceless, emotional act rather than work. This 
vulnerability is also related to the tensions of the carer identity in the sense that an 
official carer identity is rejected but also needed in order to establish a full claim to 
citizenship:  
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John: And the most grinding aspect is that there is a hidden society. Those people 
who are looking, who are carers but actually are not on record as being carers and 
they’re just sort of hidden in the background.  
 
That means that people face a paradox situation in emphasising the loving family 
relationship and at the same time feeling that there could be a political ‘abuse of 
love’ in that caring arrangements are shifted off to those with a carer identity:  
 
Marion: It can go either way – the carer may be sufficiently fond of the recipient for 
their relationship to remain warm and loving, something which can’t really be 
achieved when the carer is an employed stranger. On the other hand, perhaps a 
balance between the two is the best we can hope for.  
8.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown the nature of the construction of care as intimacy, as a 
feeling, as love and as an ideal of ‘being there for each other’. The aversions against 
institutionalisation, professionalistion, instrumentality and politics lead to a 
construction of a dichotomy of care and work through which care is positioned in 
opposition to the world of markets, paid work and economic individualism. In 
relation to the ‘pricelessness’ of care, the carer is constructed as offering a gift to the 
elderly but also to society. The following quote demonstrates how the idea of heroes 
who give up their lives for others is used politically in the public arena: 
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‘Chancellor Gordon Brown unveiled the extra cash as he praised the unsung heroes of 
British society who dedicate their lives to looking after loved ones without being paid 
a penny (…) hidden heroes who keep families together’ (Daily Mail, 21/02/07). 
 
Praising unpaid carers as morally superior and presenting those who care as heroes 
and role models in an otherwise selfish, materialist and cold society leaves many 
people without a choice. Caring is constructed as being outside a normal citizenship 
and carers are affected in any choice they make simply because the discourse around 
care presents it as morally superior. However, this moral uplifting goes hand in hand 
with economic and social pressures faced by those who do care informally as there is 
less time and space available to care for each other (Hochschild 2003a), also 
remarked by Eloise:  
 
Eloise: So, you know really a lot of admiration, and personally, I also always find it 
really admirable, if someone is taking that on, at home, yeah. But, on the other hand, 
there’s no money for it. Of admiration (...) you can’t live of.  
 
This obviously links back to the discussion of Zelizer’s (2005) notion of the two 
‘hostile worlds’. A combination of economic transactions and the realm of love, 
intimacy and attachment proves difficult in this moral consensus. As choice is an 
aspect of rational decision making and therefore often associated with the 
(masculine) sphere of work, employment and politics, it is seen as contradicting ideas 
of closeness, dedication and real care. With Zelizer (2005) I claim that the 
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construction of the two hostile worlds needs to be challenged, reconciled and 
overcome. Furthermore, the ideological and discursive distinction between the idea 
of a morally good person and the economic, political sphere of transactions needs to 
be questioned. This would help to enable an understanding of the particularities of 
care and the difficulties for those who do this work. Zelizer (2005) furthermore 
argues that the hostile worlds of sentiment and rationality have serious practical 
implications and divert from real solutions. Analysts of care (Lloyd 2006) have 
pointed to the problem of a systematic distinction between paid and unpaid carers in 
society, with the political and economic system needing ‘carers to be heroic and self-
sacrificing’ (Lloyd 2006:952). Harris (2002) identifies a remoralisation of discourses 
under New Labour in the UK which leads to a reproduction of the split between 
economic exchange and emotional intimacy. A rethinking of the nature of relational 
work (Zelizer 2005) seems to be required which includes an assessment of markets, 
their limits, promises and consequences (Karner 2008:177).   
 
I have also pointed to several arrangements that try to combine financial 
transactions with intimate care. It can be argued that due to economic and social 
developments a combination of these spheres seems desirable. In fact, markets and 
state arrangements do play an important role in many societies’ organisation of care 
(Ungerson 2005). The logic of the market has challenged the moral understanding of 
care (Glucksmann and Lyon 2006) and new forms and mixes ‘which transcend the 
public/private, market/non-market and paid/unpaid distinctions, as well as the 
love/money/duty nexus’ (Glucksmann and Lyon 2006:7.1) have emerged. Intimate 
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care by professional strangers (Ungerson 1999; Karner 1998; Zadoroznyi 2009) is 
happening in people’s own houses, and the employment of migrant carers has 
shown how care workers can be ‘adopted as fictive kin’ (Karner 1998). Barker (2002) 
furthermore identifies ‘unpaid, nonprofessional nonkin caregivers’ (Barker 2002) as 
bridging separate spheres which are underpinned by the moral construction. Zelizer 
(2005) also argues that we are constantly mixing relational intimacy with economic 
transitions but that the ideology of two separate spheres still remains. This causes 
many difficulties for those employed in what Hochschild (2003b:204) calls 
‘marketized private life’: 
‘Each realm has its own kind of feeling rules. If those in the realm of work follow 
the feeling rules of a company, and those at home rely on the feeling rules of 
kin, those in marketized domestic life draw on complex mixes of both work and 
family cultures’ (2003b:204).  
 
In order to avoid exploitation and misrecognition of both paid and unpaid carers new 
concepts of making sense of the worlds of intimacy and economic relations need to 
be created. In the previous chapter (chapter 7) I have already argued that 
asymmetrical relationships need not be harmfully hierarchical (Nelson and England 
2002) but are normal aspects of human existence. At the same time professionalism 
and employment do not necessarily mean a non-attachment, or an anti-emotional 
approach just as ‘intimate settings do not stand out from others by the absence of 
economic activity’ (Zelizer 2005:291). With reference to Fraser (2003a) Macdonald 
and Merrill (2002) convincingly argue that (professional) carers need both 
recognition as altruistic carers and redistribution in the form of better economic 
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remuneration as skilled workers. The question thus is not whether some 
commodification is better than other, or whether commodification and 
professionalisation is better in some parts than in others. What is needed is a 
reconsideration of the fractal distinctions present in the discourses on care. If 
economic exchange and intimate, loving involvement are not understood as 
contradictions anymore, political interventions can create new arrangements for 
those caring (in a professional or informal capacity) and those being cared for (at 
home or in institutional settings) which live up to people’s desire for someone 
providing loving, intimate ‘being there for each other’, but which at the same time do 
not create vulnerability to exploitation for all involved in caring relationships. I have 
also pointed out in this chapter that politics has to manoeuvre in some contradictory 
discursive realm. On the one hand political decisions are desired to enable real care; 
on the other hand, however, politics represents a world of markets and rational 
decision making, which is rejected. I have argued that politics needs to be 
understood in a positive context as a substitute for state or society, as a concept 
which encompasses all levels of society. Another paradox is the tension between 
politics and markets which are, on the one hand, seen to be representing the same 
sphere and, on the other hand, politics is sought for as an escape from the market. 
These tensions and ambivalences need to be taken seriously as they underlie the 
ideological and moral construction of care.  
 
The recognition of the ideological nature of the split between care and the economic 
sphere is essential in order to create a more just, democratic and compassionate 
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system of caring for each other (Zelizer 2005:303). This, however, does also mean an 
earnest and genuine appreciation of the motivations for the discursive construction. 
People’s associations with and imaginations of ideal care need to be taken seriously 
in order to design a successful commodification of care. An ethics of care based on 
‘an understanding of its intertwined values, such as those of sensitivity, empathy, 
responsiveness, and taking responsibility’ could help to ‘adequately judge where the 
boundaries of the market should be’ (Held 2002a:31). Caring and concern for each 
other are values vital for the functioning of a society and should be appreciated (Held 
2002a). A process of commodification of care needs to be aware of the significance 
and substance these values possess.  
  
333 
9 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have analysed the discursive construction of the moral context of care 
for elderly people. By analysing the discourses on care I could identify people’s 
associations and assumptions about what care is. This approach allowed an 
understanding of how moral attitudes, moral concepts and the moral grammar are 
reproduced in the context of care. I could show that people use this moral grammar 
to make sense of an important social practice, care for elderly people. At the same 
time, people participate in reproducing and reshaping the discourses which create 
and form people’s moral attitudes, dispositions and identities. I have described the 
moral grammar which influences individual decision making processes and which 
impacts on the general understanding of caring and being cared for. What this study 
has provided, is to fill a gap that appears in much of the care related literature, 
namely a focus on the relationship and interrelation between social practices 
(caring), social policy arrangements and ethical and moral constructions of society. 
The main aim has been to understand how care is defined within a neoliberal 
construction of modern society. Throughout the thesis I have demonstrated that care 
does not fit into an economisation of society, nor does it fit neatly into the 
individualisation thesis. Rather, care reflects an ambivalent desire of people which 
can be described as being there for each other. Care is often constructed in 
opposition to the dominant work ethic and the demands of the market driven 
society. This construction has enormously important consequences for all those 
involved in caring relationships (as carers and as those being cared for). Those 
involved in care cannot be characterised by the tasks which need to be done; rather 
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people’s identity as being the carer and as someone in need of care are defined. Due 
to the construction of care as a moral practice, based on love, intimacy and being 
there for each other, people involved in those relationships are vulnerable to 
exploitation and face a marginalised position in society.  
 
I have presented the discursive image which is created through dominant narratives, 
experiences and contributions. The themes of the chapters emerged from an analysis 
of both newspaper discourses and focus groups and they were representative of the 
most important themes in both countries, Austria and the UK. In the chapters 4-6 I 
have described the who, where and how of care. Who are those involved in the 
process of caring and how are these actors and their relationships constructed? 
Where does care take place and how are different spaces and places imagined? And 
how is care understood as a practice? 
 
In chapter 4 I have discussed the construction of care relationships and their 
significance for the understanding of care. I have argued that two opposing cultural 
discourses have emerged: Firstly, families are seen to be the ideal care framework 
and secondly, care within the family is due to economic and social developments not 
possible anymore. I have furthermore argued that the construction of family care is a 
representation of an imagined ideal which can also be embodied by non-family 
members. In that sense, there is no straightforward assumption that family members 
are exclusively responsible for the provision of care for their elderly relatives. The 
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chapter has demonstrated the importance of aspects of closeness and relating within 
care. At the same time ‘natural’ traits, attitudes and opinions do play an important 
role in people’s understandings of ‘the proper thing to do’. ‘Family’ in the context of 
care is not (only) about who but about how care is thought of. For ideal family care 
the own home is of important significance as the nexus of intimate relationships. In 
Chapter 5 I have discussed the geographies of care with a focus on the utopia of the 
home and its opposite, the institutional setting. I have argued that the dichotomy 
between loving, affectionate caring, and professionalised, institutionalised work is 
reproduced in the construction of the physical place. I have shown that people 
continuously express a preference to be cared for at home and that institutional care 
arrangements are the quintessential places which lack intimacy and thus care. Similar 
to the notion of family, home subsumes certain values, virtues and aspects of social 
life which are to some extent in opposition to the dominant, hegemonic market 
ideology. In that sense home represents an image which is both nostalgic (as it might 
represent traditional family ideals) and progressive (in opposition to a neoliberal 
world). People’s desires of home both as a symbol and as a physical space go much 
beyond an uncritical favouring of traditional family structures and ways of living. The 
nostalgia does also present an emancipatory rejection of the economic sphere. 
Aspects of nostalgia have been further explored in chapter 6 where I described the 
construction of community as an ideological extension of family and the 
neighbourhood based on a nostalgic imagination of ideal caring situations. Combined 
with the safe space of the home and the framework of the family, community is 
constructed as a counterforce to what is perceived as hostile, individualising and 
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pressurising economic, political and social developments. Community, I argued, 
represents ideals, emotions and desires about care in broader society. Similar to the 
traditional family, community is felt to be under threat by economic developments 
and it is located as having taken place at other times or in other places.  
 
One discursive theme appearing in the discussion, particularly in chapters 4 and 5, 
has been the discussion of migrant carers working in Austrian households and I have 
used the significant discourses around it to illustrate various aspects, such as the 
construction of relationships or the concept of home. Within the discourse migrant 
carers are constructed as the ideal carers in the sense that their identity is seen as 
similar to traditional family carers. Socio-economic pressures and forces are said to 
require arrangements that partly challenge a society’s moral framework. The 
discursive arrangements in relation to migrant carers, however, are used to enable a 
re-configuration of care by constructing intimate care as being bound to the own 
home and being performed by kin or fictive kin based on minding and supporting 
rather than care labour. 
 
In that sense the discourse on migrant carers demonstrates how the aspects of the 
construction of a moral framework are connected. This discourse reproduces the 
notions of what ideal care is and it reproduces ideals and images of the notion of 
family relations. The employment of migrant carers in Austria needs to be 
understood as a paradoxical form of paid informal care. On the one hand the care 
arrangements are based on formal contractual relations; on the other hand, 
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however, the discourse on this type of care paints a different picture. Migrant carers 
are constructed in explicit opposition to professional care workers and the care they 
provide is seen in contrast to institutional, professionalised arrangements. Reflecting 
the discussion in chapter 8 the person of the migrant worker is sought and bought, as 
Anderson (2000), writing about migrant domestic workers, argues, their identity and 
their personhood is purchased and commodified. The migrant carer’s identity is 
shaped by the emotional values and virtues similar to those associated with family 
members and the migrant carer is thus an example of a de-commodification of care, 
an absence of and an aversion against professionalisation and institutionalisation of 
care. For family members the employment of migrant carers enables their relatives 
to stay in their own home, which means a (symbolic) fulfilment of family care duties 
and desires. The construction of the care provided by these workers follows the 
themes of closeness, empathy, intimacy and minding which resemble traditional 
gender stereotypes. It is also an expression of a desire of real care, a theme I 
discussed particularly in chapter 6 in relation to a nostalgic imagination of care. As 
expected, it is mostly women doing caring work, but their status as women is 
furthermore constructed with particular connotations. Similarly to the way nostalgia 
for ‘ideal’ care is reproduced in the construction of migrant care, the relationship 
between women and care is reproduced as well. If ‘ideal’ care is imagined as a state 
of loving, devotional minding, it is important to be conscious of the potential 
reductions to gender stereotypes in this context. Migrant women in particular are 
constructed as ‘the other’, and they are representing the ideal of a caring identity. In 
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that sense, real caring, provided by migrant women in people’s houses, is praised as 
representing the general ideal of being a morally good person.  
 
Throughout this thesis I have discussed issues which specifically have consequences 
for women. In the introduction I stated that those involved in the provision of care 
are facing feminisation due to the moral and ideological construction of care. The 
ethics of care approach helped to identify that many of the associations with the 
ideal carer identity reflect the stereotypical feminised identity. A distinction between 
the caring, feminised subject and the career-driven masculine subject is established. 
Interestingly, men and women can fulfil both roles in the discourses, for example 
when Austrian women are described as being business-driven, in comparison to 
Slovakian women who still care. The gender connotations remain, however, as the 
dependency relations are seen to create clear boundaries between male and female 
characteristics. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2001:160) talk about the ‘housewife 
syndrome’ or ‘silent help’, describing people who are caring under the control of 
others but invisible to most others.  
 
The dichotomy of care and the boundaries between those caring and those not caring 
are also present in the discussion of dependency relations itself. In chapter 7 I have 
shown that old age is frequently associated with dependency, passivity and suffering. I 
argued that people express anxieties of dependency and vulnerability and that a 
dichotomy of the independent, self-sufficient actor on the one hand, and the 
dependent, vulnerable, elderly care receiver on the other hand, is created. In this 
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image, there is one person being active in the process, being the independent actor, 
and there is another person being dependent on the former, this is the dependent, 
passive ‘actor’. I argued that desiring and imagining the ideal of independent living as 
long as possible sketches an ideology that contradicts many values of care. The 
persistence of values of independence and self-reliance has important consequences 
for all those involved in caring relations. Any divergence from the independent actor is 
seen to be inferior to the ideal. Dependency is furthermore linked to life in institutional 
settings in which people are left to others’ goodwill. The home, on the other hand, is 
constructed in a sense that it enables independent living. An interesting paradox, 
referring to the heroic action of giving (caring), was that people want to care and be 
there for each other, but that they do not want to be cared for and do not want to be 
dependent on others. The virtue of giving can thus be contrasted with a horror of 
taking. Some criticism and challenges of the dichotomy could be identified and a focus 
on interdependence, empowerment and mutuality could be found. However, I argued 
that the focus on mutual dependencies is again highlighting mutuality, deservingness 
and self-relying actors and it does thus not provide a new understanding of human life 
and relationships. The ideal of independence can and has also been seen as a demand 
and a challenge of society for many people.  
 
Chapter 8 took up the theme of the creation of clear identities of dependent or 
independent actors and brought it together with another theme running through the 
whole study, the creation of dichotomies and the limits of a commodification of care. 
I have demonstrated and argued that care is ideologically and morally positioned in 
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opposition to work, employment, politics, bureaucracy and markets. The aversions 
against institutionalisation, professionalistion, instrumentality and politics lead to a 
construction of a dichotomy of care and work through which care is positioned in 
opposition to the world of markets, paid work and economic individualism. The 
‘pricelessness’ of care is seen as a gift to both the elderly but also to society. Praising 
unpaid carers as morally superior places them outside normal citizenship and affects 
them in any choice they make, simply because the discourse around care presents 
them as morally superior. A commodification or professionalisation of care is difficult 
since the logic of the market challenges the moral understanding of care. Two 
‘hostile worlds’ are created in the discursive construction of care and the dichotomy 
is reproduced in narratives, ideals and opinions. Additionally I argued for a rethinking 
of carers’ identities. The carer is referred to not as someone providing certain 
services, but rather as being the carer. Care is not primarily understood as the 
fulfilment of a set of divided tasks; rather it is a complex relationship between the 
person in need of care, the carer and the environment. The sphere of markets is 
identified with a buying and selling of services and specific tasks, while the sphere of 
care refers to the presence and commitment of people close to one.  
 
A new ethics of care 
The construction of a moral framework around the notion of love and in contrast to 
work must be understood as highly feminised, in a sense in which it is ‘characterised 
not by gender but theme’ (Gilligan 1982:2). Authors of the ethics of care approach 
have shown that society’s notion of morality is traditionally based upon a gendered 
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differentiation which also leads to differences in the values attached to certain 
modes of morality. Taking up my use of Zelizer’s concept of the ‘two hostile camps’, 
laid out and applied particularly in chapter 8, the gendered notion of morality is also 
expressed in the construction of care in opposition to reason, rationality and 
economic transaction. Thus, the ‘natural care relationship’ is understood to be one 
based on emotional virtues, closeness and attachment rather than reasoning. 
 
Bubeck (1995) argues that care as both an activity and attitude is deeply related to 
femininity (1995:160) and that the pressure on women to care is exercised indirectly 
through social norms and institutions constituting power hierarchies. Bubeck argues 
that the strong opposition of care and work that is created is the relevant force that 
exploits women in the realm of care. Williams (1989:7) holds that the state’s focus on 
women’s dependency and responsibility for care is related to the historical 
construction of welfare states and the organisation of care. Fraser (2003b:220) 
addresses this problem of the marginalisation of care and its reduction to self-
sacrifice and moral responsibility. Women and all other low status groups are 
vulnerable because they are constructed as morally superior in a moral order that 
favours this moral responsibility but defines it as a priceless, emotional act rather 
than work. This places them outside the realm of work and citizenship.  
 
Importantly, this thesis has also shown that there is some progressive value in the 
care discourses. On the one hand, the construction of care reproduces the 
marginalised and vulnerable position of both carers and cared for by focusing on the 
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idea of ‘being there for each other’. On the other hand, however, this discursive 
practice also constructs care as a counter-discourse. Using associated discourses, 
such as childcare (see chapter 6), I argued that a picture of the ideal of community 
has emerged which enables security and safety in an ever faster developing 
environment. Community also needs to be seen as a counter-discourse within an 
individualised, economised and marketised world and I have also pointed towards 
the positive aspects of non-traditional forms of care and responsibility for care. I 
mentioned a tendency in some discussions to see community as a modern answer to 
the demands of care for elderly people; community might replace traditional forms 
of family responsibilities. The nostalgia also includes an acknowledgment that 
traditional forms of living cannot be brought back. Community in that sense rather 
describes a contrast to marketisation and individualisation of modern life. Similarly 
the construction and the fear of dependency (chapter 7) and the construction of 
dichotomies and the challenges for commodified and professionalised care (chapter 
8) demonstrate a partial acceptance and acknowledgement of relating and being 
there for each other and showed some criticism of an ideal of individualisation and 
self-dependency.  
 
The moral context of care might contribute to a new understanding of much of the 
literature on care provision, informal care, professional arrangements and 
vulnerability of both carers and cared for. By treating the two countries as case 
studies I hope I have demonstrated that broader moral constructions go beyond 
national social policy arrangements. Literature focusing on new concepts of care can 
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benefit from an understanding of the importance of these moral discursive 
constructs.  
 
I also asked whether the moral conception of care can be contested and challenged 
and throughout the thesis I have identified potential counter-discourses, 
ambivalences and tensions in people’s accounts. At the same time the question 
arose, what political potential the analysis of this discourses might give. Norms and 
values in society can be influenced and changed by political action in an attempt to 
combine a focus on the moral grammar in a society with the socio-economic context. 
The idea that collective action can and should lead to changes in the moral 
framework of a society (see Rosenbeck 1998) points to the possibilities of an active 
creation of the moral meaning of care. One example how political intervention can 
change a moral grammar of a society could be the Scandinavian Social Democratic 
discussion of gender (see Siim 1987, 1993; Karlsson 1998; Wærness 1998). 
Governments have implemented various policies with respect to gender equality, 
care responsibilities and the distinction between public and private in the everyday 
life (see Rosenbeck 1998) and it is argued (Sörensen and Bergqvist 2002) that the 
policies on issues of care and gender equality were also meant to abandon 
traditional roles and identities of men and women. This implies an explicit idea of 
social change through political intervention in which the notion of ‘”gender” was 
conceptually transformed from a synonym for “divisions of work” to a synonym for 
“values” and “interests”’ (Skjeie and Siim 2000:354). As Hernes (1987; also Skjeie and 
Siim 2000 on the importance of social movements and Sörensen and Bergqvist 2002 
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on women’s mobilisation) convincingly shows, the intended change was explicitly 
based on a notion of the acting subjects in two ways: women’s agitation 
(‘feminization from below’) and the change of government policies (‘state feminism 
from above’).  
 
For the discussion of the moral framework of care this means that a moral grammar 
can be challenged by political intervention. At the same time, however, other 
spheres of public discourses need to be considered in order to enable a 
reconfiguration of people’s understanding of care. Another aim of this research was 
to explore the paradox that care is valued very highly but marginalised politically. In 
chapter 8 I have discussed people’s ambivalent position to the role of politics. On the 
one hand politics is seen as interfering with the ‘natural’ provision and organisation 
of care, on the other hand, political intervention is desired to enable and secure the 
very natural care. I would argue that a rethinking of the dichotomy of care and work 
needs to be attempted. If economic exchange and intimate, loving involvement are 
not understood as contradictions anymore, political interventions can create new 
arrangements for those caring and those being cared for. It is inevitable for those 
involved in care but also for society in general to bring care and intimacy onto the 
political agenda. My research shows that care and politics, care and work and 
intimacy and markets are seen and constructed as moral and ideological opposites. 
Care is representing an ideal world but it is a world against the dominant, hegemonic 
focus. This is a broad reproduction of the public-private distinction, of the ethics of 
care against a work ethic, of feminisation against the masculine dominant ideology; it 
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provides, however, also a potential to intervene in the discourses which shape 
dominant societal arrangements. People’s desires to be there for each other can be 
seen as a starting point for a political ethics of care. Consciousness needs to be raised 
that taking care out of the private realm and making it a centre focus for the public 
world need not mean to reconstruct it under the umbrella of marketisation and 
professionalisation. A public focus on relating and being there for each other needs 
to be reconstructed to allow attention for the negative and potentially exploitative 
consequences of traditional care arrangements, while, at the same time, 
acknowledging and valuing the desires and feelings people associate with ‘ideal 
care’. Care as a concept challenging what with Marcuse (2006) could be called the 
‘one-dimensional society’ must not be understood as the imagination based on 
nostalgia in its traditional sense. As described in chapter 6 imagination of a different 
way of societal living also entails progressive, forward-looking aspects which would 
need to be strengthened and supported. The private space in its traditional 
conception, however, is not the focus of a progressive conceptualisation of care. 
Rather, the relational aspects and the aversion against instrumentalisation and 
institutionalisation can provide a new ethical understanding. 
 
Care is constructed as intimacy, as a feeling, as love and an ideal of ‘being there for 
each other’. In chapter 8 I have argued that the construction of the two hostile 
worlds needs to be challenged, reconciled and overcome. A combination of financial 
transactions with intimate care is happening and theoretically, asymmetrical 
relationships need not be harmfully hierarchical. In that sense professionalism and 
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employment do not necessarily mean a non-attachment, or a non-intimate 
relationship. A political recognition of the construction of dichotomies and problems 
associated with this construction is needed. Care should not be seen as an opposite 
to work and markets but as a prerequisite for the existence of those. In many ways 
care is only recognised as it can be described as ‘work’. Carers are recognised for 
their contribution as they perform useful work for society. I would propose, 
however, that the focus on work itself is the problem and care needs to be 
recognised as a practice reflecting desires and wishes in and of society. Not because 
it involves work but because it is a deeply human practice care needs to be valued. 
That would also mean that individuals do not need to refer to traditional structures 
for the provision of care (which often lead to marginalisation and exploitation); 
rather care as a responsibility for each other should become a more prominent 
aspect of societal arrangement. Young (2002:55) talks about meaningful work in that 
context: 
An ideal of meaningful work says that work people do ought to be clearly 
connected to social uses and should be recognized by others for its contribution 
to the well-being of persons or their dwelling environments or to the well-being 
of other creatures and their dwelling environments 
 
The construction of care in contrast to the dominant neoliberal market logic can 
foster a progressive, emancipatory approach to a new understanding of society. 
What is needed is a new language and a new moral grammar which enable a 
combination of loving and dedicated ‘being there for each other’ with the values of 
equality, autonomy and justice. A new ethics of care, trying to bridge the demands of 
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a focus on relationality and individual justice, would help, on the one hand, those 
involved with and confronted by caring relations and, on the other hand, society in 
general. The paradox situation that people idealise care as a process of being there 
for each other, imagined as a process based on love and intimacy, and at the same 
time are anxious about becoming dependent on others, can similarly only be 
resolved by understanding what people associate with care and by valuing what care 
really means for them and for society. If the ideal of care (and its associated moral 
expression) becomes a dominant understanding in society tensions and 
contradictions in people’s feelings and emotions can be addressed. For that the 
discussion in chapter 7 is particularly important. Independence in the sense of self-
sufficiency as an ideological ideal needs to be challenged and replaced by an 
acknowledgement of mutual and sometimes not mutual dependencies on each 
other. Young (2002) argues that self-sufficiency is impossible but seductive. She 
proposes a different understanding of autonomy in which ‘forms of dependence and 
interdependence (...) should be understood as normal conditions of being 
autonomous’ (Young 2002:47). Autonomy, understood in this way requires social 
support and recognition of our dependency on each other. A political and discursive 
intervention starting with the recognition of dependency would enable an approach 
which fulfils people’s desire for someone providing loving, intimate ‘being there for 
each other’, but at the same time does not create vulnerability to exploitation.  
 
Caring is a moral practice in two ways: people who are in caring relationships draw 
on a moral grammar to understand their situation and to decide on what is the right 
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thing to do. Secondly, care represents a particular moral ideal for both the individual 
and society in general. Both of these aspects need to be recognised for the design of 
specific policies in the context of care, for intervention into the moral and cultural 
care discourses and for an understanding of what is imagined to be a good life.   
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